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This doctoral dissertation illustrates how the typically coordinated market economy of 
Germany fosters the creation of radical innovation. The findings of this thesis are in sharp 
contrast with theoretical expectations for the crucial case of Germany. The changes in the 
German institutional framework, including the labour market, corporate governance, 
financial institutions and skill creation since re-unification are illustrated. The influence of 
government policy on institutional change is analysed. Propositions of different approaches 
to the political and economic theory are discussed in the light of te findings. An enhanced 
theoretical framework for the support of new and emerging technologies in the coordinated 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Coordinated market economies hold their comparative economic advantage in 
incremental trajectories of innovation.  
This doctoral dissertation aims to call the underlying proposition of 
comparative political economy and, specifically, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach into question. The introductory chapter gives a first impression of the 
motivation and purpose for writing this doctoral dissertation on Radical Innovation 
in a Coordinated Market Economy: Institutional Capabilities within Germany and 
Beyond. The four research questions of this thesis, derived from the motivation and 
purpose, are presented in the Section 1.2, followed by the proposed methodology 
used in the study. The structure of this thesis is briefly illustrated in Section 1.4. The 
contributions to knowledge of this study are summarised in Section 1.5. 
 
1.1.  Motivation and Purpose 
The role of innovation in economic development has been discussed at length in 
academia, industry, and society. Kestenbaum (2009, 7) states tha  “Innovation is 
actually driving business growth […] innovative firms grow twice as fast, both in 
employment and sales, as companies that fail to innovate”. Tellis, Prabhu and 
Chandy (2009) argue that it is widely acknowledged that in terms of innovations and 
their impact on both the industry and the firm level, significant differences exist 
between radical and incremental innovations. In the search for national economic 
growth, it is not only important to identify radical innovation, but also the ways in 
which it is created. Different authors argue that innovative capabilities and especially 
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radical innovation “varies substantially in firms across nations (Diamond 1999; 
Furman, Porter, and Stern 2002; Landes 1999)” (Tellis et al. 2009, 3), and also across 
different industrial sectors (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, Sainio, and Jauhiainen 2008). In 
the search for an answer on how to create radical innovation, and with the economic 
growth in Western developed nations, some influential approaches have been 
proposed in political economy. These include the Business Systems approach 
(Whitley 2000; Whitley 1999; Whitley 2005; Carney and Witt 2012), the National 
System of Innovation approach (Nelson 1993; Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995; 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000), and the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Dore 
2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancke 1999; Casper, Lehrer and Soskice 1999) which 
are considered key approaches for this thesis, alongside the literature on Welfare 
Capitalism (Esping-Anderson 1990a).  
Each of these approaches focuses on the search for the source of innovative 
capabilities, acknowledging the role of the firm in creating innovation within a 
nation’s institutional setting. VoC is a very powerful approach in comparative social 
science, not only due to its implications for institutional theory or innovation 
management. In contrast to other approaches, the VoC approach offers a conclusive 
framework for the concept of comparative economic advantage (CEA) between 
nations, offering a modern kind of division of work between nations. In Typologies 
of Capitalism, Colin Crouch (2009, 89) describes how social science often tries to 
construct “rough, tough macho theory that concentrates on the big picture and 
ignores detail.” As a result of simplification, VoC theory continuously dichotomises 
high-income Western countries into groups such as CMEs and LMEs, ascribing to 




At the outset, this doctoral dissertation appears to be paradoxical in the face 
of the VoC approach. The institutional foundations of Germany as a typical CME are 
not expected to let German firms prosper in radical trajectories of innovation. It is 
essential for the theory of CEA within the VoC approach, that CMEs specialise their 
production on so-called incrementally innovative sectors, while LMEs focus their 
production on radically innovative sectors. The second expectation of previous 
approaches to comparative capitalism i  of a liberalisation of CMEs, at least in times 
of crisis. Facing the great recession of 2008 and the crisis of the neo-liberal model of 
capitalism itself (Chorev and Babb 2009; Nesvetailova and Palan 2010), real life 
undermines this proposition, calling it into question. The simple determinist 
proposition of liberalism leading to radical innovation, which underlies the VoC 
argument, is criticised in this thesis.  
My key motivation in writing this thesis is to develop an understanding of the 
complex relationship between national institutions, social and economic policy, and 
skill creation to support product specialisation by German firms in new technologies. 
A further development in our understanding of the influence of a national 
institutional framework upon the nation's ability to create for example, various levels 
of skill equilibria, which have an effect on innovation, is also of high relevance. 
The first purpose of this thesis is to evaluate whether the institutional 
foundations underlying the German NIS have changed since reunification. The 
debate on the fit between institutional set-ups and national trajectories towards 
innovation has been intensified by the pressures for institutional change following 
the European sovereign debt crisis in 2008 and the ongoing effects of the crisis. 
Stratfor (2016) publishes a timeline of the ongoing effects of the European crisis 
since 2008. In The Crisis of the European Union: Weakening of the EU Social 
Model, Vincent Navarro and John Schmitt (2008) argue that a weakening of the 
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entire European Union social model takes place due to the crisis. It is claimed that 
outcomes of the EU crisis could lead towards destabilisation of the social model 
underlying the idea of a European Union. In, An Introduction to Varieties of 
Capitalism, Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) argue for likely institutional change 
to coordinated market economies (CME, mainly in continental European countries) 
in times of crisis. Their approach suggests a liberalisation of CMEs due to external 
shock. In response to this proposition, the first purpose of this thesis will be to find 
out whether a change occurred, and, if yes, whether this change took place in the 
expected direction of liberalisation. A second purpose is to see how government 
policies and regulation have affected the institutional foundations of the German 
NIS. To what extent was and is social and economic policy-making in Germany 
relevant for its development as an NIS? The third purpose of this thesis is to analyse 
the ability of German firms to produce radical innovation from a comparative 
perspective. The perception of Germany as being weak in the creation of radical 
innovation is discussed, and the need to re-think this argument is illustrated. The last 
purpose is to analyse in what ways the skill formation system in Germany has 
oppressed or fostered radical trajectories of innovation in the country throughout the 
past three decades. Following Bob Hancke and Michelle Goyer in Degrees of 
freedom: Rethinking the institutional analysis of economic change (2005), changes in 
the skill formation system are supposed to be illustrated from a differentiated view, 
acknowledging various levels of skills. This thesis aims to illustrate the relevance of 
skill formation for the process of creating innovative capabilities in Germany. 
A last but very critical purpose of this dissertation is to rethink the concept of 
a rational worker underlying political economic theory. Emotional perceptions (e.g. 
fear) of emerging technologies not only influence policy making, but also a firm’s 
product market choice and individual decision-making regarding skill creation. Not 
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only is human knowledge restricted, but a human’s ability to foresee the possibility 
of future fields of work is limited. Individual decision-making in skill creation is a 
non-rational process, likely to follow certain rules. It is the principal purpose of this 
thesis to establish a picture of the non-rational human beings underlying political 
economy. In this instance, it is illustrated how social policy, welfare systems and skill 
creation interplay in Germany and why national innovation management in Germany 
not only has to be viewed from a political or institutional perspective but other 
perspectives as well. It is part of national innovation management to foster societal 
development that is accepting of new technology fields (e.g. biotechnology). 
 
1.2. Research Questions  
This thesis asks how the institutional framework of Germany interacts in order t  
enable firms to create innovation capabilities in so-called radically innovative 
sectors. This section raises four research questions to di cuss this topic.  
Three institutional approaches to political economy focus on the production 
of innovation within the borders of the nation-state: Business Systems (BS), National 
Systems of Innovation (NIS) and Varieties of Capitalism (VoC). While NIS focuses 
on the creation of knowledge and innovation in a national context, the latter two 
approaches categorise country groups depending on their degree of coordination 
between national actors. They further analyse changes in these institutional spheres 
and the impact of certain institutional characteristics on a nation's production and 
innovation behaviour. Within the institutional framework, “[i]n sum, firms have a 
number of choices in developing innovative competences and selecting innovation 
strategies that are guided by dominant institutions” (Whitley 2002, 523). In the 
Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, Hall and Soskice |(2001) argue for the 
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relative stability of national institutional complementarities, enabling a stable CEA 
between nations. They do further claim that "[e]conomic shocks and interim attempts 
to cope with them can unsettle such understandings." Following this perspective, 
they expect "CMEs (to) deregulate to become more like LMEs" (Hall and Soskice 
2001, 63). VoC does imply that external pressures cause institutional transformation 
e.g. in terms of corporate governance and ownership (Hall and Soskice 2001; Casper 
2001; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Aoki 2011; Goyer 2006). It does also imply a 
global labour market (Goyer, Reinecke, and Donaghey 2014) and skill formation 
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001a; Nickel 2011; Brown, Green, and Lauder 
2001; Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012). The global crisis of 2008 has led to a 
societal recap of liberal capitalism's role in the world economy, leaving this 
proposition about the liberalisation of CMEs in question. The question of 
institutional non-change within CMEs is not only relevant for institutional change 
theory, but also for national innovation management. It is of great interest to 
investigate whether a change in institutions can influence a firm's product market 
choice as well. Such changes could have implications for CEA approach in VoC, 
leading to a different image of national economic growth in the face of globalisation. 
Thus, the first research question is: 
 
Research Question I: 
In what ways have the institutional foundations underlying the German NIS 
changed since reunification?  
 
 The second question derives from a lack of theoretical background. As stated 
by Colin Crouch in Typologies of Capitalism (2009), the nation-state is of great 
importance for the determination of many socio-economic variables. To avoid 
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discussions about economic and social policy, many macro-level neo-
institutionalists‘ postulate virtually hermetically sealed national institutions (Crouch 
2009). Research in the area of comparative capitalism does, therefore, mostly focus 
on the national level (Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999; Lundvall 1999, 2007). 
Besides the obvious methodological advantages, e.g. in terms of available data in 
analysing the issues on the nation state level, instead of certain economic and social 
policies, comparative capitalists are “eager to play down the implications of 
globalization” (Crouch 2009, 91). Additionally, as demonstrated in the VoC, BS and 
NIS approaches, the role of globalization e.g. in the creation of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and their own systems of regulation and pressure on national 
regulation is often abolished. For this doctoral dissertation, it is important not only to 
view the German case from a macro perspective but to understand HOW institutions 
and policy interplay in the creation of innovative capabilities, within t e case of 
Germany. It is important to investigate the role of government policy and regulation 
in the development of radical innovation and comparative economic advantage. 
Institutional foundations which lead national trajectories of innovation are sensitive 
to policy change, e.g. regarding labour market policy, skill formation, corporate 
governance regulation, financial regulation, trade policy, etc. (Lee and Yoo 2007). It 
is important to identify the effects of regulatory change on national institutions 
relevant for the production of different kinds of innovation within Germany. Another 
question is about the possible effects of such intervention. If a government intervenes 
in labour market flexibility, social protection or the skill formation system, does this 






Research Question II: 
How do government policies and regulations affect the institutional 
 foundations of the German NIS? 
  
 By establishing a conclusive framework for the relationship between a 
capitalist nation’s institutional framework, and its economic performance in the form 
of innovation behaviour, VoC theory has proved to be a ground-breaking approach in 
the field of comparative political economy. The VoC approach holds that “variance 
in political institutions is the primary cause of differences in national innovative 
behavior” (Taylor 2004, 601). Where the market is allowed to structure itself for the 
most part, due to flexible labour and loose market relations, the economy is expected 
to specialise in the production of radical innovation. A high degree of market 
coordination, due to e.g. labour unions and long-time contracts, as well as 
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance and internal financing, in turn, is expected 
to lead to specialization in incremental innovation. This approach matters, because it 
brings the theory of institutionalism to a point where it explains the Holy Grail of 
economists – economic success (in the form of radical innovation). It provides the 
reader with a simple and easy to understand answer on how to create this economic 
success: Liberalism. One proposition underlying the VoC framework is based on the 
idea that CMEs specialise in the production of incremental innovation. The 
proposition of the typical CME – which would indicate that Germany is insufficient 
to produce new and emerging technologies – cries out to be challenged. In the face of 
Germany's economic performance, especially in the global economic crisis of 2008 
and after, it appears to be of high-interest whether German firms’ product market 
choice really follows incremental trajectories of innovation, characterised by old 
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technology fields at the end of their product lifecycle. A third research question 
emerges: 
 
Research Question III: 
How does German capitalism perform in terms of firm capability to produce 
radical innovation from a comparative perspective?  
 
 The highly institutional framework, which leads to the strategic decisions of 
German corporations, is frequently discussed in various fields of debate, being 
referred to as a Neo-Corporatist, Socialist, or Welfare-Production Regime, to 
mention a few of the terms applied. This discussion appeared to be surprisingly 
entertaining e.g. in the past U.S. elections. Different concepts were mainly mixed up 
(answers.yahoo.com 2016; DEBATE.org 2016; QUORA 2016), calling Germany a 
socialist regime – in direct comparison to Venezuela. Some of the post-WWII images 
of German institutions seem to have entered a professional stage of confusion by 
influencing political debates and academic research (Geyer 1984; Iversen 2005; 
Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001a; Svallfors 2003). During the 1980s and 
1990s, approaches in the field of comparative capitalism that traditionally focused on 
institutional spheres, such as the financial system, corporate governance, and the 
labour market, were extended to take into account the perspective of human well-
being within the nation. Different concepts of welfare capitalism (Esping-Anderson 
1990a; Ronald Dore and Andreff 2002; Van Kersbergen 1995) were developed, 
based upon the perspective of equality in various capitalist systems (Hicks and 
Kenworthy 2003; Kenworthy 1999; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005). This led to the 
rise of different questions, such as Do Welfare States lead to better conditions for the 
poor? Does social policy conquer the principles of capitalism? How does labour 
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marked rigidity (due to (un-) employment protection) influence the skill formation 
system? Is liberal capitalism leading to equality (American dream)? Is it "fair" to 
help some people (the poor) and does this threaten the chances of "the hard working 
people" to earn their living? In Social Protection and Skill Formation, Estevez-Abe, 
Iversen and Soskice (2001b, 147) describe inequality regarding issues "based on the 
academic background of workers, (…) [or] based on gender" only. An obvious 
shortcoming of their approach is evident in the area of gender equality, in that their 
premise is based on the assumption that human beings are rational entities. The 
authors argue that "(…) even women who are willing to invest in skill training will 
rationally choose trades and professions where there are few men" (Estevez-Abe, 
Iversen and Soskice 2001b, 159). Thus, discrimination is not talked about except as 
the rational choice of women themselves. This provides a definition of equality 
limited to an idea that gender issues are a question of choice. The argument is that 
while women choose educational paths and job positions which lead them into areas 
of lower pay and less leadership, men choose the opposite. A further implication is 
that skill creation in women is mainly led by their desire to fulfill the role of a 
mother. Providing for children does not need a high-skill equilibrium for women. 
Investing in general skills would, therefore, not constitute a rational choice. The 
authors do further argue for a linear relationship between social policy and skill 
formation. National skill equilibria would further lead the nation's firms’ product 
market choice and, with this, innovation.  
 "It is important to note that relative abundance of high levels of general 
 skills (i.e. university and postgraduate qualifications) brings comparative 
 advantages in radical product innovation (…) a flexible labor market with 
 university educated people combining excellent  general skills with 
 valuable knowledge about the industry acquiring from  switching from one 
 job to another. (…) biotechnology, segments of the  telecommunications 
 sector (…) are other examples that fall into this class." (Estevez-Abe, 




While the US is repeatedly used as a major example of the interrelationship between 
general skills and radical innovation, Germany is downgraded to a country producing 
firm-specific or, occasionally, industry-specific skill equilibria. The skill creation 
system which is argued to exist in Germany, as previously described, is due to social 
policy and labour market rigidity being ruled by a welfare production regime, which 
leads to incremental product market choices by firms and besides this, it "perpetuates 
inequality" (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice 2001b, 155). The VoC approach 
constructs an overall picture of a Welfare-Skill Formation Nexus in Germany. 
Underlying all propositions guiding Estevez-Abe, Iversen, Soskice and Hall, but also 
Mares and Thelen's arguments there is the belief in the existence of a rational 
worker. The author of this dissertation does not make an assumption of rational 
workers for the ongoing discussion since neither the existence of a single rational 
worker nor any rational human being can reasonably be expected. Within the 
population of mentally healthy human beings, we can find decision-making strategies 
which follow patterns of e.g. cognitive dissonance reduction, or fairness. Due to a 
lack of research, many areas of human decision-making have not yet been explored. 
This is no reason to call the black box of the human brain "rational". The welfare 
state in VoC is described as an artificial construct of corporations. It only exists due 
to national firms’ influence over the government. These companies desire to 
specialise their product market strategies through incremental innovation, which is 
argued to be the comparative economic advantage that these businesses ultimately 
use in a globalised working order. The complex relationship between corporations, 
welfare, labour market regulation, skill formation and innovation is of high relevance 





Research Question IV: 
In what ways has the skill formation system of Germany oppressed or fostered 
radical trajectories of innovation in the country during the past three decades? 
 
 In this sense, it is critical to analyse how the social policy and labour market 
changes of the German political economy, since reunification, may have influenced 
the national skill formation system and, with this, the skill equilibria available to 
firms. In a second step, it is important to discuss whether the changes in national skill 
equilibria might have had an effect on firms’ product market choices, and national 
trajectories of innovation. A discussion of the origin of change in social policy issues 
is important for the wider context of understanding the action and functioning of the 
social capitalist. An evaluation of the influence of corporations in policy making is of 
interest for theory.  
 
1.3. Methodology 
It is important to illustrate how this thesis attempts to answer the research questions. 
This part of the introduction provides a short introduction to the research 
methodology. For answering the research questions, the typical case of a CME, 
Germany, is selected. It is illustrated how the three approaches that are most relevant 
to this thesis (NIS, BS and VoC) identify Germany as a typical case in terms of 
coordination. Germany is crucial in the wider argument of a coordinated institutional 
outlook, leading to the focus of national corporations on product markets which 
follow incremental trajectories of innovation. During the following chapters, the 
deductive-nomological model (Hempel 1962) of explanation, underlying the 
argumentation for the comparative historical analysis of VoC, is divided into its 
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separate parts of explanans and explanandum. In the case of the German CME, 
theory expects a focus on incremental trajectories of innovation. This explanandum 
phenomenon is the proposed logical result or output of the institutional determinants 
empirically identified by different authors. These institutional input factors for the 
process of creating certain types of innovation are the explanans in the described 
analytical model. General laws of logic (general skills leading to radical innovation) 
are presented to the reader in the context of specific occurrences from the observed 
cases. The following theoretical chapters discuss the validity of each of the 
explanans that was taken for granted in the influential theory, in detail.  
For the empirical part, this dissertation uses a congruence analysis approach 
(CON) for the explanatory case study research of the critical case Germany. For 
explanatory case studies, small numbers of variables are usually selected (Blatter and 
Haverland 2012). In line with the CON approach to explanatory case studies, this 
thesis deduces propositions from the relevant theories that have been selected and 
specified ex-ante. These propositions are not treated as variables as such but, 
moreover, are used to determine whether the expectations formulated by the pre-
existing theory on comparative capitalism are confirmed or contradict in the crucial 
case of Germany. The term critical case study is used in terms of a case which 
enables one to demonstrate that even under the “most likely circumstances for the 
causality or argument to hold, it does not” (Hancke 2009, 68) and that thus the 
original theory must have deeply problematic sides. This analytical strategy is 
followed in the empirical chapters of this thesis, illustrating the performance of 
German firms in so-called radically innovative sectors throughout the past 25 years 
and the (non-) change of the institutional framework in Germany. As a result of the 
analysis of this thesis, a set of confirmations and contradictions for each of the 
propositions is identified. In a second analytical step, the differences identified 
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between expectations and observations are used in order to combine the different 
theories into a comprehensive explanation. This thesis discusses insights from the 
analysis of the research questions to consider pre-existing theories. The relevance of 
the implications is viewed within a wider discourse. Comparative historical methods 
have a long tradition in political economy. Due to the case-specific focus of this 
dissertation, the comparative analysis can only be conducted in terms of comparative 
outlooks, particularly in the analysis chapter. An in-depth analysis of the institutional 
variables two CMEs is not intended in the methodology of this dissertation. Case 
specific in-depth analysis with a timeframe since reunification is necessary for a deep 
understanding of HOW institutions and innovation interact. It is not possible to 
understand the complexity of the political and institutional interaction of a nation if 
these factors are only viewed on one level, at one time or without at least a short look 
at practice in other comparable nations. A statistical design could never capture the 
complexity of political and institutional interaction in fostering innovative 
capabilities in Germany. It is not a goal of this thesis to generalise the findings to 
other nations. The methodological goal is a high degree of internal validity. The 
explanans which were used in VoC theory and wider comparative capitalism 
literature are re-thought. One goal of this thesis is not only to criticise the VoC 
approach and illustrate its simplicity and false arguments on different levels but to 
incorporate into the diversity of capitalism theory which treats the creation of 
innovative capabilities a notion of national skill equilibrium, interacting with 




1.4.  The Structure of the Thesis 
This doctoral dissertation is organised into nine chapters: This Introduction is 
followed by the Review of Innovation Literature. Chapter one, Introduction, provides 
the background and motivation for this study. It explains the purpose and raises the 
research questions, methodology and contributions briefly. The second chapter 
reviews relevant literature in the field of innovation management. It describes the 
emergence of innovation research and, with this, the construction of different 
innovation models in management research. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the 
context within which the pre-existing theories were developed and to access how 
approaches developed. One focus is on innovation literature from an institutional 
perspective. A second focus is on innovation literature regarding coordinated market 
economies in general and Germany in particular. This chapter clarifies the theoretical 
and empirical gap in understanding institutional change and, in particular, skill 
formation, the labour market and corporate governance and financial institutions for 
the emergence of radical trajectories of innovation in coordinated market economies. 
It sets existing theories in wider contexts and considers the origins of propositions 
underlying different theories. The relationship between and relevance of the concepts 
of institutional complementarity and comparative economic advantage are discussed.  
The third chapter is the Theoretical Framework, followed by the fourth 
chapter on this study’s Methodology. In the Theoretical Framework, I develop the 
framework of analysis by incorporating the institutional approaches of NISs, BSs and 
VoC with dynamic models of innovation derived from the ideas of Schumpeter, 
Christensen and Rothwell. The second section discusses the ability of institutional 
theory in general and VoC/ NIS specifically to provide a framework for the analysis 
of trajectories of radical and incremental innovation within Germany. The influence 
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of public policy within this context is discussed. The third section discusses the 
ability of general institutionalist theory and VoC in particular to explain national 
trajectories of innovation in Germany. The supposed relationship between 
institutions and innovation is discussed. The last section draws a conclusion for 
further analysis based on the enhanced theoretical framework.  
Chapter four, the Methodology, discusses the research design, data, and 
methods for this study. In the first part of this chapter, Epistemology and Research 
Strategy, I introduce the reader to the idea of using an explanatory case study 
methodology. Yin (1981) and Jick (1979) recommend the use of a case study 
research design for explanatory purposes. As Linda Kohn (1997, 3) puts it in 
Methods in Case Study Analysis: "(...) the [case study] methodology may actually be 
more powerful for explanatory purposes in its ability to answer questions on how and 
why". The VoC perspective draws a complementary picture of LMEs specialising in 
radical innovation, while firms in CMEs specialise in the production of incremental 
innovation, in terms of sector specialisation. Using a dichotomist view, the VoC 
framework does not acknowledge the performance of German firms, in so-called 
"radical" sectors. The data analysis used in VoC appears to mislead the reader in this 
matter. The second part of this chapter is on the case selection strategy. It describes 
why Germany is chosen as a crucial case. Germany has widely been described as a 
paradigmatic case of a coordinated market economy in the VoC approach, but also in 
the NIS and BS approaches (Akkermans, Castaldi and Los 2009; Thelen 2009; 
Trampusch and Eichenberger 2012). This country, therefore, is chosen for theoretical 
reasons following inductive typical case selection strategy (see Gerring 2007; 
Seawright and Gerring 2008). The two cases observed in this dissertation are 
biotechnology and the software industry. These are described as typical cases for 
radically innovative sectors in VoC. They are selected as the two cases which are 
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most unlikely to show high performance, following the theoretical background. The 
following section, Propositions and Questions, summarises the identified 
propositions of theory which are used for answering the research questions. The next 
section is on the methods which are used for sectoral analysis. I use a mixed methods 
and mixed data approach for measuring and presenting input and output variables. 
The last section of this chapter is about Validity, Reliability, and Generalisability of 
the empirical and descriptive analysis.  
Chapter five is the first empirical chapter. It is on Institutional Change, 
Government Policy and Performance of the German Biotech Sector and is followed 
by Chapter six on Institutional Change, Government Policy, and Performance of the 
German Software Sector. Both chapters are identical in their sub-sections and 
general construction. The fifth and sixth chapters explore the historical and sector-
specific background of the two radical sectors in Germany. A short outline on the 
definition of biotech/software is followed by an overview of societal discussions and 
policy that directly concerns the two sectors. In the next step, the performance of the 
biotech sector/software sector in Germany is evaluated using the VoC method and 
different data sources (patents, publications, R&D investments and sales). The 
performance of each sector’s firms is viewed in comparison to other Western 
capitalists. 
Chapter seven is the third empirical chapter. It is on Institutional Change in 
Germany: Capabilities for Radical Trajectories of Innovation. The proposed 
institutional foundations of the German NIS are the focus of this chapter. The 
propositions are kept in mind while compared to the author’s own observations, 
including actual observable changes in institutions due to government policy. 
The eighth chapter is called Analysis and Theoretical Implications. Following 
the empirical chapters, this analysis chapter compares the expectations of previously 
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identified theories and approaches with the empirical findings. The chapter is 
constructed in six sub-sections. The first section takes  short comparative look at the 
institutional framework of different CMEs. This chapter reflects institutional changes 
in Germany from a comparative perspective and brings together different points of 
view as found in the previous chapters. This chapter reflects on the differences 
between theory and findings and presents an enhanced theoretical framework 
deriving from the findings, in the last part. 
The ninth chapter, Conclusion, Implications and Recommendations for further 
Research, provides a summary of the argument. The main conclusions of this thesis 
are presented following the research questions. Theoretical and practical 
contributions are discussed in the second section. Limitations and Research 
Implications are illustrated in the third part. The concluding remarks finalise this 
thesis. 
 
1.5.  Research Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the existing literature in different ways. It identifies 
the propositions underlying the dichotomist and determinist proposition of liberalism 
leading to radical innovation. An extensive critique of the existing theory is provided 
to the reader in order to later develop the theory.  
It is illustrated how Hall and Soskice could have drawn different conclusions, 
using the same measures of EPO data. This thesis essentially questions the logic 
behind the VoC argument and considers the reasons behind the analytical flaws. 
Implications for wider theory are illustrated.  
In the process of answering the research questions, it is found that the 
institutional framework of Germany has changed due to policy changes and 
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regulation. In spite of the changes, the institutional framework is still considered to 
be of a coordinated nature. The ability of German firms to create products in so-
called radically innovative sectors is illustrated in detail, following the cases of 
German biotech and software. Due to the enhanced theoretical framework, we expect 
the national skill equilibrium to play a central role in shifts in new and emerging 
sectors. The role of innovation policy for changes in the educational system and, in 
turn, changes in the job market can be illustrated. Germany appears to have been and 
still be a highly competitive nation in terms of these sectors, from a comparative 
perspective. An outlook on the German automobile industry’s attempts to prosper in 
future technologies illustrates the process of innovation which traditional 
corporations in Germany have chosen in order to change their product market 
strategy. The definition of radical innovation is discussed in this context and the 
relevance of differentiating between the process and the result is hown. VoC theory 
can prosper with a different notion of innovation. 
The findings of this thesis offer contributions in different areas. Theoretical 
contributions are made in the field of innovation management for re-defining radical 
innovation and identifying possible sectoral/national differences in the ways to create 
such innovation. Concepts of radical, incremental, disruptive and step-wise 
innovation are established in this thesis.  
A second theoretical contribution is the established enhanced theoretical 
framework. The new framework illustrates how radical innovation is created and 
fostered by the coordinated market economy of Germany. The framework illustrates 
changes in some areas, but especially in the logic of government policies, skill 
creation and the influence of human irrationalities on the product market strategies of 
the nation.  
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Thirdly, the theoretical and methodological explanations of VoC in relating 
institutions to innovation are being challenged. Using VoC’s very own simple 
descriptive measures for the example of Germany and focusing on radically 
innovative sector cases allows us to take a more in-depth view than the original VOC 
analysis of Hall and Soskice. The previous discussion of institutional rigidity directly 
leading to incremental innovation is questioned and a more complex relationship 
between institutional spheres, such as changes in labour market institutions and skill 
creation on multiple levels, leading to multiple changes in innovation, is elaborated 
in chapters five and eight. Chapter eight reflects on institutional change leading to 
changes in the skill formation equilibria of Germany. 
The second set of contributions from this dissertation is to give practitioners 
from different national backgrounds an impression of the possibilities of their firm’s 
product market choice. If corporations in Germany can prosper in radical trajectories 
of innovation, there should be no self-fulfilling prophecy existing for industry to 
necessarily shift R&D into an LME. More careful consideration is needed. Similarly, 
start-ups should consider their location more carefully as well. The promise of higher 
national liberalisation (e.g. possible VC investment) might not be the only factor 
influencing stable and healthy growth for a firm in the long run.  
Practical implications of this thesis are not only important for industry but 
also for policy. The role of R&D investments, LMIs and social policy and the welfare 
system for skill creation for national innovation is highly interesting. The argument 
that plain liberalisation leads to a firm’s product market specialisation in new 
technology has to be rejected. Due to these findings, it is suggested that policy 
makers from LMEs re-consider possible institutional changes and see these not only 
in the light of potential economic growth. Economic growth can be achieved using 
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different types of capitalist variety. It is suggested that simplified views of liberal 
capitalism leading to economic growth should be rejected. 
The role of the welfare state in the German process to create radical 
innovation is re-defined in this dissertation. It can be viewed not as a blockade for 
general skills, but as an enabler. In this context, it is illustrated how certain political 
instruments, which are brought in relation to a welfare state, e.g. employment and 
unemployment protection, government support for apprenticeship training and 
general education, apart from other political instruments, can be seen as highlt 
relevant to future firms’ product market choices, through the institutionalised 
theorem of individual choice in skill creation. In Skills and Skilled Work: An 
Economic and Social Analysis, Francis Green (2013, 68) illustrates how “(…) raising 
the education level of the population helps to account for GDP per capita [growth] 
through augmentation of the quality of labor.” The underlying argument is "(…) that 
greater skills enable a faster pace of technological innovation in the country" (Green 
2013, 68). Economic growth is related to the educational attainment of a group. This 
thesis sets Green’s insights in a wider context of economic theory in order to advise 
the development of general skills  
The bulk of research criticises this plain differentiation between LMEs’ 
radical innovation and CMEs’ incremental innovation (Taylor 2004; Hancké 2009; 
Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher 2007; Schneider and Paunescu 2012). These studies 
do miss out on an in-depth analysis of radical innovation and the origins of such 
within a coordinated market economy. Furthermore, the wider economic implications 
for the remaining key argument of comparative institutional advantage leading to 
certain trajectories of innovation and, with this, comparative economic advantage, 
has not yet been discussed. This dissertation scrutinises the data and propositions 
which underlie the dichotomist argument of a complementary variety of national 
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trajectories of innovation (Hancke 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Casper, Lehrer and 
Soskice 1999). It fills the previously described gaps by empirically analysing how 
CMEs’ specific institutional and policy developments slacken and contribute to 
sector-specific innovation activities. Specifically the link between labour market 
reforms in Germany and the performance of biotech and software firms within the 
institutional framework is discussed and the identified different spheres of skill 
creation within one institutional framework are highlighted. Various levels of skill 
equilibria are discussed for different kinds of innovation resulting from within one 
institutional framework.  
This chapter is an introduction to the following doctoral dissertation. It 
illustrates the motivation and purpose behind the work, followed by the emerging 
research questions. Following the research questions, the methodology on how these 
questions are answered in this thesis i  briefly introduced. The fourth section 
illustrates the structure of the chapters which follow which have been constructed in 
order to answer the research questions. The contributions of this doctoral dissertation 













2. CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF INNOVATION 
LITERATURE 
 
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the theoretical and analytical framework of 
this thesis. Since innovation is seen as a key source for economic development and 
success, a diverse range of academic fields conducts studies on this topic. Besides the 
field of engineering, researchers in the fields of management, economics, politics and 
sociology discuss diverse topics relating to innovation on different levels of analysis.  
 This critical review focuses on innovation literature which targets the 
macroeconomic context while acknowledging the role of the firm in national 
innovation. It focuses on institutional approaches in the field of political economy 
and specifically comparative capitalism. 
 A critical review of theoretical and empirical studies on innovation and the 
determinants of comparative economic advantage are discussed in the following 
sections: Section 2.1. reviews theoretical studies on innovation with a focus on 
different innovation models within the context of economic theory. Section 2.2. 
reviews the role of institutions from different theoretical perspectives in the context 
of national trajectories of innovation. In Section 2.3., studies on institutional change 
and innovation are reviewed. Section 2.4. brings together the body of innovation 
literature in the context of Germany. 
 
2.1.  From the Study of Production and Innovation to 
Comparative Economic Advantage 
In 1841, the German economist Friedrich List published The National System of 
Political Economy. List criticises Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and 
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Cause of the Wealth of Nations (1979). Smith was born in England in 1723. He died 
in 1790. The cited book is a reprint of his original work, published in 1776. He 
harshly criticises Smith's argument on free market competition in trade, e.g. his 
analysis of the treaty of commerce between England and Portugal (Smith 1979, 546). 
Within his argument, List includes a picture of a competition (e.g. wrestling fight) 
between the former German market economy symbolised by a little boy who cannot 
possibly beat a grown man (English economy) when forced into direct competition 
without regulation. He emphasises the role of customs duties and state intervention in 
international treaties of commerce and trade (List 1841, 23). List's approach stresses 
the role of governments, protective mechanisms, and the role of nation states in 
contrast to Smith's cosmopolitan vision of free trade throughout all nations. Starting 
off with his twelfth chapter, List critically evaluates Adam Smith's approach on the 
division of work and focuses on what Smith calls productive forces. He asks two 
simple questions. Firstly: (in the division of work) What is the cause of work and 
effort? Secondly: What makes our hands and feet move, so we become productive 
and produce something of value for others? His answer is clear. List emphasises the 
role of our intelligent mind, moreover he cites values, attitudes, motivation and free 
choice which are evolving and acting within the framework of societal order, defined 
by the nation state (see especially Chapter twelve, 151–152). The questions and ideas 
of Smith and List can still be found underlying some approaches in political 
economy today. Contrary to earlier economists such as Adam Smith, Joseph 
Schumpeter (in line with Friedrich List) believes that “perfectly competitive markets 
had never existed and would never exist” (Schumpeter, 1946, cited in Cantwell 2000, 
6). Schumpeter argues that this stationary state of equilibrium is interrupted by 
creative disruption, which is the creative response of the entrepreneur, who is the 
only agent of change in the circular flow, the personification of innovation, thereby 
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creating economic growth. Schumpeter further differentiates between ideas (the 
thought of a new way of doing something), inventions (a prototype of the idea) and 
innovations (a new product, process, or service which is successfully brought to the 
market). 
 The two approaches of List and Schumpeter emerged to construct the basis 
for the national innovation systems (NIS) approach. Apart from obvious adaptations 
of Schumpeterian thinking e.g. the business cycles (Freeman 1993), there are also 
similar propositions underlying NIS and Schumpeter. List constructed a direct path 
for Lundvall's (1992) book on National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning. In his book, Lundvall acknowledges the role of 
nation states, their different political economies, and institutional frameworks. He 
adds to the perspective the notions of radical and incremental innovation as deriving 
from the creation of new knowledge. He further describes innovation as a process of 
uncertainty and disruption. Lundvall (1992, 12) differentiates between technical and 
economic dimensions of innovation. These lead to an incremental process of 
innovation or a (surprisingly) radical technical and/or economic development. In 
Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter (1990) argues in favour of Smith for a 
rejection of managed trade. He uses a similar argument, e.g. "Rather than promoting 
innovation in a nation's industries, managed trade guarantees a market for inefficient 
companies" (Porter 1990, 89). Porter not only recognises economic perspectives but 
acknowledges institutions and the government's role in enabling firms to create 
innovation. "Government's proper role is as a catalyst and challenger; it is to 
encourage – or even push – companies to raise their aspirations and move to higher 
levels of competitive performance, even though this process might be inherently 
unpleasant and difficult" (Porter 1990, 87). His argument is in line with Lundvall on 
the importance of knowledge for economic development; he focuses on sectoral 
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specialisation and international competitive advantage between nations, whereas 
Lundvall concentrates on the nation itself and not on competition. The institutionalist 
NIS approach is one of the first approaches in the field of comparative capitalism, 
and it emerged broadly around 1989, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the demise 
of an alternative model to capitalism itself. Soon economics entered a debate on the 
question: "Which Capitalism will superior the other?" In Albert's (1992) 
dichotomising argument Kapitalismus contra Kapitalismus, two ways to organise 
Western societies are described. Besides the previously described economic 
competitiveness, he adds social solidarity to the debate. Michel Albert (1992) defines 
a set of three spheres which aim to symbolise social solidarity. In short, security, 
inequality and an open society are identified. Albert comes to the conclusion that 
"[I]t can be plainly demonstrated that social solidarity and competitiveness in the 
marketplace make excellent bedfellows" (Albert 1992, 148). Following Albert`s 
argument, scholars in the 1990s divide the ("free", Western, democratic) world 
(which is obviously limited to a specific range of wealthy nations) into two. The first 
group includes mainly English-speaking countries, representing the Anglo-Saxon 
model of capitalism. Exaggeratedly-speaking, these nations are organised around 
neo-liberal cutthroat capitalism which abandons social policy wherever possible. A 
second group encompasses the Rhenish model, often represented by Germany, as a 
social capitalist society with an emphasis on egalitarianism (see Albert 1992). 
Contrary to this dichotomist approach and focusing on the welfare state, Esping-
Anderson differentiates liberal Capitalism from a Continental European model 
(Germany), and a third social-democratic model, which is geographically associated 
with Scandinavia (Esping-Anderson 1996, 1990). In Divergent Capitalisms: The 
Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems, Richard Whitley (1999) adds the 
perspectives of societal institutions such as trust, but also culture, to the discussion. 
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He is following Lundvall in taking the historical and cultural developments of a 
country into account and evaluating the path-dependent institutional and 
technological advances of business systems within nation states. His emphasis is not 
so much on the creation of knowledge but the link between corporate governance 
(specifically ownership coordination) and labour. Within his book, Whitley builds up 
the basis for his argument on business systems’ in titutional differences being the 
driver for variation in a nation's innovative performance. In The Institutional 
Structuring of Innovation Strategies: Business Systems, Firm Types and Patterns of 
Technical Change in Different Market Economies, Whitley (2000) differentiates 
between five kinds of innovation strategies (dependent, craft-based responsive, 
generic, complex and risky, and transformative). With the rise of globalization, 
intensified by digitalisation, some scholars argue that the institutional features of 
capitalist countries would now be under such pressure that only the one most 
competitive model could prevail. The harsher model of liberal capitalism, with the 
USA as the best practice model, is said to prevail over the European model in the 
long run. A liberalisation of the Rhenish capitalists has been presumed. These 
leverages are well-illustrated in Hall and Soskice's (2001) An Introduction to 
Varieties of Capitalism. Hall and Soskice`s dichotomous approach divides the world 
into coordinated and liberal market economies. Even though this theory declares a 
right and need to exist to coordinated capitalism in the first place, it does later argue 
for the slow liberalisation of CMEs in times of crisis. The main argument of VoC is a 
simplified interconnection between a nation's institutional framework and its ability 
to produce radical OR incremental innovation. "The key distinction we draw is 
between radical innovation, which entails substantial shifts in product lines, the 
development of entirely new goods, or major changes of the production process, and 
incremental innovation, marked by continuous but small-scale improvements to 
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existing product lines and production processes" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 38–39). 
Opposed to Anderson and Albert's argument, CMEs are said to be ruled by welfare 
production regimes (WPR), which is the reason for the continued existence of 
coordinated capitalism. The WPRs in CMEs are argued to be allowed and sustained 
by corporations’ influence over government: "(...) quasi-corporatist regimes [which] 
provide producers with influence over government" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 49). It is 
assumed that corporations influence government policy-making, to create high levels 
of social protection, namely employment protection, unemployment protection, and, 
with restrictions, wage protection, which in turn reinforce employees’ skill 
trajectories of firm or industry specific skills needed by corporations to contribute to 
the company's product market strategies of incremental innovation. The presumed 
inequality is an unwanted but accepted side effect of the WPR. In Firms and the 
Welfare State Isabela Mares (2001) continues this argument by interconnecting VoC 
theory with a theory on varieties of welfare regimes. Her argument is on the re-
distribution of risk in society and on the ability of social policy to "offer distinct 
institutional advantages to employers" (Mares 2001, 211).  
2.1.1. Schumpeterian Innovation 
In order to create economic growth, literature suggests that innovation is a major 
source. As previously described, Friedrich List asks the questions about who creates 
the sold products and why these products are and can be created in  certain place. 
Let us bear this in mind while following Joseph Schumpeter's arguments on the role 
of entrepreneurship and innovation, and their role in creative disruption. The field of 
entrepreneurial research has been existent in academics since the 18th century, where 
it was introduced by Richard Cantillon (1759 as cited in Casson 2005, 2). Cantillon 
saw the entrepreneur as a specialist in taking risk, who “ensures workers by buying 
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their output for resale before consumers have indicated how much they are willing to 
pay for it”. The search for the meaning of entrepreneurship went on and Knight 
(1921) later defined the entrepreneur as an “uncertainty-bearer, for which service the 
entrepreneur receives a reward of pure profit” (as cited in Casson 2005, 11) Twenty 
years later, Schumpeter took a different view, not regarding an entrepreneur as a 
coordinator or risk taker, but as an innovator. “Schumpeter seems to assume that 
speculation using other people`s money is necessarily riskless. An entrepreneur who 
starts with nothing, cannot lose” (Casson 2005, 41). He describes the task of the 
entrepreneur as being to reform the “pattern of production by exploiting an invention 
or, more generally, an untried technological possibility” (Schumpeter 1942, 1329). 
 Contrary to modern thinking, Schumpeter looked at the entrepreneur from a 
psychological rather than a systemic perspective. He characterised entrepreneurs in 
the first place through their “proactive behavior” (Frank 1998, 890): the "unusually 
strong character," and the "clarity of vision and ability to act (…) personified by the 
figure of a promoter or captain of industry” (Schumpeter cited in Freeman 2003, 
380). 
 Contrary to the mainstream economic thinking of their time (Macdonald 
1965, 381) Schumpeter as well as Weber rejected hedonism as the underlying motive 
of entrepreneurial action. Schumpeter, furthermore, saw entrepreneurs not just as 
being motivated by religious reasons, but through "the dream and the will to found a 
private kingdom", "the will to conquer" and "the joy of creating, of getting things 
done” (Hagedoorn 1996, 381). Schumpeter did also see the importance of role 
models for the purpose of motivation and the development of entrepreneurs and tried 
to generate a “sociological explanation of how cultural traits are transmitted, by 
trying to explain the way role models influence the behavior of entrepreneurs” 
(Schumpeter 1927; 1928, cited in Macdonald 1965, 382).  
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 In contrast to earlier views, Schumpeter did not just talk about psychological 
characteristics and motives (other than gaining money for the entrepreneur), but 
clearly differentiated managers, inventors, capitalists, and entrepreneurs from each 
other. Thus, anyone who begins as an entrepreneur “actually carries out new 
combinations, and loses that character as soon as he has built up his business when 
he settles down to running it as other people run their business” (Frank 1998, 508) 
becomes a manager. Whereas an inventor creates something new, an entrepreneur is 
“concerned with the implementation of these new things” (Frank 1998, 508). And to 
receive the money for implementing the invention, the entrepreneur needs to 
“previously become a debtor” (Frank 1998, 508). He has to receive money from a 
capitalist (Schumpeter 1934, cited in Hagedorn 1996, 890). Being an entrepreneur is 
thus “not an occupation or a profession but a capacity or a function” (Lawton-Smith 
2010), which gets lost when it is no longer performed. In viewing the entrepreneur as 
a capitalist, an inventor or a manager “the classical economist had overlooked the 
most important role (…) the dynamic task of innovation that is the distinctly 
entrepreneurial one” (Schumpeter, 1912, cited in Casson, 46). Thus the placement of 
the entrepreneur against the background of Schumpeter`s theory of innovation 
(Hagedoorn 1996, 884) turns out to be a premise for discussing Schumpeter’s works. 
By dividing inventors from innovators “[I]t is not the entrepreneur who figures out 
new possibilities. These are already present, often in the form of common 
knowledge, abundantly accumulated by all sorts of people. It is the ‘doing the thing’; 
the will to demonstrate that mere possibilities can be turned into reality, that 
constitutes the special contribution of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur” (Witt 2002, 13). 
Schumpeter contributed a big part to our modern understanding of the distinction 
between creativity, inventions, and innovations. He introduced the notion of new 
combinations, which referred to the introduction of a new product, or service, or a 
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new quality of a product [product innovation], a new method of production [process 
innovation], a new market [market innovation], a new form of delivery [delivery 
innovation], a new source of supply of raw materials [raw material innovation] or 
half-manufactured goods, and finally implementing a new organisation for any 
industry [organisational innovation] (see Schumpeter, 1934, 66; 1939, 84–85, cited 
in Hagedoorn, 1996, 888).  
 Schumpeter thought that “the success of capitalism depends on a process of 
constant economic evolution and fluctuation” (Frank 1998, 513). Since he also 
believed that “perfectly competitive markets had never existed and would never 
exist” (Schumpeter 1946, cited in Cantwell 2000, 6), comparisons with this 
hypothetical state seemed unhelpful. Thus, based largely on the works of Leon 
Walras, Schumpeter developed the theory of the circular flow as a “static state, in 
which all profits are reduced to zero, the economy is closed, and all is in perpetual 
equilibrium” (Frank 1998, 507). He argued that this stationary state of equilibrium is 
interrupted by creative disruption, which is the creative response of the entrepreneur, 
who is the only agent of change in the circular flow, the personification of innovation 
who thereby creates economic growth. Referring to Kondratieff’s long-wave theory, 
Schumpeter argued that these disruptions t  the circular flow would come in waves. 
The primary wave is the main effect of innovation clustering. It occurs because “the 
appearance of a few entrepreneurs facilitates the appearance of others, and these the 
appearance of more in ever-increasing numbers” (Schumpeter 1934, 228, cited in 
Frank 1998, 509). The wake of this primary wave is followed by more numerous 
secondary waves, “in which the initial increase in the purchasing power from new 
enterprises spreads over the whole economy giving rise to general prosperity” (Frank 
1998, 509). Freeman (2003) honours Schumpeter’s contribution of these cycles in 
terms “of successive technological revolutions” (Freeman et al. 2003, 12). He 
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criticises how Schumpeter failed to analyse satisfactorily either the timing or the 
phases of the technological revolutions or the timing of the related, but necessarily 
later, phases of the associated business cycles, however.  
 It is important to mention that there is an ongoing discussion concerning 
whether Schumpeter changed his opinion of the relevance of entrepreneurial 
innovation for economic growth later on in his life. Different authors (such as 
Freeman et al. 2003; Witt 2002; Hagedoorn 1996; Langlois 2003), assert that 
Schumpeter emphasised the importance of new venture development by individual 
entrepreneurs during his Early or European period, but seemed to adopt a new 
approach “in which large enterprises create economic change through routine and 
mechanical management” (Langlois 2003, 287) later on during his American period. 
Schumpeter has been criticised for his ignorance of the active role of consumers and 
businessmen in shaping innovations (Witt 2002, 15), the need to distinguish between 
original sources of innovation as opposed to subsequent imitation, as well as the 
aforementioned dichotomy between the early and late Schumpeterian theories, which 
implies that single entrepreneurs lose importance.  
Schumpeter's work suggests a focus on the individual level. The entrepreneur as 
an agent of change and the individual human being (alone or within a corporation) as 
a source of innovation is recognised. Schumpeter does further describe the macro 
structure of innovation as coming in disruptive waves. The role of the nation state 
and institutional spheres is not of high relevance for his theoretical framework. It 
matters in shaping the action of the entrepreneur. 
2.1.2. Five Generations of the Process of Innovation 
In Towards the Fifth-generation Innovation Process, Roy Rothwell (1994) describes 
five different approaches to the process of innovation within a firm. Rothwell 
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contributed largely to the field of innovation management by not only recognising 
the role of innovation but recognising different firm strategies in order to create 
innovation throughout different decades. Rothwell differentiates between: 1) the first 
generation (1950–1960) innovation process, Technology Push Model; 2) the second 
generation innovation process (1960–1970), Market Pull Model; 3) the third 
innovation process (1970s–1980s), Coupling Model of Innovation; 4) the fourth 
generation of innovation (1980s–1990s), Integrated Innovation Process; and 5) a 
fifth generation innovation model, 5G. Rothwell acknowledges that all types of 
innovation models continue to exist in various forms. He does further acknowledge 
sectoral differences in the concentration of innovation strategies. Rothwell does not 
define an end date for the fifth generation of innovation strategies. The twenty-four 
characteristics of the fifth generation process of innovation, which are identified, are 
inductive. The model is not operationalised as clearly as the previous four models. 
Still, Rothwell delivers important insights into firm-specific choice of an innovation 
strategy, depending on country, sector, and product.  
 Similarly to Schumpeter in his approach to innovation, Rothwell sees 
innovation as a process. Not only does the entrepreneur (inside or outside an existing 
firm) create innovation (by developing an idea and bringing it to the market), but 
innovation is influenced by strategic management decisions and the interplay 
between market need, technological development, investment (in technology and 
marketing), collaboration internally (e.g. different departments involved 
simultaneously) and externally (e.g. suppliers), and time/cost tradeoffs (a product 
introduced 1% faster means 1–2% more costs but only 0.1% more profit – see 
automobile industry in Germany/Tesla).  
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2.1.3. Disruptive Innovation 
In What is Disruptive Innovation? Christensen, Raynor and McDonald (2015) 
discuss the issue of Tesla as a disruptive innovation. Since the publication of The 
Innovator`s Dilemma, Christensen's (2013) idea of disruptive innovation has been 
used in different contexts. The original idea of disruptive innovation was not in terms 
of Schumpeter's notion of creative disruption. His book described an innovation 
management strategy – one managerial approach or strategy in order to create an 
innovation. Disruptive innovation, after Christensen, is about a start-up’s low price 
version of a pre-existing item. After entering the market and reaching a certain size, 
"[e]ntrants then move upmarket, delivering the performance that incumbents’ 
mainstream customers require while preserving the advantages that drove their early 
success. When mainstream customers start adopting the entrants’ offerings in 
volume, disruption has occurred" (Christensen, Raynor and McDonald 2015). A vital 
discussion has emerged in which one side argues that, for example, Tesla, Uber and 
Google have produced disruptive innovation (Boyadjis, Rassweiler and Brinley 
2016), while the other group argues that disruptive innovation is misunderstood 
(Christensen, Raynor and McDonald 2015), and a third group suggests that 
Christensen has misunderstood the developments of his own idea (Wadhwa 2016).  
 Disruptive innovation after Christensen is an approach to innovation 
management which describes a certain process of a firm's strategic choice in order to 
gain market value. Current developments in literature intermingle Schumpeter's 




2.2.  Institutional Approaches to the Study of Innovation 
A diverse range of institutional approaches to the study of innovation has emerged 
since the 1990s. Comparative Capitalism (CC) literature defines institutions as 
shaping the supply side, “examining how various institutions shape the collective 
supply of inputs (e.g., skills, capital) available to firms and other economic actors” 
(Deeg and Jackson 2007, 7). CC literature does generally suggest a theory of 
comparative institutional advantage whereby the different institutional frameworks 
between countries are assumed to support certain economic activities, such as e.g. a 
country’s ability to radically innovate in different ways. Table 1 summarises the 
three main approaches to the study of institutions and innovation. These three 






Table 1: Three Recent Institutional Approaches on National Trajectories of Innovation 
Source: Own illustration using sources shown in Table




Lundvall (1992) National 
Systems of Innovation: 





Systems: A Comparative 
Analysis 
Focus is on the creation of 
knowledge. Institutional and cultural 
context determines learning 
(creation of knowledge) and 
innovation in a society. Focus on 
firm level and scientists. Case 
specific focus on the working of the 
national system in its own right – 
not in terms of international 
competition. 
Single or comparative 
case studies of countries. 
Storytelling on complex 
historical and cultural 
interplay. 
Idiosyncratic elements 
depending on author’s 
preferences. 
Innovation as the 
result of interactive 
learning processes.  
Innovation as a 
process and not a 
single event. 
 No diff. between knowledge and skill, 
learning and training – focus on scientists. 
 Focus on creation of knowledge for 
innovation – underplays role of institutional 
determinates influencing not only knowledge 
but firm choice and firm performance of a 
nation. 
 Role of government limited to learning 
incentives.  
 Looks for one best way of economic policy 
making by emphasising the importance of a 
knowledge society 
 Incremental/ radical innovation divided on 
base of unexpected effects on economy or 
technological development 
 Cooperation among firms as necessary 
supplement to competition 
 Dynamic change within societies 
Business 
Systems 
Whitley (1998, 1999) 
Divergent Capitalisms: 
The Social Structuring 
and Change of Business 
Systems 
Variation in particular institutions 
determines economic organisation 
and firm strategy. In addition to 
CG/LM, skill formation, societal 
institutions such as trust, but also 
culture and policy making are of 
relevance.  
Comparative historical 
analysis of Continental 
European, Asian and 
former Soviet nations. 
Secondary data and 






according to culture 
and history.  
 No conclusive framework on certain 
institutional spheres determining particular 
types of innovation.  
 Wider approach which argues for a general 
path dependency in firm strategy depending 
on CG, human capital, historic, cultural and 
social institutions. 
 
 Institutional change is path dependent. 
 Internationalisation of firms depend on 
nature of institutions. 
 Firm strategy develops according to 
national institutions 
 Emphasis on CG (e.g. ownership 
coordination), industrial coordination (e.g. 
alliance), employment relations (skill 
development and LM) & role of states 
Varieties of 
Capitalism 
Hall and Soskice (2001) 
Varieties of Capitalism: 
The institutional 
Foundations of 
Comparative Capitalism  
Focus on five institutional spheres 
within which firms need to solve 
coordination problems. 
Complementary institutional 
frameworks reinforce each other and 
create comparative economic 
advantage in form of radical/ 
incremental innovation.  
Comparative historical 
case study designs. 
Secondary data and 
descriptive methods used. 
Most prominent: 
Comparative analysis of 
Germany and the USA 
using patent counts, from 
the European Patent 
Office in thirty 
technology classes for 










 Dichotomist views on CMEs/LMEs and 
incremental/radical innovations 
 Simplifying institutional complementarities 
onto: CME/incremental innovation and LME/ 
radical innovation 
 Methodological limitations due to single data 
source, method, and case selection. 
 Missing institutional change (endogen, 
globalisation or crisis) and its relationship to 
economic change in terms of innovation 
behaviour. 
 Institutional determinism missing the role of 
organisations, agents, power structures, role 
of government policy for innovation. 
 National institutional frameworks 
complementing each other – right to exist. 
 Institutional frameworks featuring flexible 
LMs, shareholder value and general skills, 
being oriented to free market capitalism 
will prosper in sectors associated with 
radical innovation. 
 Rigid LMs, firm/industry specific skills 
and stakeholder orientation being oriented 
to coordination between different parties 
will create incremental innovation. 
 Welfare Production Regime 
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2.2.1. National Innovation Systems and Tripe Helix 
Following Lundvall’s approach on NISs, Etzkowitz and Leydersdorff construct the 
Triple Helix approach in The dynamics of innovation: from National Systems and 
"Mode 2" to a Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations. The Triple 
Helix approach acknowledges the role of knowledge creation for the creation of 
innovation in new and emerging sectors, such as biotechnology and software. It 
focuses on clusters around universities. An entire field of research and policy making 
has emerged following this stream of research. It emphasises the role of university 
spin-offs and cluster policy emphasising knowledge-industry linkages to create 
innovation (Bergeron, Lallich and Le Bas 1998; BMBF 2006; BMWE 2015; 
Etzkowitz 2010; Etzkowitz 2004; Feldman, Francis and Bercovitz 2005; Liecke 
2009). This dissertation focuses on national trajectories of innovation. Therefore, 
cluster policy and related literature is acknowledged, but not further considered. Due 
to its relevance for policy making, Triple Helix has emerged as an important 
approach in innovation management. It derives from the NIS framework. In general, 
we can differentiate between at least three types of approaches to the study of NISs – 
the Statist, Laissez-Faire and Triple Helix Model. All models inhibit the notion of 
interactive learning and knowledge creation within the nation state as one entity 
which is defined due to the government policy of one country. The models 
differentiate institutional spheres in the country and acknowledge the role of 
coordination for innovation. While, for example, the Business Systems approach 
appears to be a single and closed approach, NIS is characterised by complexity, as 
expounded by a variety of authors (Freeman 1995; Lundvall 1999; Nelson 1993). 
The macro perspective of NIS reunites the different approaches in the NIS context. 
Each nation is viewed as a learning and knowledge-creating entity in its own right. 
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The VoC approach can easily co-exist with NIS. Where NIS explains the dynamic 
approach of interactive learning, VoC sees nations as entities in complementing 
systems of institutional and, therefore, also economic advantage. This offers an easy 
explanation of why some nations specialise in incremental innovation. 
2.2.2. Business Systems 
In Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems, 
Richard Whitley (1999) re-focuses on the national level. Within his approach on 
Business Systems, he adds the perspectives of societal institutions such as trust, but 
also culture, to the discussion. He follows Lundvall in taking the historical and 
cultural developments of a country into account and evaluates the path-dependent 
institutional and technological developments of business systems within nation 
states. His emphasis is not so much on the creation of knowledge but on the link 
between corporate governance (specifically ownership coordination) and labour. This 
is obviously a supplement to the Triple Helix approach which focuses mainly on the 
creation of high-tech sector innovation within a certain knowledge-intense network. 
Whitley acknowledges the role of grown-up corporations i  the creation of 
innovation and bringing trust into the picture for analysis, e.g. through laws enforced 
by governments. Whitley talks about trust from a societal perspective: The ability to 
trust other actors in a market economy. He does not talk about the psychology of 
trust or about Lundvall's definition of trust as resulting from values and personal 
experiences of individuals within the society. Within his book, Whitley builds up the 
basis for his later argument on business systems’ in titutional differences being the 
driver for variation in national innovative performance. In The Institutional 
Structuring of Innovation Strategies: Business Systems, Firm Types and Patterns of 
Technical Change in Different Market Economies, Whitley (2000) differentiates 
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between five kinds of innovation strategies (dependent, craft-based responsive, 
generic, complex and risky, and transformative), which are further distinguished in 
terms of certain characteristics: technical and user uncertainty, user differentiation 
and product quality specialisation, organisational competence destruction, use of 
codified knowledge, and the complexity of the knowledge base. Whitley's work 
might not be characterised as an approach within the field of innovation studies, but 
it has developed in the field of political economy, within the discipline of 
comparative capitalism. His work is highly relevant to the theoretical context of this 
dissertation. The NIS approach views institutional settings and the dynamic creation 
of learning and knowledge within each single country. BS encompasses a range of 
different countries (not only developed Western ones) and compares them to one 
another. Whitley tries to capture more than plain data about institutional settings and 
innovation, by telling stories (culture, historical developments, trust and fear) of the 
country. 
2.2.3. Varieties of Capitalism 
In 1989, East and West Berlin were reunited. This accomplishment was a far-
reaching step for the previously divided country and an important signal for the 
world. Germans from both east and west celebrated freedom and free capitalism 
together on top of the Berlin wall. The images of this event were beamed across the 
world and became a symbol for the demise of the Soviet Union and, with this, an 
alternative model for capitalism itself. The study and comparison of different 
capitalist nations (mainly rich, highly industrialised Western nations) gained 
relevance from the 1990s. Soon it appeared to some scholars that there must be a 
single best way of organising a nation. Where the NIS approach emphasises the 
general importance of knowledge within any ("free," Western, democratic) nation, 
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BS differentiates much more according to historic and cultural issues and aims to 
observe and understand them instead of implementing certain measures. These 
approaches appeared to be quite complex. NIS scholars do mainly observe nations 
out of competition, while the BSs approach ascribes economic developments to 
unique cultural and historical issues (along with other comparable institutional 
measures). In an attempt to simplify the picture of VoC nations’ diverse ways of 
organising their market economies, scholars aimed to divide the ("free," Western, 
democratic) world (which obviously is limited to a specific range of wealthy nations) 
into two. In this context, two ways to successfully organise Western societies were 
described. The first way described a group of mainly English-speaking countries, 
representing the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. Exaggeratedly-speaking, these 
nations are organised around a neo-liberal cutthroat capitalism which abandons 
social policy wherever possible. A second group points towards the Rhenish model, 
often represented by Germany, as a social capitalist system based on an egalitarian 
society (see Albert 1992). Contrary to this dichotomist approach and focusing on the 
welfare state, Esping-Anderson differentiates liberal Capitalism from a Continental 
European model (Germany), and a third social-democratic model, which is 
geographically associated with Scandinavia (Esping-Anderson 1996, 1990). In 
addition to this, in The uncertain future of the Italian welfare state, Ferrera (2000, 
1997) describes a fourth type of a southern European model, which emphasises 
informal institutions and the role of the family. Later on, Ebbinghaus and Manow 
(2001) identified a fifth model in Japan. By simplifying a complex system of national 
institutions on the one hand, and national innovation behaviour into one dichotomous 
model of incremental and radical innovation, directly relating institutions to 
innovation, without acknowledging other factors, such as the heterogeneity of firms, 
natural resources, a country’s political or military power, or the role of the state, but 
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only the one-dimensional framework of the co-ordinating strengths of a national 
market and its effect on specialising in certain (radical/incremental labeled) sectors, 
the VoC approach offered an easily understood framework. In their introduction, 
Hall and Soskice describe innovation as “one of the most crucial dimensions of 
economic success” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 44). They focus on the institutional 
influence of the development of certain kinds of innovation within the country. Hall 
and Soskice (2001, 6) describe five institutional spheres through which "firms must 
develop relationships to resolve coordination problems, central to their core 
competencies". The five spheres are the sphere of industrial relations, the sphere of 
vocational training and education, the sphere of corporate governance, the broad 
sphere of inter-firm relations, and finally coordination problems vis-à-vis with their 
own employees. Depending on a nation’s ability to solve these coordination 
problems on each sphere, the VoC approach divides nations into different categories 
of Liberal or Coordinated market economies, associating CMEs with incremental 
change and LMEs with the ability to specialise in radical innovation. Table 2: 
Characteristics of CMEs and LMEs displays the characteristics which allow them to 
specialise in a certain trajectory of innovation. It is argued that comparative 
advantage in high-tech economies with radical innovation may be supported by 
combinations of certain institutional conditions, uch as “[l]ax employment 
protection, weak collective bargaining coverage, extensive university training, little 
occupational training, and a large stock market” (Schneider 1999, 250).  
“The basic idea is that the institutional structure of a particular political 
economy provides firms with advantages to (…) perform some types of 
activities, which allow them to produce some kinds of goods, more efficiently 
than others because of the institutional support they receive for those 
activities in the political economy” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 37).  
 
 VoC does not focus on a national level, but on the firm within the nation. The 
firm is seen as an entity striving to “develop and exploit core competencies or 
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dynamic capabilities”. With dynamic capabilities, Hall and Soskice mean the “(…) 
quality of the relationships the firm is able to establish, both internal, with its own 
employees, and externally, with a range of other actors (…)” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
6). The authors continue their argument by saying that since many of firms’ 
capabilities are of a relational nature, a firm does also experience a lot of 
coordination problems. Being successful in the production of a certain kind of 
product indicate sthat a firm is able to handle certain kinds of coordination problems 
well and is able to communicate with other relevant actors. Hall and Soskice 
acknowledge that although there may be types of comparative advantage, these 
institutional frameworks confer that they have not yet explored, they focus “on their 
impact on innovation since a firm's capacity to innovate is crucial to its long-run 
success” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 38). Taylor criticises the empirical basis of VoC 
(represented by Hall and Soskice 2001). He criticises the fact that Hall and Soskice`s 
“predictions are not supported by their empirical data and that the evidence offered 
by VoC proponents depends heavily on the inclusion of a major outlier, the United 
States, in the class of liberal-market economies” (Taylor 2004, 58). Despite critiques, 
Voc has become a key approach in the wider field of comparative capitalism. Its 
ability to interconnect national institutional frameworks with trajectories of 
innovation is highly relevant for national players in politics, economics and 
academia. More recent literature (e.g. Hoepner 2005) in the area of VC asks for the 
relevance of institutions and whether some of them might not be directly related to 
certain kinds of innovation but moreover "just" compatible with those institutions 
necessary to create a certain trajectory of innovation. A more differentiated, non-






*1 Six OECD nations were left in “more ambiguous positions (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
and Turkey)” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 20). 
*2 Hall and Soskice do not argue that one kind of innovation is superior to another; they only 
differentiate between the two forms: “(…) we are not arguing here that one is superior to another” 
(Hall and Soskice 2001, 20). 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of CMEs and LMEs  
Source: Own illustration using Hall and Soskice, 2001, 20–29 
 
2.2.4. Varieties of Capitalism and Comparative Economic Advantage 
In –the search for Economic Success, comparative capitalists (CC) have raised the 
previously described dichotomist argument of rational-functionalism, suggesting that 
national innovation capability is determined by complementary institutional settings 
in turn leading to complementary sectoral specialisation in production. The approach 
which emerged and is still taught argues for institutional features of LMEs such as 
stock market financing, external labour markets and shareholder orientation to 
provide firms with incentives to take risks, and, in contrast, the institutional features 
of coordinated market economies such as bank-based financing, internal labour 
markets, and stakeholder relationships encourage firms to exploit internally 
accumulated resources. Near the beginning of An Introduction to Varieties of 
Capitalism, Peter Hall and David Soskice, identify five institutional spheres "in 
 LMEs CMEs 
Characteristics -Tolerant of merger and 
acquisitions 
- Long-term investments  
- Top management has ultimate 
control over firm  
- Consensus decision-making 
facilitates network monitoring  
- General skilled labour, 
transferable across firms 
 
- Requires highly skilled labour; 
share of information and work 
autonomy  
- Lax employment protection - Lifetime employment, equalised 
wages  
- Licensing agreements instead of 
inter-firm collaboration 
- Inter-firm collaboration on R&D 
important 
OECD countries 
belonging to a specific 
group*1 
USA, Britain, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, Ireland 
Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, Finland, and 
Austria 
Impact on innovation*2  Comparative advantage in 
producing radical innovation 
Comparative advantage in 
producing incremental innovation 
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which firms must develop relationships to resolve coordination problems central to 
their core competencies" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 6–7). These spheres are identified 
as industrial relations, vocational training and education, employees, inter-firm 
relations, and corporate governance. A very simplistic picture is drawn, as 
illustrated in Figure 1: Complementarities between Institutions and Innovation 
between CMEs and LMEs.  
 
  
Figure 1: Complementarities between Institutions and Innovation between CMEs and LMEs  
Source: Own illustration following Hall and Soskice (2001, 20-50) argument 
 
 Within this section, the underlying propositions of the VoC approach are 
identified. Following the summary of the Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, 
several chapters of this volume focus on a further discussion of skills, LMIs, 
Industrial Relations (IR), CG and financial globalisation in relation to national 
trajectories of innovation. Comparative institutional advantage is seen as the source 
of comparative economic advantage. The summarised propositions in these chapters 
are evaluated within the following sections.  
 In Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the 
Welfare State, Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice (2001) draw a simplistic picture of 
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a combination of Labor Market flexibility (LMf) and a general skill base leading 
national firms, e.g. in the USA, to superior performance e.g. in the software, 
biotechnology or telecommunications sectors. As argued in the Introduction of Hall 
and Soskice’s (2001, 44) book, these sectors are characterised as sectors "where 
radical innovation is important". General skills are argued to be recognised by all 
employers; their value is independent of firm type or industry (e.g. university or 
college education). In contrast, nations such as Germany that follow a production 
strategy which mass-produces but specialises in incremental innovation of high-
quality products require firm-specific and, in addition, industry specific skills. Firm-
specific skills are not useful for the employee outside the context of the firm. They 
are created by on-the-job training. In contrast, industry-specific skills are recognised 
by any employer within a specific trade (e.g. apprenticeship and vocational training). 
A first proposition identified is that a relative abundance of high levels of general 
skills in a national market economy brings it a comparative advantage in terms of 
radical product innovation. High levels of firm/industry specific skills are required 
for the production of incremental innovation. 
Proposition 1: General skills lead to radical innovation.  
 The second proposition can be identified as the relationship between flexible 
LMs and radical innovation. A flexible labour market is required for general skills to 
be transferable throughout industries. These are argued to dominate LMEs and 
thereby provide them with the ability to specialise their production in radically 
innovative sectors.  
Proposition 2: LM flexibility leads to radical innovation.  
 In a second step, Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice (2001) describe how 
Welfare Production Regimes dominate most CMEs, and create inequality in the 
affected nations, as a side effect of their chosen product market specialisation. 
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Welfare Production Regimes are said to produce inequality based on "the economic 
background of workers [and] (...) based on gender" (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and 
Soskice 2001b, 147). One might ask: Why would CMEs accept inequality in their 
society? Thelen (2001) and Wood (2001) answer this question. In Varieties of Labor 
Politics in the Developed Democracies, Thelen (2001) expands her approach, by 
adding a perspective on institutional change. Thelen argues that coordination "is a 
political process and an outcome that has to be actively sustained" (Thelen 2001, 73). 
On page 77, she further argues that this happens "through negotiation by highly 
organized employer organizations and unified and encompassing labor movement". 
Obviously, this is very different from her argument on process and the direction of 
change in LMEs. Thelen states that a reconfiguration of industrial relations within 
LMEs leads them to further liberalisation, and a "fundamental renegotiation of the 
terms of coordination" (Thelen 2001, 73) in CMEs. Emphasising these relationships, 
Steward Wood (2001) in his chapter on Business, Government, and Patterns of 
Labor Market Policy in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, points out that 
the content of LMP in CMEs derives from employer preference. Therefore, the 
degree of constraint on government is fundamental for corporations to pursue their 
variety of production strategies. The WPRs in CMEs are argued to be allowed and 
sustained by a corporation's influence over the government: "(...) quasi-corporatist 
regimes [which] provide producers with influence over government" (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001, 49). It is assumed that a corporation’s influence over government 
policy making creates high levels of social protection, namely employment 
protection, unemployment protection, and, with restrictions, wage protection, which, 
in turn, reinforces employees skill trajectories of firm or industry specific skills 
needed by corporations to contribute to the firm's product market strategies for 
incremental innovation. The presumed inequality is, therefore, an unwanted but 
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accepted side effect of the WPR. In Firms and the Welfare State, Isabela Mares 
(2001) continues this argument by interconnecting the VoC approach with theory on 
the varieties of welfare regimes. Her argument is on the re-distribution of risk in 
society and on the ability of social policy to "offer distinct institutional advantages to 
employers" (Mares 2001, 211). Two further propositions can be identified as 
showing how WPRs dominate most CMEs and thereby create inequality; secondly, 
CME's social and economic government policy is strongly influenced by its inner 
national corporations. In contrast, LME's policy making is not assumed to be 
controlled by corporations. Thus, radical innovation can be created.  
Proposition 3: WPRs dominate CMEs and create inequality. 
Proposition 4: CME's policy making is strongly influenced by corporations. 
These first four propositions are illustrated in context with each other in 
Figure 2: Skills, LM, WPR and Corporations’ Influence on Trajectories of 
Innovation in Germany.  
Steward Wood (2001) argues that the stability of LMP over time is 
"determined by governments power to initiate reform or reversal" (Wood 2001, 248). 
Wood further rejects the "Dirigiste conception of policy-making" and argues that 
instead "government should produce policies that complement the institutional 




Figure 2: Skills, LM, WPR and Corporations’ Influence on Trajectories of Innovation in Germany 
Source: Own illustration following Hall and Soskice's argument (2001, 40–49) 
 
 By "dirigiste" Wood means: "according to which coordination is secured by 
designing a set of sanctions and incentives and imposing these patterns of behavior 
on firms" (Wood 2001, 274). One essential proposition of VoC is that the 
institutional outlook of the dichotomist capitalist groups is relatively stable and 
somehow path dependent if not change resistant. Therefore, Wood’s argument needs 
to be evaluated within this context. In Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed 
Democracies, Thelen (2001) expands this approach on the influence of LMI on the 
national production regimes, by adding a perspective on institutional change. Thelen 
argues for a reconfiguration of industrial relations within LMEs leading them to 
further liberalisation, and a "fundamental renegotiation of the terms of coordination" 
(2001, 73) in CMEs. Thereby she argues that coordination "is a political process and 
an outcome that has to be actively sustained (…) through negotiation by highly 
organized employer organizations and unified and encompassing labor movement" 
(Thelen 2001, 73–77). In the context of institutional change theory within the VoC 
approach, Hall and Soskice also comment on the influence of globalisation. They 
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divide globalisation into two streams of research: firstly, he monolithic political 
developments and secondly financial globalisation. As previously mentioned and 
contrary to previous approaches, VoC does not argue for general liberalisation due to 
globalisation pressuring for one best model of capitalism – at least not at first glace. 
Furthermore, Hall and Soskice (2001, 56) do not suggest that firms move their 
"corporate activities across national borders, as firms seek access to new markets and 
new sources of supply". Moreover, they suggests that "companies may move some of 
their activities to liberal market economies, not simply to lower labor cost, but to 
secure access to institutional support for radical innovation" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
57). This implies a bifurcated response by deregulation in LMEs and limited 
deregulation in CMEs and leads to a fifth proposition on the division of work, 
namely sectoral production over dichotomist national market economies being 
associated with a superiority in certain trajectories of innovation. 
Proposition 5: CMEs will move activities to LMEs in order to create radical 
innovation. 
In terms of financial globalisation, Hall and Soskice (2001, 60) describe 
extensive pressure on the institutional frameworks of CMEs. Large firms are 
described as increasingly relying on international financial markets. In this context, 
CME firms are expected to change their corporate governance (CG) strategy into 
shareholder value standards. This requires them, among other things, to "(...) revise 
their accounting standards, appoint independent directors, and deliver the high rates 
of return associated with shareholder value" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 60). This shift 
in CG standards is further argued to lead to changes in the other institutional spheres 
(LM, social policy and skill formation due to a corporation`s influence over the 
government) and could result in "shifts in strategy extending all the way down to 
production regime" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 61). In times of crisis, Hall and Soskice 
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(2001, 63) suggest: "[There are] (...) no such constraint[s] on CMEs deregulating to 
become more like LMEs". 
Within the described context of shifts in CG within CMEs, and a slow 
liberalisation of the institutional spheres of CMEs due to financial liberalisation, 
sixth, and seventh underlying propositions can be identified. The seven identified 
propositions are illustrated in Figure 3: An Illustration of Propositions underlying 
VoC.  
Proposition 6: CME's Corporate Governance structure will change towards 
shareholder value.  
Proposition 7: CME's institutional foundations are under fundamental renegotiation 
and will liberalise. 
 
Figure 3: An illustration of propositions underlying VoC  
Source: Own illustration following VoC arguments 
 
 This section identifies seven propositions underlying the VoC argument.  
Proposition 1: General skills lead to radical innovation. Firm/Industry specific skills 
lead to incremental innovation. 
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Proposition 2: Labour market flexibility leads to radical innovation. Labour market 
rigidity leads to incremental innovation. 
Proposition 3: WPRs dominate CMEs and create inequality. 
Propositon 4: CME's policy making is strongly influenced by corporations.  
Proposition 5: CMEs will move activities to LMEs in order to create radical 
innovation. 
Proposition 6: CME's Corporate Governance structure will change towards 
shareholder value.  
Proposition 7: CME's institutional foundations are under fundamental renegotiation 
and will liberalise. 
 
2.3.  Institutional Change Theory and Innovation 
Depending on one’s values and beliefs, each researcher develops a slightly different 
view on the topic of institutional change. A rational choice author may favour path 
dependency change models where historic institutionalism emphasises the 
importance of punctuated equilibrium. Interestingly, there is a dominant model of 
thinking existent in institutional change literature. This is the model of path 
dependency, which partly includes the concepts of punctuated equilibrium, and 
critical junctures (depending on the researcher’s perspective). Originally, path 
dependency was an idea put forward by David (1985) and Arthur (1994), who were 
both teaching at Stanford University (USA), and had previously exchanged ideas 
with each other. David’s short five-page QWERTY paper represents one of the most 
famous examples of path dependency applied to technological innovation 
(Ebbinghaus 2005). David (1985, as cited in Ebbinghaus 2005, 7) stated:  
 "The keyboard layout of American typewriters was developed 130 years ago 
 to cope with technical problems of mechanical typewriters, without 
52 
 
 considering a more efficient keyboard arrangement with respect to typing 
 speed. As users invested in learning this established standard, more optimal 
 alternative keyboards could not later overcome the predominance of 
 QWERTY, even during the fundamental technology driven switch from 
 mechanical to electric typewriters and then to computer keyboards. The 
 diffusion of the technological standard became a self-reinforcing process: 
 The more people learned to use this design, the less likely it was for 
 competing keyboards to take over." 
 
Ebbinghaus argues that there are actually two models of path dependency which 
exist in literature. For the first one, David and Arthur’s work on technical innovation 
is converted and applied to the emergence of social convention, which emerges due 
to the “accidental but repeated use” of a trail. This model is also used in institutional 
change theory and takes more of a sociological perspective than any of the others. It 
may explain institutional construction and development. Two characteristics of path 
dependency have been universally criticised in the literature. An economist, who 
believes in the self-regulating power of markets, criticises the perception that 
inefficient paths are chosen in path dependency. Non-economists might then also see 
the lock-in phenomenon of chosen paths as problems in that it “denies individual 
actors freedom of action and excludes the potential for change” (Ebbinghaus 2005, 
11). Another critique is that small events in early phases might have crucial long-
term effects, which cannot be predicted but only analysed afterwards. Ebbinghaus 
does, therefore, conclude that this “deterministic model can only explain those hyper 
stable cases of path dependence that follow the proposition of stochastic events and 
unobstructed self-reinforcing processes” (Ebbinghaus 2005, 11). Page (2006) 
criticises the loose use of path dependency. He explains that David (1985) had 
already mentioned the concept of path dependency as being almost metaphorical 
when compared to that of equilibrium. “By equilibrium here I mean limiting 
distributions over outcomes” (Page 2006, 89). Thus, he continues by stating that path 
dependency originally meant that “current and future states, actions, or decisions 
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depend on the path of previous states, actions, or decisions" but that lately, p th 
dependency has become a popular conveyor of the looser idea that history matters 
(Crouch and Farrell 2004; Pierson 2004). Page (2006) summarises common 
misunderstandings with the model of path dependency and also gives the reader an 
overview of different models of path dependency. The five misunderstandings which 
Page lists are: 1) “Increasing returns are neither necessary nor sufficient for path 
dependence (…)”; 2) “any constraint, (…) can create path dependence (…)”; 3) 
“outcomes in the Polya Process do not depend on the order of past events” (Page 
2006, 90); 4) "Phat vs. Path dependency – even if the sequence of events in the past 
matters, it does not necessarily matter for the coming future"; 5) “The future is not 
deterministic, but stochastic and biased towards early decisions. The process exhibits 
early path dependence and not extreme sensitivity to initial conditions” (Page 2006, 
91). He, therefore, classifies a variety of Ball and Urn models which are quite simple 
models of the familiar Polya Process. As a second class of models, he names the 
decision-theoretic models, which assume a “decision maker who takes sequential 
action” (Page 2006, 106). He describes a number of observations which can be made 
about such an approach to path dependency. 
 As previously described, institutional theories within the field of comparative 
capitalism do often anticipate a system of institutional complementarity within 
national market economies. This institutional complementarity is reinforcing. 
Therefore, the national institutions are expected to be relatively stable and to slowly 
develop in a path-dependent manner. Through this, the theories of institutional 
complementarities and the theory of institutional path dependency are interrelated in 
many cases. Even though both concepts can be united, they are distinct from each 
other in that they can exist there. Complementarities provide one explanation of why 
institutions may stay relatively stable even though there are strong pressures (from 
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globalisation) from outside. Incremental change is also explained due to step-by-step 
changes; the main argument is that institutional frameworks would stay stable over 
time if they were not destroyed my major external shocks. One of the most famous 
authors in the field of path dependency is Kathleen Thelen. Thelen emphasises that 
“institutions are constructed in the context of some historical choice point in the past, 
and then once they are in place, they lay out an enduring logic of political 
development (…) critical junctures (or choice point) (…) which occur in the past” 
and “produce historical trajectories” (Thelen 2009, 474).  
 In the development of a path dependency model explaining institutional 
change, Thelen makes a point by providing a toolkit to interconnect the questions of 
institutional reproduction and institutional change. Thelen (2005 and 2009) has 
widely argued, that “the key to understanding institutional evolving and change lies 
in specifying more precisely the reproduction and feedback mechanisms on which 
particular institutions rest” (Thelen 2009, 397). Prior to Thelen, the concept of 
feedback mechanisms was developed by Pierson, who is a representative of the 
rational-choice way of thinking. Thelen (2009) criticises his approach to change as 
being discontinuous and characterised by the breakdown of one set of institutions 
and its replacement by another. She does emphasise that external shocks do not 
necessarily have to lead to a large change in institutional behaviour. Secondly she 
(Thelen 2004) explains that, even in the absence of external shocks or historic 
ruptures, change does also take place in settled times, in an incremental way, and this 
is true in the context of Germany. 
 By taking a historical perspective on institutional development and change, 
Thelen (2004) has constructed an argument of a political-coalitional theory of 
institutional reproduction and transformation. In 2009, she gives further attention to 
gaps between institutional rules and their actual behaviour and the opportunities for 
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incremental change which occur as a result of these gaps. By drawing attention to her 
empirical research and case studies, she emphasises that most institutional change in 
real life does not occur due to big term external shocks which lead to institutional 
reproduction. “[R]ules are never simply applied, they are always interpreted, 
enforced and enacted, and, of course, by actors who have divergent and conflicting 
interests” (Streek and Thelen 2005a as cited in Thelen 2009, 491). She uses her 
empirical research to show how capitalist economies are changing and manages to 
show that changes in CMEs (incremental changes, rather than institutional 
reproduction) is not simply explained by existing theories of punctual equilibrium 
but by theories of change. Following this finding, she gives the reader case examples 
and builds up a comprehensive theoretical framework in explaining how gaps 
between the institution (a rule) and the actual behaviour of the institution can exist or 
develop and how these incremental changes can be the basis for larger real life 
changes in institutions. By not only recognising change in CMEs but also providing a 
framework for their explanation, she does make an important contribution to the 
research field in the area of institutional change in capitalist systems. 
 In addition to Deegs, in Complementarity and institutional change in 
capitalist systems,1 Thelen does not just talk about possible drivers of change 
themselves but presents the reader with a model of four modes of change (layering, 
drift, displacement, conversion) and analyses the direction of institutional change in 
the VoC context. The following pages do develop an understanding of what underlies 
these and other approaches on institutional (non-) change in the field of comparative 
capitalism.  
                                                
1 Deeg (2007, 612) describes how “[i]n the recent literature on comparative institutional political 
economy, complementarity has become a central concept (e.g. Aoki 2001; Milgrom and Roberts 1995; 
Hoepner 2005)”. He uses the theory of Hall and Soskice (2001) as an example of complementarities 
influencing specific outcomes (LMEs vs. CMEs) and the approach of path dependency (Pierson, 
2005) as it influences the stability of institutions.  
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 It has been widely argued that the VoC approach is too static and has focused 
“on permanency and path-dependency, missing important dynamic elements of 
economic change (Crouch and Farrell 2004; Crouch 2005a; Hancke and Goyer 2005; 
Streek and Thelen 2005; Jackson and Deeg 2006)” (as cited in Hancké, Rhodes, and 
Thatcher 2007). The previously described path dependency approach, which has 
emerged as the dominant approach in explaining institutional stability and change, 
has been extensively criticised for ignoring “endogenous sources of national system 
transformation and within-system diversity” (Hancké et al. 2007, 7). VoC is not only 
an approach to compare differences across nations, but it is also helpful to "elucidate 
the processes whereby national political economies change" (Thelen 2001, 65). By 
talking about institutional change, Hall and Soskice (2001) mean the change of the 
set of rules that actors of our society (such as the members of an organisation) 
usually use as a basis for their actions. Institutions are not only shaping “the 
collective supply of inputs (e.g., skills, capital) available to firms and other economic 
actors” (Jackson and Deeg 2006, 7) but are also providing “comparative institutional 
advantages”. The VoC approach links institutional variables with a variety of distinct 
economic outcomes, and, in particular, with a nation’s specialisation towards either 
incremental or radical innovation. Institutional change does, therefore, not only mean 
a change in the institutional framework itself but also in its outcome in terms of the 
nation’s trajectories of innovation. In the context of the VoC debate, institutions are
seen as “durable entities” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 9) which resist the pressures of 
globalisation. This consistency is described as being a result of complementarities. 
Deeg 2007 (612) argues that "complementarities have become a central concept in 
comparative studies". Thereby, VoC’s division of advanced capitalist economies into 
two primary types and its prediction that “when confronted with pressure for change, 
liberal market economies will get ‘more liberal’ and coordinated market economies 
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will resist liberalization in order to sustain complementarities” is given as a major 
example of complementarities (Deeg 2007, 612). 
 The review of innovation literature discusses the existing literature in 
innovation management and institutional theory. Three main approaches combining 
institutional spheres with research on innovation are identified, and the relevance for 





3. CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK – NATIONAL TRAJECTORIES OF 
INNOVATION 
 
For the case study analyses at the sector level, the dynamics of innovation and their 
consequences for comparative economic advantage of the nation are discussed in 
context of wider theory. As previously described, this dissertation explores two key 
issues: (i) the determinants of national trajectories of innovation, especially in terms 
of institutional complementarity and policy, and (ii) the effect of radical trajectories 
of innovation within a CME in the wider economic discussion.  
 In an attempt to create an enhanced theoretical framework in the analysis in 
this chapter, this dissertation addresses the theoretically given institutional factors 
that are described by different approaches to characterise coordinated/liberal nations. 
It further reflects identified propositions, and institutional change within these 
contexts. An integrated theoretical framework is drawn in order to describe the 
mechanisms of decision making for creating radical trajectories of innovation within 
Germany. Policy and contextual factors regarding trajectories of innovation are 
added to the perspective.  
 This chapter is structured in the following way. Section 3.1 provides a short 
overview of the terms and definitions used in this thesis. Section 3.2 provides the 
broad theoretical background on how institutional factors theoretically influence 
national trajectories of innovation in Germany. The usefulness of the VoC theory in 
this context is discussed. Institutional change theory in the context of VoC and 
innovation is shown. Section 3.3 provides a theoretical analysis of policy change and 
its expected effects on institutional spheres, such as the job market and skill 
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equilibrium, as it relates to decision making and, therefore, the trajectories of 
innovation in Germany. Section 3.4 concludes with a discussion and a newly 
suggested theoretical framework. It evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of this 
framework.   
 
3.1.  Definitions 
This dissertation raises the issue of radical innovation within a coordinated market 
economy. It is clearly important to define the concepts of radical innovation and the 
institutional spheres within this context. Yet the definitions, particularly in the field 
of radical innovation, abound. “Depending on the researcher, essentially the same 
phenomenon may be labeled as discontinuous innovation (Anderson and Tushman 
1990), emerging technology (Day and Schoemaker 2000), or even disruptive 
technology" (Christensen 2000, as cited in Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, Sainio and 
Jauhiainen 2008, 279 ).  
These different definitions between radical and incremental innovation make 
it hard to actually compare existing research which is often conducted on the basis of 
different models. We can observe this even within institutional approaches in CC. 
Where NISs view radical innovation on different levels and would, for example, call 
an unexpected economic success (Lundvall 1999) a radical innovation, the VoC 
approach focuses on high-tech sector performance. It describes newly-emerging 
sectors which are automatically characterised by radical innovation. Still, within one 
sector, it may be possible to find incremental and radical innovation. For example, 
this dichotomy is very visible within the German automobile industry: a traditional 
industry that aims to create radical innovation. Nevertheless, there are often some 
common elements relating to the definition of radical innovation. Many definitions 
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are based on Schumpeter`s (1934) differentiation between day-to-day improvements 
and “radical changes with a great impact on sectors of industry and business cycles” 
(Hagedoorn 1996, 888).  
 The existing definitions do typically include aspects relating o “high market 
and technological uncertainty, new market creation, current product cannibalization, 
and even effects on the knowledge base of the company” (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et 
al. 2008, 279). Radical innovation is said to “play a different role in the firm’s 
product portfolio”, but also in a whole market sector, compared to incremental 
innovation. Where radical innovation is generally called upon to transform whole 
product portfolios or market segments, incremental innovation is called upon to 
“provide low-risk potential for product upgrades” (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al. 
2008, 279). These definitions or attempts to define the difference between radical 
and incremental innovation do not provide a clear framework in terms of what 
exactly may be called a radical/incremental innovation. For this thesis, I follow the 
definition of VoC which ascribes to new and emerging sectors the term radical: 
software and biotech are two major examples of radically innovating sectors. Hall 
and Soskice (2001) use this simplified definition in order to later explain CEA 
derived from CIA. This dissertation attempts to reflect on the idea of CIA directly 
leading to CEA. The sectoral perspective on innovation is, therefore, used in order to 
directly discuss the dominant VoC approach despite knowing the shortcomings of 
this approach. Casper, Lehrer and Soskice (1999) discuss, through themes, the ability 
of radical and incremental innovation to occur within one sector, e.g. the biotech 
sector of one nation. Later scholars (e.g. Hancke and Goyer 2005) discuss the 
influence of various institutional constellations within one nation upon not only one 
innovational outcome.  
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 By not simply trying to identify radical innovation, but also the way in which 
it is created, it has been shown by different authors that the internal as well as 
external factors of firms are relevant for the creation of radical innovation, thus not 
only institutional factors. An example for this research is Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
Sainio and Jauhiainen (2008) who argue that the firm size generally influences a 
firm`s ability to radically innovate, and that smaller companies would thereby be 
experts in radical innovation, whereas radical changes in large firms would not be 
able to happen as easily. Other authors view radical innovation from a different point 
of view and argue that it “varies substantially in firms across nations (Diamond 1999; 
Furman, Porter and Stern 2002; Landes 1999)” (Tellis et al. 2009, 3), and also across 
different industry sectors. These cross-country and cross-industry differences are the 
basis of Hall and Soskicès (2001) assertion that innovation is influenced by the kind 
of capitalist system in any given country. Identifying certain sectors which are more 
influenced by radical innovation than others offers a kind of definition, which the 
two authors use to measure cross-country differences in terms of the ability of a 
country to radically innovate. As argued by Hall and Soskice (2001) some nations 
such as the USA thereby specialise n radicaly innovating sectors, whereas others 
such as Germany focus on incrementally innovating sectors. This mirroring picture 
has been built upon by many other authors such as Porter (1990). Porter 
distinguished clearly between the two market economies of LMEs and CMEs, the 
first one being superior in new high-tech industries such as biotechnology and 
software, and the other one, being superior in industries such as machine tools, the 
chemical industry or luxury cars. The Fraunhofer Institute (Warschat 2009, Ardilio 
2009) tries, for example, to enhance the radical innovativeness of firms by building 
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up a technology radar.2 From a different perspective, Srwholec and Verspagen find, 
in their analysis of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) Europe, that:  
 “[d]espite the work on sectoral taxonomies of innovation, or sectoral and 
 national systems of innovation, these two dimensions – sectors and countries 
 – only capture a minor part of the variance in the innovation strategies that we 
 observe at the firm level. Within sectors and countries, a multitude of 
 innovation strategies is observed.” Srwholec and Verspagen (2007, 35) 
 
 CC literature defines institutions as shaping the supply side, “examining how 
various institutions shape the collective supply of inputs (e.g., skills, capital) 
available to firms and other economic actors” (Deeg and Jackson 2007, 7). Within 
the VoC approach, these independent variables are limited to five spheres. CC 
literature does generally suggest a theory of comparative institutional advantage. 
The different institutional frameworks between countries are assumed to support 
certain economic activities, such as e.g. a countries ability to radically innovate, in 
different ways. The VoC (Hall and Soskice, 2001) approach was established in the 
field of CC. It does, therefore, inhibit propositions of institutionalism and 
institutional change. Debating its propositions on institutional change is relevant for 
understanding VoC’s concepts of relative stability, institutional complementarities, 
and path dependency. The focus of this part of the thesis is on the intersection 
between institutional change itself and the outcome of capitalist variety as described 
by Hall and Soskice (2001): innovation behaviour of nations due to sectoral 
specialisation in radical vs. incremental sectors.  
 The nature of organisations and institutions themselves is to be differentiated. 
An organisation is defined as a “durable entity with formally recognised members, 
whose rules also contribute to the institutions of the political economy” (North 1990, 
                                                
2 A network between the 57 institutes and 12,000 employees of the Fraunhofer association and 




3 as cited in Hall and Soskice 2001, 9). Hall and Soskice refer to North when they 
define institutions as a “set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally follow, 
whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons” (North 1990, 3 as cited in Hall 
and Soskice 2001, 9). Organisations, as compositions of different members, create 
rules for interaction with each other. These evolving rules do influence the nature of 
a country’s institutions, which are expected to stay relatively consistent towards 
change. The proposition of relative stability over time is not only of importance for 
understanding institutions themselves but is underlying Hall and Soskice’s larger 
assertion that there are two different kinds of market economies. It is argued that one 
cannot find one superior market economy (either CME or LME) but that these two 
manage to co-exist throughout pressure of globalisation and competition, due to their 
relative stability. This co-existence does, in turn, explain the specialisation of 
countries in terms of their innovation behavior. Literature which compares capitalist 
systems not only discusse  whether the differentiation between CMEs and LMEs is 
useful and correct, it also discusses its underlying proposition of relative institutional 
stability, but also why this stability exists.  
 There are three main perspectives notable in institutionalism: historic, rational 
choice, and the sociological perspective. Early institutional theory militates against 
cross-national comparisons. In contrast, the approach of new institutionalism 
"utilizes to identify the most salient institutional determinants” (Peters, Pierre and 
King 2005, 1280). Peters et al. (2005) describe the renewed scholarly interest 
“among comparative political sociologists in the state as an analytic concept (...) 
analytical significance ascribed to institutional arrangements” (Peters, Pierre and 
King 2005, 1280) in political science as having triggered the interest in new 
institutionalism in the past 15 years. Historic Institutionalism is characterised by 
three features. Firstly, it addresses substantive questions that are of interest to the 
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broad public; secondly, it specifies sequences and traces transformations and 
processes of varying scale, and thirdly it analyses “macro contexts and hypothesizes 
about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just 
one institution or process at a time”. Historic institutionalism has not developed as a 
single point of view in the study of institutions. In a rational choice tradition, 
Weingast (2002) answers the question on why institutions are needed. He explains 
that they need to capture gains from cooperation. Weingeist describes a social 
dilemma which individuals do often face when there are no institutions constructed. 
This dilemma appears because individuals cannot agree on how to distribute the 
gains which they get from cooperation. Weingeist not only gives an answer about 
why institutions exist but also theorises about why institutions differ across nations: 
“because incentive problems differ greatly across environments, the type of 
institutions necessary to mitigate these problems also varies” (Weingeist 2002, 670). 
Weingeist states that “(…) institutions restructure incentives so that individuals have 
an incentive to cooperate” (Weingeist 2002, 670). It has been argued that, generally, 
contrary to historic institutionalism, rational choice tends to scarify the nuances for 
generalisability. Thelen (1999) argues that this differentiation does not fit well. She 
argues that good researchers in both areas try to generate hypotheses that are then 
brought to bear on empirical phenomena. They cannot simply be divided into 
“empirically” vs. “theoretically” driven work. She concludes that differences remain, 
but theorists work through these differences. She thereby views each approach as 
nearly fluid in terms of the other. Both perspectives on institutions are exogenous 
ones, which means that “institutions affect individual interaction and choice in a 
variety of ways: institutions constrain individual choice, how individuals interact, 
their information and beliefs, and their payoffs” (Weingeist 2000, 661). One might 
notice that this is in total contrast to the third approach which co-exists in 
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institutional studies. Contrary to historical institutionalism, the sociological 
perspective allows one to see institutions as being “socially constructed in the sense 
that (they) embody shared culture understandings (…) of the way the world works” 
(Thelen 1996, 386). Institutions are not seen as constructed by a country’s cultural, 
but as part of it and continuing to form it as well. Parents, grandparents, and children 
follow the cultural perspectives of their previous generations and institutions, as 
demonstrations of culture. Institutions act as scripts that individuals enact, almost 
unconsciously. 
 VoC is not only an approach which compares differences across nations, but 
it is also helpful to "elucidate the processes whereby national political economies 
change" ( Thelen 2001, 65). By talking about institutional change, Hall and Soskice 
(2001) refer to the change in the set of rules that actors in our society (such as the 
members of an organisation) usually use as a basis for their actions. Thereby 
institutions not only shape “the collective supply of inputs (e.g., skills, capital) 
available to firms and other economic actors” (Jackson and Deeg 2006, 7) but also 
provide “comparative institutional advantages”. In particular, the VoC approach 
links institutional variables with a variety of distinct economic outcomes, and, in 
particular, with a nation’s specialisation into either incremental or radical innovation. 
Institutional change, therefore, not only means a change in the institutional 
framework itself but also in the outcome of the nation’s trajectories of innovation. In 
the context of the VoC debate, institutions are seen as “durable entities” (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, 9) which resist the pressures of globalisation. This consistency is 
being described as a result of complementarities. Deeg (2007, 612) argues that 
complementarities have “become a central concept" in comparative studies. Thereby 
VoC’s division of “advanced capitalist economies into two primary types –
coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs)” and 
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its prediction that “when confronted with pressure for change, liberal market 
economies will get ‘more liberal’ and coordinated market economies will resist 
liberalization in order to sustain complementarities” is offered as a major example of 
complementarities. Hall and Soskice themselves argue that there are two types of 
work existing in the literature, those that focus on institutions and the way in which 
they reproduce stable patterns of behaviour and on those that attribute great force to 
the pressures associated with globalisation. They tend to see national practices as 
inertial factors that will be transformed by these pressures. Hall and Soskice believe 
that their model “anticipates institutional change in all the developed democracies 
(…) but (also) provides a framework within which the importance of those changes 
can be assessed" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 66). Searching for this new approach on 
institutional change, the reader finds that the offered “approach” is mainly a 
proposition about how CMEs and LMEs would change. Therefore, diverse 
hypotheses are presented as given findings and, in turn, are used as direct behaviour 
rules for these two types of market economy. The main theory behind Hall and 
Soskice’s assertion is obviously Aokis’s (1994) approach on institutional 
complementarities. Hall and Soskice’s way of connecting institutional change with 
complementarities can also be found i  other works (Deeg 2007; Person 2004; North 
1991) which argue that the existence of “complementarities among institutions 
inhibits change, i.e. reinforces a given institutional path by generating increasing 
returns to actors. In this case, complementarities lead to predictions not of specific 
outcomes, but of institutional stability (until overwhelmed by other forces)” (Deeg 
2007, 612). It is argued that VoC provides a framework by which to understand 
institutional stability and sectoral specialisation of nations even in times of 
globalisation and global pressure. One might criticise this assertion and argue that 
nation states are not “hermetically sealed”. As Hancké et al. (2007) illustrate, various 
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authors (see Crouch and Farrell 2004; Martin 2005; Panitch and Gindin 2005; 
Pontusson 2005) have criticised this. It is argued that VoC does not acknowledge 
exogenous pressure and its effect on institutional change. In addition to the 
expectation of institutional stability, VoC encompasses the idea that "only in times of 
economic shocks, the foundations of coordinated market economies could be 
unsettled and therefore CMEs could be deregulated to become more like LMEs" 
(Hall and Soskice 2001, 63). It is argued that the common knowledge which is 
required by CMEs cannot easily be adapted by LMEs. CMEs do not face such 
constraints. This argument leaves us with the expectation of a liberalisation of CMEs 
in times of global crisis. The question about whether such proposed deregulation 
goes hand in hand with a change in national trajectories of innovation is left open in 
VoC.  
 
3.2.  Background of Theoretical Framework: Perspectives on the 
Institutional Framework of CMEs and Innovation 
Claiming to define a right to exist to relatively stable and co-existing market 
economies VoC draws attention to the influence of a complementary institutional 
framework on proposed mirroring of national trajectories of innovation. The 
approach draws on propositions which leave us with a set of questions as arising 
from the paradoxes appearing in economic developments in CMEs, such as 
Germany. By redefining the relationships between skill formation, LMIs, CG and 
their influence on sectoral production specialisation as representing trajectories of 
incremental/radical innovation, an attempt to refute this paradox and draw an 
alternative theoretical framework for observing developments in the German political 
economy needs to be undertaken. Placing the political economy of skill formation in 
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a key position in comparative capitalist debates on varieties of national innovation 
behaviour is a valuable approach which needs to be further discussed in the context 
of the propositions rising from VoC. This chapter aims to discuss the propositions 
underlying VoC in detail, through a comprehensive look at the literature. The 
structure of this section follows the previously identified propositions on innovation 
in CMEs: 
Proposition 1: General skills lead to radical innovation.  
Proposition 2: LM flexibility leads to radical innovation.  
Proposition 3: WPRs dominate CMEs and create inequality. 
Proposition 4: CME's policy making is strongly influenced by corporations.  
Proposition 5: CMEs will move activities to LMEs in order to create radical 
innovation. 
Proposition 6: CME's CG and finance structure will change towards shareholder 
value.  
Proposition 7: CME's institutional foundations are under fundamental renegotiation 
and will liberalise. 
 
3.2.1.  The Political Economy of Skill Formation and Innovation 
In their Introduction to Are Skills the Answer? Crouch, Finegold and Saki (2004, vii) 
describe a common belief of economists nowadays that, if standards of living are to 
advance, countries need to "secure competitive advantage in a global economy by 
moving into product markets requiring highly skilled and highly productive 
workforces". This approach can also be found within the VoC framework. Whereas 
CMEs such as Germany are described as using industrial or firm-specific skills, 
LMEs are argued to require university-level general education for their radical 
innovation. In a global world, supporting the division of work, it is not rare to 
discover policies which aim to fill the potential gaps in highly skilled labour. Thus, 
where the country’s own market economy does not produce enough of these general 
skills, policy making looks at supporting industry e.g. in terms of high skill 
immigration (BMBF 2012b; International Business Times 2015; Kahanec and 
Zimmermann 2011) or university level education (Band and Länder 2011; 2007). 
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The previously mentioned proposition on high skills and highly productive 
workforces as the solution in an attempt to gain comparative advantage has been 
criticised by different scholars, in terms of employment generation (Keep and 
Mayhew 2001), and national skills equilibria (Crouch, Finegold and Sako 2004). In 
the context of competitiveness in High Skills: Globalization, Competitiveness and 
Skill Formation, Brown, Green and Lauder "show that national economies can 
remain competitive without upgrading the skills of large sections of the workforce" 
(Brown, Green, and Lauder 2001, 12). Some other scholars have argued that the role 
of skills as such is often overrated and this deflects attention from a nation’s actual 
measures of performance, such as equality and sustainability (Grugulis and 
Stoyanova 2011; Grugulis 2003). In Skills and Skilled Work: An Economic and 
Social Analysis, Adam Green (2013) divides evidence which links skills to 
performance into three spheres. For the purpose of a good overview, these three 
levels are adopted: firstly, the micro level of studies which examines detailed micro-
settings of skill measures (e.g. pay depending on a certain skill); secondly, studies 
evaluate the effect of work-related training on job performance and intermediary 
organisational goals (Jones 2012; Jones and Grimshaw 2012). In The Effects of 
Policies for Training and Skills on Improving Innovation Capabilities of Firms, 
Jones and Grimshaw (2012, 1) describe how the relationship between skills and 
innovation can be identified in general but that "the mechanisms through which they 
interact in real-world economy remain somewhat opaque". As argued by Green 
(2013, 68) "[a]t the aggregate level, employers' performance is gauged by the 
productivity of the business sector". In accordance with High Skills, Green relates 
this macroeconomic productivity of certain sectors to the development of GDP. In 
the context of the previously described approach from an Institutional Foundation of 
Comparative Advantage, this dissertation focuses on literature regarding the link 
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between skill formation and innovation. One focus is on the aggregate level of 
sectoral innovation as it relates to incremental/radical innovation within the VoC 
framework, looking specifically at radical innovation in CMEs. The existing 
literature focuses on skills, skill creation, and economic performance, or on the 
relationship between skills (in general) and innovation. The sector-specific 
production of skills as related to the sector-specific product market specialisation of 
firms has hardly been captured. This might be due to a lack of available secondary 
data, but also due to dominating economic and sociological approaches which 
generally focus on the plain differentiation between forms of degrees (emphasising 
high levels of knowledge as the one superior thing, which can only be achieved by 
highly developed nations instead of newly industrialising countries), instead of fields 
of degrees. Studying fields of degrees appears to be essential in understanding 
sectoral development in nations. The German market economy, for example, is 
characterised by high levels of well-trained workers who have developed from the 
apprenticeship system, not just the university system. This system has a high 
reputation in Germany. Graduates of a three-year dual apprenticeship can hardly be 
compared to high school graduates from the US or UK. The industry-specific skills 
of these gradates not only enable them to study at a university but might even earn 
the students credit points in order to reduce the duration of their study while pursuing 
an undergraduate degree.  
 In general literature on the topic of skills and their relation to innovation can 
be broken down on several levels, which are more or less relevant for this 
dissertation. The vast majority of the literature focuses on the creation of skills. 
Different streams describe e.g. the effect of job training and HRM's relevance for 
innovation in firms (Amara et al. 2008; Baldwin and Johnson 1996; Freel 2005; 
Lopez-Cabrales, Pérez-Lu, and Cabrera 2009; Shipton et al. 2006). Following a 
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techno-sociological perspective on institutionalism (e.g. Cluster, Network), the 
Triple Helix approach on innovation (Etzkowitz 2004) received generous attention in 
the literature. A large amount of empirical work has been conducted on university 
(graduate and post-graduate) industry collaboration (Behrens and Gray 2001; Link 
and Scott 2005; Martinelli 2001; Salminen-Karlsson and Wallgren 2008; Shane 
2004; Shane and Venkataraman 2000; Wallgren and Dahlgren 2005). Underlying 
these studies is a proposition on the general skills of university graduates in newly 
emerging technical fields and how they are highly relevant for existing firms and the 
foundation of firms.  
 In search of an answer to the question of whether market economies which 
are characterised by high degrees of coordination specialise in the creation of 
firm/industry-specific skills, Jonas Edland and Anne Grönland (2008) compare the 
levels of firm-specific skills across 21 coordinated countries. In Protection of Mutual 
Interests? Employment Protection and Skill Formation in Different Labour Market 
Regimes, they only partly support this proposition. Edland and Grönland identify the 
existence of a variety of types of coordination. They argue for a further 
differentiation of CMEs and point out different combinations of firm-specific and 
general skills inherent in each single CME and further required for each specific 
industry. Contrary to the position indicated by VoC, the authors further point out a 
high level of on-the-job training in LMEs. In The Unexpected Appearance of a New 
German Model, Werner Eichhorst (2014) describes the German experience of 
increasing levels of employment after global crisis. Counter inductively, a growing 
share of this employment is found to be of "low pay and non-standard work" with a 
growing "reliance on mechanisms of internal flexibility for the skilled core 
workforce" (Eichhorst 2014, 1).   
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 From a different angle it is not only suggested that the "(...) impact of 
technology on employment skills is uneven (...) some jobs become deskilled or 
eliminated, others present the opportunity for re-skilling" (Brown, Green, and Lauder 
2001, 17) and, therefore, in general, a relative abundance of general skills, such as 
those acquired from university or college education, does not necessarily lead 
national economies towards comparative advantage in terms of radically innovating 
sector performance. Contrary to Proposition 1 (P1) Keep and Mayhew (2001, 6) 
illustrate the paradox of low skill jobs dominating the UK (LME) economy, with 
only a small proportion of "well-developed high-performance work systems" in place 
(see also Lloyd 1999). In The Contribution of National Vocational Qualifications, 
the Growth of Skills in the UK, Irena Grugulis suggests that the British (LME) 
system lacks the ability to "encourage knowledge and skills". In terms of competitive 
advantage Drucker (1999, 88) calls for technologists a :  
"the one group in which developed countries can have a true and long-lasting 
competitive advantage (…). This group includes people who apply 
knowledge of the highest order" (...) "[t]hey include automobile mechanics 
and all kinds of repair and installation people." (Grugulis 2003, 457) 
 
 He re-emphasises the relevance of productivity but especially of knowledge-
worker productivity for leadership in the world economy. IN a similar way to 
Drucker, in The Search for Flexibility, Skills and Workplace Innovation in the 
German Pump Industry, Finegold and Wagner (1998) stress that the modern 
metalworking apprenticeship in Germany provides individuals with strong 
theoretical and applied training to foster innovation. Moreover, Meisters have the 
right set of broad skills needed to act as effective team leaders. Without knowing it, 
they open up a new perspective on the interrelationship between skills and 
innovation. General skills can be created through traditional apprenticeship training, 
and technical skills are highly relevant for the ability of firms to face increasing 
73 
 
competition and innovation. In summary, even though a group of continental CMEs 
is characterised by the existence of types of traditional apprenticeship training which 
are broadly associated with firm-/industry specific skills in the VoC framework, 
modern apprenticeship training can provide workers with general skills. Moreover, 
within these systems, Meisters take on a special role with high-level skills being 
transferrable across industries through their leadership abilities. Empirical work 
suggests that the dichotomist view on general vs. specific skills for innovation is not 
sufficient. The role of technicians and experts within their respective fields is crucial 
for innovation in general. CMEs don't necessarily specialise in traditional 
apprenticeship training (country cases). Apprenticeship training doesn't necessarily 
lead to firm/industry-specific skills (Meister). Specific Skills (technicians) might be 
necessary for the creation of radical innovation. 
3.2.2.  Labour Market Flexibility and Innovation 
Interrelated with the VoC proposition on skill formation, the approach assumes a 
relationship between labour market flexibility and a firm’s ability to create radical 
innovation. P2 states: Labour market flexibility leads to radical innovation and this 
phenomenon was identified in the previous review of the VoC approach.  
 In an attempt to analyse labour market developments, both socio- and 
politico-economic institutionalism usually focus on analyses of the effects of social 
policy and industrial relations (Busemeyer and Iversen 2012; Crouch and Streeck 
1997; Eichhorst, Grienberger-Zingerle and Konle-Seidl 2010; Esping-Anderson 
1996a; West and Nikolai 2013). In many cases, the literature argued for the existence 
of a relationship between labour market rigidity and high unemployment (Mankiw 
and Romer 1991; Nickell 1997; Regini 2000; Siebert 1997). In Unemployment and 
Labour Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America, Stephen Nickell 
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differentiates measures of labour market rigidity and social policy. His findings 
suggest that certain spheres support unemployment whereas others don't. 
Unemployment is supported by "1) generous unemployment benefits that are allowed 
to run on indefinitely  (...)”; 2) “high unionization with wages bargained collectively 
and no coordination between either unions or employers in wage bargaining (...)”; 3) 
“high overall taxes impinging on labor (...)” and 4) “poor educational standards 
(...)."(Nickell 1997, 73) 
 
 Opposed to this are: 1) “strict employment protection legislation and general 
legislation on the  LM (...)”; 2) “generous levels of unemployment benefits, so 
long as these are  accompanied by pressure on the unemployed to take jobs (...)” 
and 3) “high levels  of unionization and union coverage, so long as they are offset 
by high levels of coordination in wage bargaining particularly in employers." 
(Nickell 1997, 73). 
As illustrated by Western and Beckett (1999) in How unregulated is the US 
Labor Market?" factors other than labour market flexibility had an impact on 
employment numbers in the USA as well. The expansion of the US penal system 
influences the employment measures. Thus, for employment performance measures 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the US depended in part on a high and increasing 
incarceration rate. One more finding of Nickell is that LMIs "that conventionally 
come under the heading of rigidities have no observable impact on unemployment". 
Nickell further suggests a differentiation between coordinated labour markets. He 
describes finding continental European countries with flexible LMs and high 
unemployment rates, those with flexible LMs and low unemployment rates but also 
continental European countries with rigid labour markets and high unemployment 
(e.g. Netherlands) or low unemployment (e.g. Germany). A more differentiated 
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picture is being drawn. He concludes that "the broad-brush analysis that says that 
European unemployment is high because European labor markets are ‘rigid’ is too 
vague and probably misleading" (Nickell 1997, 73). Hall and Soskice (2001, 41–42) 
aim to illustrate the mirroring trajectories of innovation between the USA (arguably 
flexible LM) and Germany (arguably rigid LM), but, as previously illustrated, most 
empirical studies do not concentrate on the LMs influence on radical/incremental 
innovation, but on factors such as employment creation or overall performance. In 
the OECD Jobs Study 1994, John-Claude Paye suggests a liberalisation of labour 
markets to increase national productivity and innovation. Contrary to this suggestion, 
Zhou et al. (2011, 21) "warn against the unconditional plea by mainstream 
economists for the deregulation of labor markets". In Flexible labor and innovation 
performance: Evidence from longitudinal firm-level data, Zhou, Dekker and 
Kleinknecht use the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) to illustrate the 
effect of temporary contracts on firms’ innovation behaviour. They find that "the 
‘rigidity’ of insider-outsider labor markets also has advantages, as it allows for 
‘functional’ flexibility. The often criticized protection of ‘insiders’ can be interpreted 
as an investment in the loyalty and commitment of workers" (Zhou, Dekker and 
Kleinknecht 2011, 72). The authors continue their argument by concluding that 
functional flexibility of internal labour markets may have advantages for 
organisational learning and the historical memory of firms. In this context, they 
illustrate how market leaders seem to have a need for continuity in learning and in 
preventing knowledge from leaking to competitors. 
 CMEs are characterised by diverse labour market arrangements. CMEs which 
are characterised by rigid LMs are found to create diverse innovation. Radically 




3.2.3.  Social Policy Making, WPRs and Innovation 
The proposition raised by the VoC approach on the economic and social policy 
making of CMEs being strongly influenced by a nation’s firms in order to reinforce 
national skill equilibria and rigid LMIs is another element in the ongoing discussion. 
As previously illustrated, VoC theory points to two propositions (P3: WPRs 
dominate CMEs and create inequality; P4: CME's policy making is strongly 
influenced by corporations) relating to social policies and the welfare state, which are 
interrelated with labour market arrangements and skill formation.  
 In her analysis of The Paradox of Liberalization – Understanding Dualism 
and the Recovery of the German Political Economy, Anke Hassel (2012, 57) 
questions this simplification and suggests that certain social policy changes are 
"driven by producer coalitions of export-oriented firms and core workers` 
representatives, rather than by firms per se". Busemeyer and Trampusch (2011) 
argue that, in the case of Germany, the country’s VET system, which is an alternative 
to academic education, cannot be understood as being a result of firms’ preferences, 
but must be understood in the historical Christian context of the country. As argued 
by Van Kersbergen (1995), it has arisen from rather a Christian approach to 
education and social equality and may, therefore, have been of ongoing relevance in 
election campaigns over the past decades in German political regimes. Several 
studies suggest adding a new perspective to this discussion by viewing large firms’/ 
MNCs’ influence over government policy making in the face of financial 
globalisation (Becht and Röell 1999). Private governance mechanisms are argued to 
have an influence on policy making (Goyer et al. 2014). The role of MNCs 
(Filatotchev and Wright 2010; Witcher and Chau 2012) in shaping national LMIs, 
e.g. in terms of social dumping, is apparent. MNCs are described as having gained 
the ability to "regime shop by choosing where to locate their production" (Goyer et 
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al. 2014, 474) depending on labour market policies and other preferences. They are 
shaping globalised labour governance in terms of influencing the skill formation 
preferences of governments (e.g. towards a knowledge society in Western nations), 
but also social policy making (e.g. reduction of employment protection, emergence 
of alternative forms of employment in Germany – Zeitarbeit). The interlocking 
theme fields of skill formation, capitalist variety, and welfare regimes led to the sixth 
proposition identified through the VoC approach. The belief that coordination is a 
driver of inequality appears to be almost a paradox in the face of striking inequality 
and high unemployment in LMEs (Esping-Anderson 1996b). Thelen (2014) further 
differentiates CMEs indicating that egalitarian capitalism and social solidarity are not 
necessarily bound to coordination but can also occur in liberal market economies. 
She argues for changes within the LME and CME frameworks, illustrating a variety 
of new politics of social solidarity measures. Contrary to the proposition arising from 
VoC, welfare systems are, in general, associated with greater equality. Social 
policymaking in CMEs appears to be made by democratic processes, including 
unions and employee representatives. 
3.2.4.  Coordination and Innovation 
Several studies have discussed the ability of CMEs to produce radical innovation 
(Bartholomew 1997; Casper, Lehrer and Soskice 1999; Hancke 2009; Heinrich 
2012). In Can High-technology Industries Prosper in Germany? Institutional 
Frameworks and the Evolution of the German Software and Biotechnology 
Industries, Steven Casper, Mark Lehrer and David Soskice (1999) make a 
comparison of sectoral specialisation in German and US firms. Their argument is for 
the German "social and economic institutional patterns [to] encourage incremental 
innovation" (Casper et al. 1999, 22). Their argument is not that the coordinated 
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market economy is unable to produce radical innovation, but relates to the difficulties 
it has in specialising its production in incremental innovation even within radically 
innovative sectors. In Varieties of Capitalism Revisited: Globalization and 
Comparative Institutional Advantage, Bob Hancke (1999, 2) illustrates exactly the 
same picture of institutional complementary leading to dichotomist specialisation 
between Germany and the US. Hancke sharpens the illustration by arguing that "[t]he 
German innovation system, as it can be read in these data, is almost a mirror image 
of the American. Patents in incremental innovation dominate, while radical 
innovation is rather weak" (Hancke 1999, 2). The one, identical chart which is used 
in Casper, Lehrer, Soskice`s (1999), Hancke`s (1999) studies, and later becomes the 
key source of Hall and Soskice's (2001, 41–42) argument, is illustrated in Chart 4: 
EPO Patent Distribution for Germany and the US. 
The simplistic picture which arises from VoC has been criticised extensively. 
In Empirical Evidence Against Varieties of Capitalism's Theory of Technological 
Innovation, Mark Taylor (2004, 601), suggests that VoC's "predictions are not 
supported by the empirical data" and that the evidence offered by VOC proponents 
"depends heavily on the inclusion of a major outlier, the United States, in the class of 
liberal-market economies”. This critique is supported in Mapping the Institutional 
Capital of High-Tech Firms: A fuzzy-set analysis of capitalist variety and export 
performance, by Martin Schneider, Conrad Schulze-Bentrop and Mihai Paunescu 
(2010) whose fuzzy set analysis shows that a “high share of university graduates and 
a large stock market are complementary institutions leading to strong export 
performance in high-tech” whereas employment protection, which is another 
institutional domain of the VoC argument “is neither conducive nor harmful to 
export performance in high-tech”. The authors also analysed mergers and 
acquisitions, and do not suggest that a high volume of those “as a form of 
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institutional arbitrage leading to knowledge flows, acts as a functional equivalent to 
institutions that support knowledge production in the home economy” (Schneider et 
al. 2010, 41). In Do ‘liberal market economies’ really innovate more radically than 
‘coordinated market economies’? Dirk Akkermans, Carolina Castaldi and Bart Los 
(2009, 181) "refine Taylor's analysis, using a broader set of radicalism indicators and 
making industry-level comparisons". They find some statistical confirmation of the 
position based on VoC, but only in terms of certain measures of radicalism within 
certain sectors. None of this literature comments on polito-economic institutional 
theory and how its findings might relate to theory and which implications this might 
have on theory. Moreover, their approaches in studying VoC are not based on 
qualitative analyses which could lead them towards these implications. In 
Developing Innovative Competences: The Role of Institutional Frameworks, Whitley 
(2002, 500) mentions, that “the variety of (…) innovation strategies within each kind 
of market economy is sometimes greater than the contrast between CME and LME 
would suggest”. The role of complementary national innovation systems for  
production choices in MNCs has merely been neglected in the literature. Within this 
field, research has been conducted on the influence of MNCs e.g. on national LMIs 
but also policy making (Goyer, Reinecke and Donaghey 2014). MNCs arguably have 
the ability to "regime shop". They can choose a production site which best fits their 
needs e.g. in terms of cheap or flexible labour. In practice, representatives of energy 
intense MNCs such as BASF but also German automobile manufacturers represented 
through VDA do increasingly declare their willingness to shift production sites to 
market economies which offer cheaper natural resources and electricity (Diemer 
2015; Niedermark 2015). Little research has been conducted on the proposed 
tendency of large corporations to shift production sites to LMEs in order to use their 
institutional systems and create radical innovation. Whilst this is a neglected field in 
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research, such tendencies are obvious within the economy. Especially high-
performing technology clusters like Silicon Valley seem to attract diverse ranges of 
firms. In this context, firms such as Siemens (2015), SAP (2015), but also publishing 
companies like Axel Springer SE (2015), and automobile manufacturers like BMW 
(2015) have shifted labs to the US. In an argument pointing to the global division of 
work of MNCs according to national polito-economic institutional frameworks, the 
behaviour of the German automobile industry supporting a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) is of relevance as well. The question is whether or not 
the industry’s future projects (networked driving and electro mobility), which rely on 
software and high-technology, might push their engagement. A division of work 
between US software giants and German manufacturers does appear especially likely 
due to VDA's inability to answer any question on software patent or development 
within a potential and desired TTIP (Smethurst 2015). It may be that manufacturers 
believe they just don't need to take care of this element of development. This is in 
contrast to the German software sector’s position on this topic (Digitaleurope, ITIC, 
and BITKOM 2015).  
The literature suggests that the analysis arising from VoC is insufficient. 
CMEs inhibit the ability to produce radical innovation. Previous research fails to 
illustrate the potential attempts of MNCs to set production sites or labs in an LME in 
order to foster radical innovation. 
3.2.5.  Corporate Governance and Innovation 
In the previous overview on the approach arising from VoC on National Trajectories 
of Innovation, a proposition on coordinated market economies' corporate governance 
structure (stakeholder) and its predicted direction of change due to financial 
globalisation has been identified. P6: CMEs’ Corporate Governance structure will 
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change towards shareholder value. Following Albert's (1992) dichotomising 
argument in Kapitalismus contra Kapitalismus, comparing capitalist nations, two 
ways to successfully organise Western societies were described. The distinction 
between an Anglo-Saxon and a Rhenish model of capitalism was followed in a 
description of the dichotomising CG systems. The same dichotomy can now be 
found underlying the VoC perspective.  
 For the purpose of a clearer structure, this section discusses the literature on 
corporate governance and later links it to innovation. Section 3.2.6. is then structured 
around the topic of different types of globalisation and their effect on national 
institutions, e.g. liberalisation of CG; it's implicit effect on innovation behaviour and 
patterns of production. 
The two ideal types of CG identified in the literature are the system of 
concentrated ownership, which is "characterized by controlling block holders, weak 
securities markets, high private benefits, of control, and low disclosure and market 
transparency standards, with only a modest role played by the market of corporate 
control, but with a possible substitutionary monitoring role played by large banks 
(...)" (Coffee 2000, 2 as cited in Herrigel 2010, 471) and the dispersed ownership 
system which is characterised "by strong securities markets, rigor disclosure 
standards, and high market transparency, in which the market for corporate control 
constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism" (Coffee 2000, 2 as cited in Herrigel 
2010, 471). Several approaches to the study of comparative CG can influence a 
researcher’s perception and position. Depending on one's point of view, corporate 
governance is conceptualised in different ways. In Corporate governance and 
national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda, Filatotchev, Jackson 
and Nakajima (2013, 965) argue that the principal-agency framework is the dominant 
approach in CG research. The shareholder perspective inherent in this approach 
82 
 
allows researchers to understand the behaviour of corporate investors, who aim to 
seek maximum returns on their investment. This perspective helps us to understand 
incentive schemes for top managers, which are designed to align shareholders' 
interests with those of the top management of the corporation, through bonus 
payments. Transaction problems are central to agency theory, raising questions such 
as: How can shareholders in a managerial-controlled firm minimise their agency 
cost? (Aguilera and Jackson 2010; Eisenhardt 1989; Filatotchev and Wright 2010). 
Such incentives aim to secure an intended monitoring effect of shareholders over top 
managers. This approach mainly focuses on the relationship between shareholders 
and managers. It remains insensitive to other stakeholders. In contrast, stakeholder 
theory acknowledges the existence of national differences in terms of a firm's 
shareholder or stakeholder orientation. In countries with stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance, the focus is mainly on the impact of governance on labour 
management, but also suppliers (Jackson 2005; Neubaum 2006; Schmidt 2006; 
Vitols 2005) and in terms of corporate social responsibility for the wider economy 
(Aguilera et al. 2006; Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath 2008; Johnson and Greening 
1999). The team production model acknowledges the relevance of stakeholders. 
These stakeholders arguably invest in the firm as member of a cooperative team to 
produce new wealth. They do let a board of directors coordinate their investments to 
resolve coordination problems. This perspective changes the roles between 
shareholders, managers and stakeholders (Blair and Stout 1998; Ho 2014; Kaufman 
and Englunder 2005). In A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Blair and 
Stout argue that: 
"the essential economic function of the public corporation is not to address 
principal-agent problems, but to provide a vehicle through which 
shareholders, creditors, executives, rank-and-file employees, and other 
potential corporate "stakeholders" who may invest firm-specific resources 
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can, for their own benefit, jointly relinquish control over those resources to a 
board of directors." Blair and Stout (1999, 248)  
  
Contrary to these previously described society/interest group centred 
approaches, the perspective on institutional approaches for the study of comparative 
corporate governance suggests that the institutional frameworks of a nation 
complement each other and do thereby determine specific product market choices for 
firms, inherent to the market economy (Hall and Soskice 2004; Hall and Soskice 
2001; Hancke and Goyer 2005; Höpner 2005). Both streams of research not only 
look at corporations and economic developments from a different angle but 
complement each other. This is described in Globalization and Labour Market 
Governance, in which Goyer, Reinecke and Donaghey (2014, 475) argue that 
"Institutional frameworks do preclude certain trajectories of change but do not 
specify how actors operate within an institutional framework".  
 In this dissertation, I follow Goyer et al.'s (2014) argument and define 
complementary national institutional frameworks to be the given playing field within 
which different interest groups play ongoing matches according to their own 
different perceptions. These perceptions, such as those of a shareholder, might be 
influenced by their national institutions in turn, as well as mechanisms of group 
think. The free will of an actor, allows him/her to shift from one perception to 
another – under the assumption of a consistent personality. Aiming to explain the 
origins of cross-national divergence in CG structures, Herrigel (2010, 488) finds that 
"the key problem of such an attempt lies in the finding that most national cases 
which are analyses in comparative capitalism do not fall into systems of 
dispersed/outsider and concentrated/insider systems". He describes why approaches 
to CG have issues with heterogeneity within national CG systems and ascribes it to 
their underlying belief in the Chandaliarian model of corporate development. 
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 It is not the aim of this dissertation to discuss the development of CG theory 
in more detail. A focus is given on literature relating to the linkage between CG and 
innovation. In this context, the previously described model on team production is 
further advanced by Huse and Gabrielsson (2012, 233) in Board Leadership and 
Value Creation: An Extended Team Production Approach. The authors propose an 
advancement of the team production approach which assumes "that the firm is a 
separate and independent moral entity, and that the main task of a board is to create 
long-term values and sustainable competitive advantage in the firm". They combine 
traditional views with Aoki's (1984 as cited in Huse and Gabrielsson, 2012) notion of 
"cooperative game theory, and a behavioral theory of the firm (Cybert and March 
1963)". In this approach, the board of directors and its cohesiveness plays a crucial 
role in mediating between "a firm's value-adding stakeholders to access relevant 
competence and strategic knowledge" (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012, 234). In this 
context, the board of directors is not viewed as instance mechanism for control (as in 
agency theory) but as a value creating mechanism which needs to cooperate in order 
to develop "critical and questioning attitude in the boardroom (...) A key issue is that 
the board members in their decision-making have the integrity to be independent and 
are allowed to ask challenging and discerning questions" (Huse and Gabrielsson 
2012, 241) of the CEO.  
 When it comes to innovation, this approach argues that the task of a central 
board is strategic participation and collaboration in creating innovation. The strategic 
product market choice and development of (future) markets requires specific 
competencies within the core work force. The development of these competencies 
and skills needs to be led by the board of directors. Several empirical studies have 
looked at the relationship between corporate governance and innovation, from 
different perspectives. In The Role of Finance and Corporate Governance in 
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National Systems of Innovation, Andrew Tylecote (2007) emphasises the importance 
of CG as the framework through which a firm acquires and re-locates finance and 
this leads the decisions about R&D investments and potential new product market 
strategies. He illustrates how differently sized firms (e.g. start-ups in emerging 
technology sectors) require different sets of finance (see Tylecote and Ramirez, 
2006). Even though he interconnects CG and finance he does, also, differentiate 
between sectoral behaviour and illustrates "how such differences could help explain 
the sectoral pattern of performance and specialization of national economies". He 
further finds that sectors "differ in technological regime: the knowledge environment 
in which firms operate" (Tylecote 2007, 1476). 
 In Corporate Governance and the Innovation System in France, Goyer (2001) 
argues from the perspective of polito-economic institutionalism for a relationship 
between complementary CG structures to relate to certain trajectories of innovation. 
Goyer follows Mayer's (1996) argument on a dichotomist CG structure, which 
"shapes the ability of firms to make credible commitments to its employees and 
suppliers – which, in turn, is a critical element for incremental innovation" (Goyer 
2001, 137). In accordance with this argument, in Ownership Structure and R&D 
Investments, Lee and O’Neill (2003) illustrate how ownership structure might 
determine a firm's investment strategy. The relationship between ownership structure 
and technological innovation performance is analysed in Choi, Park and Hong 
(2012). In the case of Korean firms, the authors cannot find a relationship between 
concentrated ownership and technological innovation performance. In this context, 
Choi et al.'s (2012) approach, focusing on an entire nation (instead of being sector 
specific) and quantitative analysis may have led to these findings. A qualitative 
approach on the influence of concentrated (foreign) ownership and its influence on 
different kinds and processes of technological innovation within each sector might 
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have indicated different findings. Their study suggests "that it would be interesting 
for future research to examine what interests large shareholders might peruse other 
than technological innovation in emerging economies" (Choi, Park and Hong 2012, 
280). In the context of the expectations arising from VoC on globalisation in general 
and financial globalisation specifically, one more proposition has been identified, 
namely P7: CMEs’ institutional foundations are under fundamental renegotiation and 
will liberalise.  
 A wide range of CG structures within CMEs and LMEs exists even though 
there are accepted institutional differences between LMEs and CMEs. CMEs shift 
towards institutional spheres associated with liberal market economies at different 
speeds. Fifteen years after the publication of VoC, CMEs are still characterised by 
high degrees of coordination. In the face of the global financial crisis, attempts to 
coordinate the financial spheres of LMEs have been made. Attempts to enhance 
welfare and social policy have been made, for example in the US.  
  This chapter establishes the theoretical framework for the study of national 
trajectories of innovation from an institutional perspective. Definitions of institutions 
and institutional change are given, and the theoretical propositions inherent in 
existing approaches in theory are identified. This chapter is a preparation for the 
empirical chapters. It enables the later analysis and discussion leading to an enhanced 





4. CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
 
"The methods we use should reflect the causal complexity assumed by our theories." 
(Haverland and Blatter 2012, 6) 
 Institutional theory in comparative capitalism requires the use of deep 
historical knowledge. The main research design in this field is the comparative 
historical perspective since it involves a large degree of explanatory variables and 
enables one to understand the full complexity of all visible relationships. This 
dissertation asks HOW the institutional foundations of Germany interact in order to 
create radical trajectories of innovation. This overarching question includes several 
propositions of pre-existing theory (e.g. in terms of case choice or the relationship 
between institutions and economic performance). This chapter introduces the reader 
to the research questions deriving from existing theory. It illustrates the propositions 
underlying existing theory. 
 This chapter is organised in the following way: Section 4.1. presents the 
Research Strategy and Epistemology. Section 4.2. discusses the Case Selection 
Strategy of Germany. Section 4.3. discusses the Propositions and Questions again. It 
describes the three analytical chapters. Section 4.4. describes the methods and 
Section 4.5. look at the Data. Section 4.6. reflects on the issues of Validity, 
Reliability, and Generalisability. 
 The relationship between national institutions and economic development has 
been of high importance in the field of comparative capitalism. Within this field, the 
VoC approach, in particular, assumes linear relationships between coordinated 
institutional frameworks and incremental trajectories of innovation. In this approach, 
Germany is described as a crucial case as a major example of a CME. The assumed 
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specialisation of the nation's firms in incremental trajectories of innovation is 
scrutinised in this thesis. This dissertation sheds light on how the institutional 
foundations of Germany support the creation of radical innovation, by discussing the 
meaning and aiming to fully understand what is meant by "specialisation", "radical 
innovation" and "institutional framework" in areas such as "social policy – WPRs". 
By understanding how the influential approach to VoC has attempted to analyse the 
ability of Western nations to prosper in emerging markets, and having focused on a 
variety of propositions regarding the identified institutional framework, it is obvious 
that within this field only a case specific, n-depth analysis makes sense to shed light 
on the questions being asked. The strong performance of German firms in so-called 
radical sectors appears to be paradoxical in terms of the expectations arising from the 
approach. Deriving from the analyses and their theoretical implications, the thesis 
aims to enhance the VoC approach. The research questions being asked are: 
Research Question I: 
In what ways have the institutional foundations underlying the German NIS 
changed since reunification?  
Research Question II: 
How do government policies and regulation affect the institutional 
foundations of the German NIS? 
Research Question III : 
How does German capitalism perform in terms of firm capability to produce 
radical innovation from a comparative perspective?  
Research Question IV: 
In what ways has the skill formation system of Germany oppressed or 




4.1.  Epistemology and Research Strategy 
This study conducts a comparison of descriptive and explanatory merits deriving 
from previously illustrated theory. Throughout the previous two chapters, the 
theoretical background and the key literature have been discussed extensively. The 
propositions underlying the theory have been identified, and the Research Questions 
have been developed: in order to answer the Research Questions, the deductive-
nomological model of explanation underlying the VoC approach to comparative 
capitalism is divided according to its explanatory merits (the identified propositions) 
and the phenomenon of explanandum identified by VoC.  
The critical case study design of this thesis aims to use the crucial case of the 
coordinated market economy of Germany's biotech and software sectors in order to 
test empirically how far the phenomenon of weak high-tech performance and strong 
specialisation in incrementally innovating sectors can be confirmed. This research 
design is not chosen in order to test the existing theory, but in order to further 









Yin (1981) and Jick (1979) recommend the use of a case study research 
design for explanatory purposes. As Linda Kohn (1997, 3) puts it in Methods in Case 
 Figure 4: Research Strategy  
Source: Own illustration 
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Study Analysis: "(...) the [case study] methodology may actually be more powerful 
for explanatory purposes in its ability to answer questions on how and why". In 
Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis, Matthew 
Miles (1979, 597) summarises some of the main critiques of qualitative studies and, 
in particular, case study research. He "(...) found that the actual process of analysis 
during case-writing was essentially intuitive, primitive, and unmanageable in any 
rational sense". Miles addresses the issues of a possible overload of data, an 
inapplicability of the quantitative notion of reliability, an essentially intuitive 
interpretation of the findings and, therefore, low validity, and, despite the existence 
of vague rules of thumb, the lack of clear rules and guidelines.  
 In The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers, Robert Yin (1981) discusses Miles' 
critiques by differentiating between data use, data collection methods, and research 
strategy. He disproves the interconnection between qualitative research and a case 
study research design. In this study, I have started off with a discussion of existing 
theories and identified their ability to explain or predict the observable trajectories of 
innovation in Germany. I am following George and Bennetts's (2005) method – a 
congruence (CON) analysis approach.  
"The typical goal of the congruence analysis approach to case studies is 
contribute to the theoretical debate in a discipline or field of research. [CON 
case studies] are used to elucidate and to compare the explanatory merits of 
competing or complementary theories" (Haverland and Blatter 2012, 10).  
 
 In this context, a critical case study is conducted. The term critical case study 
is used in terms of a case which enables one to demonstrate that even under the 
“most likely circumstances for the causality or argument to hold, it does not” 
(Hancke 2009, 68) and that thus the original theory must have deeply problematic 
elements. It is important to understand that the purpose of this study is to develop 
theory not to test it (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). In an attempt to further develop 
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theory in the field of comparative capitalism, congruence analysis appears to be 
particularly worthy due to its ability to give different meanings to concepts 
depending the way they are theoretically embedded. For example, Germany's 
specialisation in the engineering fields points to path dependency within historical 
institutionalism, but also illustrates domestic pressures in politics. As Sager, 
Thomann, Zollinger and Mavrot (2014) point out:  
 "(…) one should rely not only on single observations, but on clusters of 
 observations to obtain a picture which is meaningful in the light of the 
 theoretical framework. This picture is then contrasted with the meanings to 
 reduce the risk of a ‘confirmation bias’ (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 
 174).” (Sager et al. 2014, 463–464) 
 
 In, qualitative research in political science, Blatter, Haverland, and van Hulst 
(2016) go beyond a simple description of the of existing diversity in case study 
research; they aim to provide an orientation by creating their own system of 
classification. They point out that one of the main advantages of CON research in 
case studies is that it can serve as a bridge between theoretical paradigms. "In a 
congruence analysis, a broad set of empirical observations is compared to different 
sets of expectations that are derived from distinct comprehensive theories" (Blatter, 
Haverland and van Hulst 2016, 5). The authors further describe how also, in 
epistemological terms, CON takes an in between position. "The term ‘congruence’ 
points to the weight that is given to the correspondence between abstract theory and 
concrete observations; but both abstract concepts and concrete information are also 
judged according to how coherent they are in respect to other concepts and other 
pieces of information" (Blatter, Haverland and van Hulst 2016, 6). 
Due to the small number of cases used in this study, the discussion about the 
reasonability of its determinist vs. probabilistic thinking needs to be discussed. Theda 
Skocpol (1984, 378) explains that "comparative historical analyses proceed through 
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logical juxtapositions of aspects of small numbers of cases. They attempt to identify 
invariant causal configurations that necessarily (rather than probably) combine to 
account for outcomes of interest.” In Small N's and big Conclusions: An Examination 
of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases, Stanley 
Lieberson (1991), argues that Mills’s methods for small N studies cannot be used 
with all macro societal data sets.  
"The methods require very strong assumptions: a deterministic set of 
forces,  the existence of only one cause, the absence of interaction 
effects, confidence that all possible causes are measured, the absence of 
measurement errors, and the assumption that the same clean pattern would 
occur if data obtained for all relevant cases." (Lieberson 1991, 315–316) 
 
In context of the VoC approach, these discussions of small N studies are of 
great interest. Not only does the determinist approach assume only one cause 
(liberalisation), the absence of interaction effects (only a further specialisation of a 
nation in its own way or a liberalisation of CMEs) but it is confident about its 
measurement, which can (and in this thesis is) easily shown to be misleading.  
In a later discussion Liberson argues that:  
"The methods of agreement and difference are outdated and inappropriate  
 procedures for comparative or historical analysis based on a small number of 
 cases. The methods cannot employ a probabilistic perspective, deal with data 
 errors, use multivariate analyses, or take into account interaction effects. All 
 of these are critical features in contemporary ways of thinking about social 
 processes." (Lieberson 1994, 1225) 
 
Following Liberson, this thesis argues that "a probabilistic epistemology is the 
only realistic approach to social processes – since it enables us to deal with 
measurement errors, multiple causes, incomplete information, and factors (…)" 
(Lieberson 1994, 1236).  
This thesis does not aim to construct a determinist image of relationships 
between institutional foundations in CMEs that necessarily lead to radical trajectories 
of innovation. Furthermore, the previously established image of a determinist 
93 
 
relationship is criticised and, through in-depth analyses and long term relationships, 
the thesis aims to increase the understanding of complex relationships in the political 
economy of Germany, that are influencing the performance of so called radically 
innovative sectors within the institutional and political context of the market 
economy. The plain differentiation between radically and incrementally innovative 
sectors as chosen by key approaches in the VOC context is criticised later on in this 
thesis. 
In Comparative-Historical Methodology, James Mahoney (2004) illustrates 
some more recent approaches to the methods used in the qualitative methodology of 
comparative-historical studies. As stated by Mahoney and argued for in the design of 
this thesis, it is "to recognize that quantitative analysis is not the only or necessarily 
the best way to generate valid causal and descriptive inferences; in fact, for many 
research questions, one can and will do better with comparative historical methods" 
(Mahoney 2004, 97).  
Due to the relevance of VoC, it is of great importance to illustrate that the 
linear relationship, which would create complementary institutional frameworks in 
nations, leading to complementary economic advantage, does not exist in this 
simplified way. The hope of complementing economic advantages, even within 
economically successful, well-developed and highly-advanced Western nations is an 
utopian illusion. This thesis uses the same kind of analysis, data and methods in a 
first attempt to illustrate the findings of Hall and Soskice (2001), Hancke (1999) and 
Casper et al. (1999); demonstrating how they came to their conclusions and why 
their conclusions are not sufficient for describing economic variety across nations. 
Beyond this, this thesis follows more recent discussions of the VOC approach. 
Acknowledging the perspective of Casper et al. (1999) (e.g. in differentiating 
between more and less radical innovation within one sector case), but by further 
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acknowledging that a variety of paths of adjustment are possible within a single 
institutional framework (e.g. government policy), the corporate choices of MNCs and 
institutional change might be two of the factors influencing corporate product market 
choice and performance within one sector (Hancke and Goyer, 2005; Wood, Dibben 
and Ogden 2014). This thesis enhances the original view of the VoC approach by 
adding other data sources and methods. 
 
4.2.  Case Selection Strategy 
The German biotech and software sectors are chosen as crucial cases. Germany, as 
the context for the two sectors, has widely been described as a paradigmatic case of a 
coordinated market economy within the VoC approach, but also National Innovation 
System (NIS), and Business System (BS) approaches (Akkermans, Castaldi and Los 
2009; Thelen 2009; Trampusch and Eichenberger 2012). Chapter eight illustrates this 
context in further detail. While Hall and Soskice (2001), Hancke (1999) and Casper 
et al. (1999) chose a direct comparison between sectoral developments within the 
two national contexts of Germany and the USA, other approaches in comparative 
capitalism view Germany in the context of a wider range of nations and aim to 
establish their own typologies depending on the nation`s institutional frameworks 
(e.g. Business Systems). 
 The simple differentiation between "radical" and "incremental" sectors has not 
only been criticised by Hancke (2009) and Taylor (2004) but even earlier by Casper, 
Lehrer and Soskice (1999) who describe that, even within one sector, there are 
different kinds of technologies existing which can again be differentiated into the 
two spheres. Thus even though the sectoral cases have generally been correctly 
identified by theory as being radical/incremental sectors, within one sector there may 
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still be different niches of production in which one economy could specialise, 
depending on its institutional framework (see Casper, Lehrer and Soskice, 1999). 
Casper, Lehrer and Soskice (1999) argue, for example, that “[b]oth the platform-
technology segment of biotechnology and the services segment of software fit the 
inherited institutional framework of Germany better than many other segments of 
high-tech” (Casper, Lehrer and Hall 1999, 22). In addition to the argument of Casper 
et al. (1999) this thesis takes on a discussion about the creation of radical innovation 
within the typical case of the German automobile industry, a so-called typical old 
and incrementally innovating sector. While it is not a key focus of this thesis to 
differentiate technology classes in order to further measure innovativeness, a 
discussion about the approach of German corporations in creating radical innovation 
within crucial radical vs. incremental sectors is conducted. 
 Thus, the context of Germany for the two sector cases of biotech and software 
is chosen for theoretical reasons following the inductive typical case selection 
strategy (see Gerring 2007; Seawright and Gerring 2008) for the overall focus and 
analyses. 
 It appears highly relevant to the further discussion if and how the institutional 
foundations of Germany have changed over time. The comparison of observations 
with expected changes described in different theories is of great interest. Due to 
reunification, the chosen timeframe can only include the past 25 years. Before 
reunification, the western side of Germany could not easily be compared to the US in 
terms of data. In terms of the institutional foundations, five spheres were identified 
by Hall and Soskice. As described in the theoretical framework and further illustrated 
in Section 4.3. the propositions underlying the relationship between each of these 
spheres and the ability of national firms to produce "radical innovation" is 
questioned. As suggested by theory, VoC is neglecting the role of government policy 
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in institutional change and the NIS. The intervening sphere of government policy is 
added to the discussion i RQII. After discussing whether the German institutional 
framework is of a coordinated nature and how this has changed, the third research 
question is asked in order to discuss the comparative performance of German firms 
in radically innovative sectors. In the last step, the interrelationship between 
institutions in Germany, institutional change and the performance of German firms in 
so-called radical innovation are discussed. Derived from theory and in the analysis in 
this thesis, the sphere of skill formation is put into focus.  
 The biotechnology and software sector are typical cases of radical innovation. 
Case studies of these two so-called radically innovative sectors and their 
development over time in the context of a typical CME are of high interest.  
 Discussing the process of creating radical innovation within a so-called 
typical incrementally-innovating sector is of high relevance for theoretical 
implications as well, due to the in-depth view and further differentiation between 
different kinds of innovation. 
 Crucial cases are cases "which are ‘most-likely’ to show high levels of 
congruence with the expectations deduced from the dominant theory in the scientific 
discourse and ‘least-likely’ to conform to alternative theories" (Haverland and Blatter 
2012, 11). It appears to be instructive to analyse the performance of radically 
innovative sectors, as crucial cases within the German context – a country which is 
characterised and described as having a highly successful economy but, due to VoC 
theory, is expected to fail in the production of high-tech innovation, the kind of 
innovation which might determine the economic success of this country in the future. 
It is important to determine the direction of change of the German political economy 
in terms of skill formation, LMIs, CG and (financial) globalisation's influence on 
these. Analysis suggests that these input factors may either liberalise or stabilise and 
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prevent the country from becoming a radical innovator. VoC is a powerful theory 
illustrating the ability of CMEs to create radical innovation. As a paradox to this 
theory, a slow, adaptive institutional change leading to a continuously coordinated 
outlook of the market economy with a past and present strong appearance of radical 
innovation behaviour is found. The main objective of this thesis is the further 
development of theory on institutional change in CMEs, and, foremost, an analysis of 
the impact on the nations' trajectories of innovation, by bringing aspects of other 
innovation-related aspects (e.g. policy influence) into the picture. It is particularly 
important to develop VoC theory due to its implications for national policy making 
in terms of labour markets and skill formation systems, but also corporate 
governance VoC theory would not be as powerful and influential without bringing 
together theory on institutional complementarities with the overall goal of 
comparative economic advantage in the form of innovation.  
 
4.3.  Variables and Propositions 
The theoretical approach to VoC can be broken down into a number of propositions. 
The overarching propositions frame the relationship between coordination and 
innovation. In this context, innovation (i) can be identified as the dependent variable 
(DV). The institutional framework (if) of a nation is the independent variable (IV). 
VoC divides innovation into radical (R) and incremental (I) innovation. 
Simultaneously VoC views institutional frameworks dichotomously as coordinated 
(C) or liberal (L). 
The primary proposition is as follows: 系件血 蝦 荊件 詣件血 蝦 迎件 
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 In an attempt to understand the theory, the literature review on VoC has 
identified intervening institutional variables which are used to explain coordination. 
The four main variables are skill creation (sc), labour market regulation (lmr), 
corporate governance structure (cg), and preferred financial institutions (fi). VoC 
does again draw a dichotomist picture of coordinated nations being characterised by 
firm and industry (FI) specific skill creation, rigour (R) labor markets and 
stakeholder oriented (ST) CG which primarily uses bank (B) finances. LMEs are 
characterised by general (G) skills, flexible (F) LMs and shareholder-oriented (SH) 
CG which primarily uses the stock markets (SM) for finances.  系件血 岷繋荊嫌潔 髪 迎健兼堅 髪 鯨劇潔訣 髪 稽血件峅  蝦 荊件 詣件血 岷罫嫌潔 髪 繋健兼堅 髪 鯨茎潔訣 髪 鯨警血件峅  蝦 迎件 
It is important to note the proposition, arising from VoC, that WPRs (wpr) dominate 
CMEs. This proposition is an explanatory variable in VoC’s change theory, arguing 
for corporations to control social policy making and, therefore, create Rlmr and 
inequality (IQ). They, therefore, have an interest in keeping the institutional outlook 
stable, since they aim to continue production in their chosen product market strategy, 
which is characterised by incremental innovation but brings the firms a comparative 
economic advantage in world competition. Contrary to this, LMR are identified as 
being dominated by the free market (fm) and therefore inhibit equality (E). They are 
stable by definition, due to the invisible mechanisms of the self-regulating free 
market. 系件血 岷拳喧堅 岫繋荊嫌潔 髪 迎健兼堅 髪 鯨劇潔訣 髪 稽血件岻 蝦 荊芸峅  蝦 荊件 詣件血 岷血兼 岫罫嫌潔 髪 繋健兼堅 髪 鯨茎潔訣 髪 鯨警血件岻 蝦 継峅  蝦 迎件 
 These two distinct institutional outlooks of national market economies are not 
only described as co-existing, but they are called to be distinct from and complement 
each other, leading to institutional stability and comparative economic advantage in 
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the form of the two different types of innovation. At least, this is the basic theory. It 
gets more complicated with the second independent but intervening variable of 
globalisation. The VoC perspective expects that where the pressures of globalisation 
(GLO) and financial crisis meet the institutional foundations of CMEs and LMEs, 
these systems react differently towards the pressure. While LMEs are expected to 
stay stable, CMEs are expected to liberalise (this is extensively described in the 
literature review and theoretical framework). Two more propositions regarding the 
institutional change theory underlying VoC can be identified:  罫詣頚 髪 系件血 岷繋荊嫌潔 髪 迎健兼堅 髪 鯨劇潔訣 髪 稽血件峅  蝦 系件血 岷繋荊嫌潔 髪 迎健兼堅 髪 鯨茎潔訣 髪 鯨警血件峅  蝦 系件血 岷罫嫌潔 髪 繋健兼堅 髪 鯨茎潔訣 髪 鯨警血件峅  蝦 ╂ 件  
 罫詣頚 髪 詣件血 岷罫嫌潔 髪 繋健兼堅 髪 鯨茎潔訣 髪 鯨警血件峅  蝦 詣件血 岷罫嫌潔 髪 繋健兼堅 髪 鯨茎潔訣 髪 鯨警血件峅  蝦 迎件 
One large field of questions which has hardly been discussed in the literature yet is 
the expectation arising from VoC of institutional change in CMEs and its potential 
effect on trajectories of innovation in affected nations. It is not clear how the nations' 
trajectories of innovation would change as an effect of institutional change.  
 The first part of this dissertation is occupied with the deductive approach, 
aiming to discuss theoretical explanations for real economic developments. In a 
second step, I am exploring whether VoC theory holds its promise and is able to 
explain national trajectories of innovation. This thesis, therefore, looks at every 
single assumption underlying the propositions arising from VoC. In the last part of 
this dissertation, the findings are reviewed and existing theory is considered in 
response to these. The relationship between skill formation, corporate governance, 
and financial globalisation is re-thought in the context of government policy. Instead 
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of a mere linear relationship between certain institutional levels and one kind of 
innovation, one aim of this thesis is to describe the complexity between different 
institutional factors influencing a variety of resources needed for different kinds of 
innovation, e.g. labour market flexibility to influence the creation of low-wage jobs 
but also the creation of general skills.  
 The key argument of the findings in combination with the chosen 
methodology is that even though the institutional foundations of Germany have 
partly undergone liberalisation, in terms of financial institutions, globalisation and 
corporate governance in MNCs, German capitalism has focused its efforts on the 
sphere of national skill creation (clearly in interaction with the labour market and 
social policy). These efforts of the German government are to be differentiated from 
developments in other nations. The effects of nation-specific skill creation are highly 
relevant for the development of radical trajectories of innovation. Without an in-
depth analysis of the single propositions underlying literature, a long term view, 
different data and an approach to the method of difference, as used by Mill, for 
example, these complex interrelations could not be understood.  
 
4.4.  Methods 
The major CME example of Hall and Soskice’s (2001) original Introduction to 
Varieties of Capitalism, Germany, has undergone severe change since reunification 
due to external pressures such as globalisation, EU membership, and global 
economic crisis. This thesis, therefore, takes the opportunity to look at the case from 
a longitudinal perspective, focusing on the past 25 years (since re-unification). In the 
literature review in this thesis, expectations of VoC theory have been identified. In 
the following chapter, it is analysed whether the expectations arising from VoC can 
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be found in the real economic behaviour of the German CME. For this purpose, the 
institutional variables which have previously been identified and the overarching 
questions which summarise these, are discussed. Within the German case, five 
institutional spheres of NIS have been identified for further analysis: skill formation, 
labour market, industrial relations/ WPR, CG and in the context of the influence of 
globalisation, the financial institution. These spheres represent the independent 
variables, which VoC assumes change towards liberalisation. Aiming to understand 
the developments in the German market economy, this chapter uses sense-making 
methods. Policy making is added to the perspective. A first analytical chapter 
descriptively analyses the effects of shifts in political regimes and policy change on 
the institutional foundations of the German NIS. The effects of these policy and 
regulatory changes as well as potential institutional (non) change are described in 
terms of the effect on the national skill equilibrium and derived job market. The 
impact of the change in job market structure is descriptively analysed using a 
comparative perspective and appreciating the role of the global crisis. A second part 
of the chapter looks at in-depth case studies of the performance developments of two 
radical sectors in the CME.  
4.4.1.  VoC Analysis 
Peter Hall and David Soskice base their approach to VoC on the shoulders of a 
simple calculation which is illustrated in a single chart, which has been previously 
published numerous times in similar but distinct contexts (Casper, Lehrer and 
Soskice 1999; Hancke 1999). As previously described in the Theoretical Framework, 
this chart is highly misleading. It neglects the actual performance of nations in a 
sector and implies malperformance by Germany, which does not exist. The 
calculation underlying this chart goes as follows:   
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"The data are from the European Patent Office and calculated for thirty 
classes of technologies. For technology class i (e.g. machine tools) Germany's 
relative specialization is measured by the share of German machine-tool 
patents in total German patents less the share of global machine-tool patents 
in global patents" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 41 in footnotes).  
 
In Chapters six and seven I illustrate how the VoC calculation misleads the 
reader. It is not sufficient to draw any conclusion on the trajectory of innovation of a 
nation, due to the effect of the US (an outlier in all terms).  
4.4.2.  Other Descriptive Measures 
In an attempt to analyse the performance of two radical sectors in the German market 
economy, a mixed methods approach is chosen. Besides the VoC calculation, I 
illustrate the numbers behind the calculation and give an overview on diverse, simple 
descriptive measures, such as the total patent counts, the national percentage of 
world share of patents in the chosen sector and foreign ownership of patent 
applications to the EPO. Each of these methods is illustrated from a comparative 
perspective using other highly developed industrial nations. These are chosen 
following VoC case selection strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001, 20). In contrast to 
VoC, I acknowledge Whitley's and Esping-Anderson’  findings and separate the 
Nordic capitalists from the continental/conservatives. Japan is observed as a CME, 
an Asian one which has grown out of a distinct culture and history. In a further 
analysis, five high-tech sectors are chosen, and their patenting performance and 
ownership in patent applications is compared throughout the nations. An important 
part of the chosen methods is the sense making and historical analysis. Developments 
in a sector, certain policy making decisions, and competitiveness can only be made 
sense of by observing the developments and describing them. A plain chart which 
shows one dimension of longitudinal performance might not make sense without 
knowing the story of the nation in an international context. 
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4.5.  Data 
This dissertation makes use of a mix of data. Patent data are generally used in terms 
of measuring the output factors of R&D. The view of patent data as an output 
variable has changed throughout time. The application for a patent, at the EPO, can 
illustrate a person’s or corporation’s intention to implement a new product within the 
market. Furthermore, the application could also be used in order to block other 
competitors or in order to reserve one’s rights. These actions lack the intention to 
implement the new idea. Equally, an idea which is implemented, for example, in the 
European market does not necessarily show success. The Theoretical Framework of 
this dissertation argues for innovation to be the successful implementation of an idea 
(e.g. product, service, etc.). The data used for analysis represent input and output 
factors of the process of innovation: patent data and R&D investments are viewed as 
input factors while sales and publication are treated as output factors, in terms of 
academia and business. The theoretically- (following the VoC approach) given 
proposition of one method and data source (patent data) offering enough safety to 
build up a whole theory is criticised. This work uses a mix of methods, but also a mix 
of data sources, reflecting input and output factors of innovation, represented by 
patent data, but moreover by R&D spending on the input side and publications as 
well as the share of the sector's total annual sales on the output side. 
4.5.1.  Patent Data 
Patent data have a wide use in the field of comparative capitalism. In general patents 
are seen as:  
 “a key measure of innovation output, as patent indicators reflect the inventive 
 performance of countries, regions, technologies, firms, etc. (…). They are 




Thus, patents are often interpreted as an output indicator. This is also the context in 
which Hall and Soskice (2001) interpreted their patent data. In general, patent data 
are taken as indices for the conomy’s specialisation in a certain sector. A 
disadvantage relevant for this work is that the “value distribution of patents is 
skewed as many patents have no industrial application (and hence are of little value 
to society) whereas a few are of substantial value” (OECD 2002, 136). Thus one 
country may be strong in patenting for example in the sector of biotechnology, but 
these patents may be produced in research institutions, such as universities, without 
linkages to the industry, or missing biotech firms in the country one may never see 
an outcome with any value for society. Thus a country may hold a significant number 
of patents in their biotechnological sector, but might, for many reasons, be unable to 
bring a drug on to the point of commercialisation. This is also a point on which 
German patents are often criticised (Warschat 2009). Even though patents may have 
a close link to inventions, this work does not view them as a direct indicator of 
innovation. Thus, they may not be seen as a variable directly indicating the 
successful commercialisation of a product, which by defining innovations as a 
successfully commercialised new product, process, service or new material 
(Schumpeter 1939) means that patents may not be seen as an output factor of 
innovations, but moreover an input factor for an innovation which might or might not 
lead to successful commercialisation and thereby innovation. Thus patent data cannot 
be used as standalone data in a analysis of Germany’s bility to radically innovate 
and an analysis of the past developments and cross-national differences of any 
specific sector case.  
 In their analysis, Hall and Soskice (2001) have focused on patent data in 
showing the parallel pictures of German and US firms, as major examples for a 
coordinated and a liberal market economy focusing on parallel trajectories of 
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incrementally vs. radically innovating sector cases. The use of patent data as a first 
step for analysis is attempted in this thesis, as following the argument of existing key 
theory. Besides the use of patent data which does obviously have certain 
shortcomings, other measures are used in order to reflect upon the shortcomings. The 
first step of following Hall and Soskice`s argument is followed by a more 
differentiated view on other data sources and, in the following chapters, a more 
detailed view within the institutional framework surrounding the two sector cases. As 
stated by Witt and Jackson in Varieties of Capitalism and institutional comparative 
advantage: A test and reinterpretation (2016), patent data and even patent citations 
have well-known limitations.  
 "Not all innovations can be patented (e.g., new software), and firms do not 
 necessarily patent their innovations for cost or strategic reasons (Archibugi & 
 Planta, 1996). Moreover, radical innovation may also be associated with 
 process innovations driven by changes in organization for which new 
 technology is a necessary but not a sufficient condition" (Witt and Jackson 
 2016, 798).  
 
 Despite the general criticism of the use of patent data, more specific issues 
regarding the biotech and software sector need to be considered. 
 By analysing patent data, it is important to bear in mind that the EPO 
does not grant software patents as such. It hereby does “not grant patents for 
computer programs (‘software patents’) or computer-implemented business methods 
that make no such technical contribution” (SWPAT 2010, 3). The EPO’s procedure 
for granting patents (only in cases that make a technical contribution) is very 
different from the USPTO`s practices. Thus, the USPTO does grant patents which 
would probably be rejected by the EPO.  
 “Under the EPC a computer program claimed as such is not a patentable 
 invention (Art. 52(2) (c) and (3) EPC). Inventions involving computer 
 programs that implement business, mathematical or similar methods and 
 do not produce technical effects (e.g. because they solve a business 
 problem rather than a technical one) are not patentable, and no patents 





By fulfilling certain conditions, software patents are also filed at the EPO. Examples 
are the pop-out-context-menu “EP249293”, granted to Philips, or the Microsoft 
Patent “EP0618540”3 (SWPAT, 2010). By only analysing EPO data, all patents 
being granted have to go through the same conditions. The EPO does not list 
“software patents” as such in its database. The following patent analysis had to be 
conducted using general ICT patents,4 which do potentially include “software 
patents” and software patents indicating the largest share of growth within this 
sector. In order to enhance the reliability of the thesis's measurements, other 
measures of the output side of innovation are viewed in the context of biotech and 
software cases. 
 Secondly, not only does the general use of patent data have its advantages and 
shortcomings, which need to be considered, but it needs to be reflected upon the 
chosen database. As described by Kim and Lee (2015) in Patent databases for 
innovation studies: A comparative analysis of USPTO, EPO, JPO and KIPO, patent 
data analysis is the "most commonly applied one in order to monitor technological 
trends, analyzing technology innovation patterns, or developing technology 
strategies" (Kim and Lee 2015, 332). In this context, it is not only the selected 
technology class or chosen national context which affects the findings of the 
                                                
3 This patent is described as: “An operating system provides a common name space for both long 
filenames and short filenames. In this common namespace, a long filename and a short filename are 
provided for each file. Each file has a short filename directory entry a d may have at least one long 
filename directory entry associated with it. The number of long filename directory entries that are 
associated with a file depends on the number of characters in the long filename of the file. The long 
filename directory entries are configured to minimize compatibility problems with existing installed 
program bases” (V3, 2010).  
4 ICT-related patents are currently identified using the following codes of the International Patent 
Classification (IPC): "Telecommunications G01S, G08C, G09C, H01P, H01Q, 
H01S3/025,043,063,067,085,0933,0941,103,133,18,19,25), H01S5, H03B, H03C, H03D, H03H, 
H03M, H04B, H04J, H04K, H04L, H04M, H04Q; Consumer electronics G11B, H03F, H03G, H03J, 
H04H, H04N, H04R, H04S; Computers, office machinery B07C, B41J, B41K, G02F, G03G, G05F, 
G06, G07, G09G, G10L, G11C, H03K, H03L; Other ICT G01B, G01C, G01D, G01F, G01G, G01H, 
G01J, G01K, G01L, G01M, G01N, G01P, G01R, G01V, G01W, G02B6, G05B, G08G, G09B, 
H01B11, H01J(11/,13/,15/,17/,19/,21/,23/, 25/,27/,29/,31/,33/,40/,41/,43/,45/), H01L" (OECD 2009). 
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researcher. Kim and Lee illustrate how the choice to analyse data from a certain 
patent database can affect the findings. The choice for the EPO within the context of 
this thesis is due to theoretical reasons. The analysis of Hall and Soskice (2001) was 
re-done and looked at in more depth. Despite this key approach in the given field of 
research, the national context for the two sector cases is Germany. Aiming to observe 
changes in patent applications to the EPO, this continental European country is best 
represented by choosing the European Patent Office. 
4.5.2.  R&D Investments and Sales 
The data provided by the R&D Scoreboard are limited to Eur pe’s 1000 largest R&D 
spenders vs. the rest of the world's largest R&D investors. Mostly, large firms are 
captured, and thus the results are limited to large firms. This is problematic when 
viewing the Japanese firms in the software sector, since thereby they were brought 
(by the data source) in a comparison with US firms. Thus capturing Japanese firms 
together with EU firms would have given an absolutely different picture to an 
anlaysis capturing them with US firms which so strongly dominate the market. A 
similar problem occurred in other contexts with the number of captured French and 
German firms. Thus the sample size was too small to actually draw conclusions, 
especially in the second instance where the captured R&D firms in the data set were 
viewed by the annual sales. Thus, where the data had legitimacy in terms of R&D 
was in terms of considering that these firms would be the strongest ones in Europe; 
this position was not legitimate for selecting such a small number of firms and 
judging their sales and this small sample size might be the reason for the large 




4.6.  Validity, Reliability and Generalisability 
This dissertation not only criticises the dichotomist world view of VoC in terms of 
complementary institutional frameworks but, moreover, in terms of the ability and 
influence of the VoC approach to draw a picture of comparative economic advantage 
(innovation) between nations depending on their institutional frameworks. Without 
going into more detail, it can be acknowledged that comparative economic advantage 
is an approach originally developed by Michael E. Porters The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations (Porter 1990, 16) which gives a fair overview of rationales of 
trade, such as the economies of scale. Porter explains how existing theories (e.g. 
economies of scale) reason competitive advantage. He identifies a major question 
which has not been acknowledged in existing theory: Which nation's firms will use 
competitive advantage and in what industries? By identifying this question, I argue 
that Porter lays the foundations for the VoC approach. The most important issue with 
these approaches and my own dissertation is the notion of validity. Do we describe 
what we say we describe; do we measure what we aim to measure? I would argue 
that we don’t. I will further argue that a comparative economic advantage as a 
parallel picture of specialisation in certain sectors does not exist. Even though the 
VoC calculation appears to measure a specialisation, it neglects actual performance. 
Furthermore, whilst we can illustrate total patent counts or other data sources, we 
cannot possibly illustrate real innovation. Any measures are only a symbol of 
innovation. Sectoral performance does not capture the notion of radical/incremental 
innovation properly. Radical innovation can be identified within any sector. What we 
measure is the performance of (relatively) new and emerging sectors within a market 
economy. We call this radical innovation. Similarly, the institutional spheres are 
extensively described in VoC. The identified institutional spheres are often not what 
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we would expect since the logic which constructs the propositions behind the 
institutional influence on innovative capabilities is not universal, but its correctness 
depends on individual sight. A labour market offers more than rigidity versus 
flexibility. Skills are not only general versus specific. An economic theory which 
expects humans to behave in rational ways needs to be re-thought and cannot be 
valid.  
 The internal validity of this dissertation's findings is increased compared to 
other literature on the VoC approach through the use of an in-depth perspective, 
different methods and sick description. The measures have been and can further be 
repeated. They prove to be reliable. In these two instances, the dissertation adds to 
pre-existing approaches. Generalisability is not a goal of this dissertation. There has 
been extensive criticism of the fact that VoC generalises its theory upon diverse 
nations. In turn, it is argued that, by illustrating paradoxical innovation behaviour in 
VoCs critical case, the ability to generalise the propositions arising from the theory 
for other nations is limited. The theoretical framework constructed in the conclusion 
of this thesis is conducted for the context of the German NIS with a particular focus 
on the creation of radical innovation – cases of biotech and software but also in the 
sense of new technology and changing/emerging markets. It may enhance existing 
approaches but is not to be generalised for other CMEs per se. 
The theoretical implications for the study of innovation, which differentiate 
between incremental, radical, disruptive and stepwise innovation could, in a further 
step for testing within different fields of technological development, offer grounds 





5.  CHAPTER FIVE : INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 
GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND PERFORMANCE 
OF THE GERMAN BIOTECH SECTOR 
 
By considering the proposition arising from VoC about coordinated market 
economies, such as Germany, performing more strongly in incremental trajectories 
of innovation (such as automobile or machinery industries) but performing more 
weakly in radical trajectories of innovation, one would expect Germany to perform 
weakly in the biotechnology and software sectors and to specialise its performance in 
other areas, such as the automobile industry. This proposition is questioned 
throughout this chapter.  
 In the context of this chapter, RQ III is the focus of the analysis. Later on, 
RQ1V is discussed. Within these two case studies, four second order chapters are 
created. The first section for each sector case consists of an analysis of national 
innovation policy regarding each sector. The second of these includes the VoC 
calculation as previously conducted in Hall and Soskice`s introduction to the VoC 
approach. It is uses exactly the same calculation, for more recent years – since re-
unification. Following this calculation, the numbers behind the VoC-Chart (Casper, 
Lehrer and Soskice 1999, 22; Hall and Soskice 2001, 41–42; Hancke 1999, 2) are 
shown. Other countries are brought into the comparison, and other measures are 
added, still using patent data alone as previously mentioned authors have. A different 
conclusion is drawn. In the third section, other input factors for innovation are 
analysed – R&D investments and publications using the VoC calculation. A fourth 
section illustrates the output factor for innovations in terms of sales and exports. IN 
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conclusion, VoC theory's ability to explain the identified trajectories of innovation 
throughout the past 25 years is considered.  
 This chapter consists of an introduction, defining biotechnology and 
describing the German biotech market, as well as a review of German biotech 
policies. The heart of this chapter consists of key measures on the biotech sector’s 
performance which include measures of two inputs (patent data and R&D) and two 
output factors of innovation (publications and share of total returns). These measures 
are compared with Hall and Soskice`s findings and are summarised in the last part of 
this section. Conclusions are drawn to finalise the chapter.  
 
5.1.  Defining Biotechnology and Biotech Policies 
According to the OECD (as cited in BMBF – biotechnologie.de 2009, 20), 
biotechnology is “defined as the application of science and technology to living 
organisms, as well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living 
materials for the production of knowledge, goods, and services”. When talking about 
biotechnological activities, they can roughly being differentiated into three kinds of 
activities, which are each characterised by a colour. Green biotechnology is clearly 
the most unpopular form of biotech in Germany (chemie.de 2017). It is used to 
change plant characteristics to improve or change their abilities. Since the general 
opinion on gene manipulated food is rather sceptical in Germany, this kind of 
biotechnology is also still viewed very sceptically. Simple online research shows 
dozens of protest-websites, emphasising the dangers of gene-manipulated vegetables. 
German industry clearly specialises in red biotechnology (BMBF 2007), which, 
compared to green biotechnology, focuses on the development of new medication 
and diagnostics. It is frequently used in cancer research. White biotechnology is 
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industrial and involves work in such areas as cell production. Industrial 
biotechnology is also used to create insulin from bacteria. Besides the three big fields 
of biotechnology one can find smaller, rather badly defined fields. Thus the fourth 
colour in the biotech rainbow is blue biotechnology. The focus of this discipline is 
biological organisms in the world’s oceans, especially bacteria found in the deep 
ocean. In short blue biotech describes the technical use of processes and organisms in 
marine biology (Chemie.de). It is possible that, with further developments in 
biotechnology, one may, later on, differentiate even more between disciplines. The 
most popular areas in biotech in Germany today are red, green and white. Many have 
argued that the German biotechnology sector has not been as successful in the past as 
it generally could have been (Nussbaum, 1983 as cited in Lehrer 2000). For example, 
Giesecke (2000) stated that even though the German federal government was the first 
to directly support biotech R&D, the outcome of this support has been quite different 
from the intention of making biotechnology a competitive industry. Different authors 
explain this “lack” differently, for example as a result of the institutional framework 
conditions (Hall and Soskice 2001). Giesecke sees it as a reflection of simple 
inferiority, compared with the sector’s world leader – the USA. Thus even though the 
German biotech sector is promoted by the government to the tune of of €253m yearly 
(2009), which is a relatively high amount (The Boston Consulting Group 2017) 
compared to other sectors, such as the German energy technology sector, compared 
to the USA, where biotechnology has been called a key technology for the future, 
and where it is promoted with about $28,6 billion per annum, Germany does not 
provide enough resources to actually compete with this Goliath. Even a comparison 
between Europe and the US biotech environment might be very uneven, since both 
industries have around 2000 companies, but the US sector employs nearly twice as 
many people, spends around three times as much on research and development, 
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raises over twice as much venture capital, and has access to 10 times as much debt 
finance. It earns twice as much revenue (see Ernst & Young 2009). Therefore, the 
US is not only highly specialised but it does also have very different market 
structures leading to this performance compared to the EU. The US has the world’s
largest pharmacy market which has doubled its size within the past 20 years (The 
Boston Consulting Group 2017) and is “not only the biggest national market but also 
the fastest growing one” (Giesecke 2000, 4–5) in the world. The connection between 
a pharmacy industry and red biotechnology is obvious. In Europe and especially in 
Germany, where gene manipulation is strongly criticised by citizens, and the law, for 
a long time, did not allow genetic modification (seeing it as equally dangerous as 
atomic energy production) and still restricts them significantly now, there is also, 
automatically, a different market for green biotech than in the US, where customers 
are open to genetic modification. The market conditions for biotechnology are, 
therefore, very different in the US and most other countries, especially such 
extremely sceptical markets as the German market. The German biotechnology 
sector has not always been in focus politically. In contrast, the German government 
regulation system was considered to be one of the barriers for the development of the 
biotech industry in Germany and also for the adoption of biotechnological techniques 
in the pharma industry (Liecke 2009). This was due to non-regulation of the German 
laws according the new biotechnology sector in Germany. Thus Liecke (2009) draws 
attention to the case of the pharma company, Hoechst, which tried to establish a 
factory for the production of human insulin in 1984, close to Frankfurt. The Hessian 
administration court forbade Hoechst in 1989 from building the factory and 
compared the potential danger of such a factory with the dangers assocaited with the 
the atomic energy industry. This case is just an example of how missing national 
regulations led, automatically, to a ban in biotech activities, due to the very negative 
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image of biotech in society. In 1990, a liberalisation in the law took place due to the 
European Union regulation act of 1990 with guideline 90/219 EC about the treatment 
of genetically modified organisms in closed systems and 90/220 EC, which regulated 
field experiments. These changes were followed by other changes in 1996 and 1998, 
which led to a unification of the laws and conditions for the biotech sectors in 
Europe. These changes in the German regulatory system did not take place in 2000, 
as planned by the European Union, but in 2002 after the European Union had taken 
Germany, due to non-fulfillment of the regulations, to the European court (EuGH) 
(see Liecke 2009 for more details). These political activities led to a paradoxical 
situation in Germany, where certain Länder governments actively problematised the 
commercialisation of biotechnology, but, at the same time, federal government 
promoted the biotech industry with large amounts of public funds and pictured it as 
an industry with great future potential (see Liecke 2009). In the late 1960s, an OECD 
report identified biotechnology as an area that was expected to play a key role in 
future economic development; following this report the German government first 
began to support this sector (Buchholz 1979). Various research priorities were 
identified for biotechnology, on the understanding that “biotechnology had future 
scientific and economic potential” (Giesecke 2000, 3). In contrast with the politics 
(non-regulation of biotech and non-fulfillment of EU regulations) taking place at the 
same time, the government established a program in 1996, called the “BioRegio” 
competition. This involved the BMBF (Bundesministerium fur Bildung und 
Forschung 2008) organising 17 regional biotechnology centres in Germany. The 
programs typically included “free consulting services for business plan development 
and market scanning, subsidies to help scientists pay most patenting costs, the 
provision of low-cost lab space for fledgling start-ups in ‘incubator labs’ built in 
close proximity to university labs, and the provision of subsidized commercial space 
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in nearby life-science-oriented technology parks once new firms start to grow” 
(Handelsblatt 1998, as cited in Casper, Lehrer, Soskice 1999, 20). This competition 
is often referred to as the beginning of biotechnology developments in Germany. 
Three of the four largest biotechnology clusters in Germany are found in the 
"winning regions in 2009 – Munich and Rhineland (Cologne)” (Biotech Report 
2009). The government intervention was very successful and not only led to a 
regional clustering of the biotech industry in Germany but also led to a strong 
increase in absolute patent numbers from 1996 to 2002, where the number of 
annually filed patents nearly doubled. The number of small start-ups also increased. 
The introduction of the Neuer Markt, “Germany's second stock market for low-cap 
issues” in 1997 (Lehrer 2000, 90) might have played its part in these developments, 
since, at this time, biotechnology was not only being recognised as a key sector by 
the German government, but increased capital enabled German firms to invest in 
R&D.  
 
5.2.  VoC Calculation on the Biotech Sector’s Performance 
This section leads to an analysis of the German biotech sector, focusing on the 
previously mentioned four key measures of patent data, R&D investments, as well as 
publications and sales in biotech firms. The four measures are the same for the 
software sector, where the same databases and calculations have been used. The 
tables and graphs are interpreted independently; secondary literature is used in the 
analysis where it seems useful for understanding the specific sector. The analysis is 
summarised at the end of each chapter – Biotech and Software.  
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5.2.1.  VoC Calculation on the Biotech Sector’s Performance - Patents 
Giesecke (1997) shows that the United States are outperforming all other countries in 
the biotechnology sector. This finding, which is congruent with Hall and Soskice’s 
assertion about LMEs specialising in radical innovation, can also be found by 
viewing the selected patent data. Taylor (2004) showed that the USA should not be 
taken as the only representative of LMEs, but that other LMEs’ performances in 
radical sectors are very different from that of the US. Figure 5: Biotech Patent 
specialisation across nations shows biotechnology patent specialisation according to 
EPO data from 1986/87, 1996/97 and 2006/07. The data are OECD data from the 
European Patent Office and calculated for the biotechnology sector in each country 
(France, Germany, UK, USA and the European Union). Each country’s relative 
specialisation was measured using the example of Hall and Soskice (2001, 41; as 
also shown in Diagram 1: EPO patent distribution for Germany and the US by 
Casper, Lehrer and Soskice, 1999, 6–7).  
The share of one country’s biotech patents in its total patents was taken as 
less than the share of global biotech patents in global patents. Thus this calculation is 
the same kind of calculation which Hall and Soskice (2001, 41–42) used. The 
calculation is limited to biotechnology patents5 only; other sectors’ patent 
specialisations of each country are not measured since they are not relevant for this 
work. The 0-achse in Figure 5 illustrates the world’s average specialisation in 
biotechnology patents. Thereby one country, such as the UK in 1996/97, may have a 
higher share of biotech patents compared to its total patents, than the world’s 
average. As a result, its diagram becomes positive. The illustration does, therefore, 
                                                
5 Biotechnology patents are currently identified using the following codes of the International Patent 
Classification (IPC): "A01H1/00, A01H4/00, A61K38/00, A61K39/00, A61K48/00, C02F3/34, 
C07G(11/00,13/00,15/00), C07K(4/00,14/00,16/00,17/00,19/00), C12M, C12N, C12P, C12Q, C12S, 




strengthen the argument arising from VoC that Germany has been an incremental 
innovator in terms of specialisation in biotech patents for the previous 30 years. 
Other countries’ relative specialisations, such as the French biotech specialization, 
seem to be negative compared to the world average and the United Kingdom (for the 
years 96/07 and 06/07) and the United States, which,  as expected, has a positive 
outcome and is thus above the world's average for specialising in the production of 
patents in the biotech sector, compared to overall patent production. The overall 
European specialisation is also displayed and, throughout the years, negatively 
compared to the world’s average. By analysing Figure 5, the US is clearly the 
country which specializes most in the production of biotechnology patents, compared 
to the word`s average. 
 
 
By viewing the absolute data behind this figure, as illustrated in Table 3: Data 
based on Figure 5; world share and countries’ hares of biotech patents in 1986/87, 
Figure 5: Biotech patent specialisation across nations  
Source: Own illustration using OECD’s European Patent Office data 
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1996/97, 2006/07 and the data calculation, one might note that the world’s average is 
strongly influenced by the United States’ numbers. These show that the US did hold 
a share of 50% of the world’s biotech patents in 1996/97, thereby 11% of the 
nation’s total patents were filed in the biotech sector. This strong specialisation is not 
being achieved by any other country and especially not by any other country holding 
such a huge share of the total biotech patents. In these terms, the US is outperforming 
all other nations, but its strong performance might not be a good anchor for 
measuring the world’s biotech performance. Viewing the total values instead of the 
Figure tells us that Germany`s share of biotech patents, compared to the total number 
of patents in the country, has permanently been relatively low compared to the other 
countries over the past 30 years, but that, even though the total number of annual 
filed biotech patents has doubled over time, Germany maintains its total world share 
and did file 12% of the total filed patents in biotech in 2006/07. Thereby Germany 
produced around 30% of the European Union`s biotech patents. At the same time, the 
EU took the biggest share, by filing 40% of the world`s biotech patents. The EU did 
still have a relatively low (3.9% which is less than the 4.8% from the 1996/97 period) 
percentage of filed biotech patents, compared to its total filed patents. But the huge 
absolute numbers of EU patents influence the world's share of biotech patents in 
relation to total patents (from 5.3% to 6.9% and on to 4.4% in 2006/07). Figure 6: 
Total count of EPO patent applications in the technological field of biotechnology by 
priority date and inventor's country illustrates how the French, German and UK 
patent counts have developed throughout the previous 30 years. The US is left out of 
this analysis since it is clearly an extreme example and a comparison with this nation 
might let all other relative performances look weak, independent of their actual 
performance. From the total numbers of EPO patent applications, it is clearly visible 
that Germany not only holds a total share of 12% of biotech patents but that 
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1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Germany 119 134 126 164 222 222 268 304 328 325 336 290 299 308 350 410 496 593 674 848 1036 1017 1047 890 813 752 770 635 
France 46,1 54,3 64,5 99,7 116 124 141 141 160 182 171 199 182 201 231 224 223 279 367 405 434 432 377 361 365 316 388 333 



















Figure 6: Total count of EPO patent applications in the technological field of biotechnology by priority date and inventor's country  
Source: Own illustration using OECD database on EPO data 
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Table 3: Data based of Figure 5 world share and countries’ shares of biotech patents in 1986/87, 1996/97, 2006/07 
Source: Own illustration, using OECD’s European Patent Office data 
 
  Total Patents Total Biotech Patents World Share of Biotech Patents 
Share of Biotech. Patents 
compared to Countries’ Total 
no. of Patents VoC Calculation 
Year: 1986/1987       
France 8146 281 5,5% 3,4% -1,8% 
Germany 20919 571 11,2% 2,7% -2,5% 
UK 7022 364 7,1% 5,2% -0,1% 
USA 25488 2208 43,3% 8,7% 3,4% 
European Union 48107 1724 33,8% 3,6% -1,7% 
World 97081 5104 100,0% 5,3% 0,0% 
        
  Total Patents Total Biotech Patents World Share of Biotech Patents 
Share of Biotech. Patents 
compared to Countries’ Total 
no. of Patents VoC Calculation 
Year: 1996/1997       
France 11871 500 4,3% 4,2% -2,7% 
Germany 33144 1087 9,4% 3,3% -3,6% 
UK 8826 804 6,9% 9,1% 2,2% 
USA 49210 5754 49,6% 11,7% 4,8% 
European Union 77122 3664 31,6% 4,8% -2,1% 
World 168484 11602 100,0% 6,9% 0,0% 
        
  Total Patents Total Biotech Patents World Share of Biotech Patents 
Share of Biotech. Patents 
compared to Countries’ Total 
no. of Patents VoC Calculation 
Year: 2006/2007       
France 16705 720 6,3% 4,3% -0,1% 
Germany 47812 1404 12,4% 2,9% -1,4% 
UK 11000 534 4,7% 4,9% 0,5% 
USA 64614 3972 35,0% 6,1% 1,8% 
European Union 114840 4463 39,3% 3,9% -0,5% 
World 259247 11353 100,0% 4,4% 0,0% 
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5.2.2.  VoC Calculation on the Biotech Sector’s Performance – Research and 
Development Investments 
The impact of R&D investments on a firm`s ability to create innovation, in 
general, has been discussed by many researchers (e.g. Piante and Bogiliacino 2008). 
It is discussed whether R&D investments can be seen as having a direct impact on a 
firm's ability to create patents in the first instance and new products in the second. 
On the one hand it is argued that, especially in highly knowledge intense sectors, 
such as the biotechnology sector, huge funds for the firm's Research & Development 
are needed, indicating that a firm can actually not merely file a patent, but has 
enough capability and funding to bring a patent through the different stages of the 
research pipeline. Thereby one might argue that a firm’s ability to invest in R&D 
does, at least in part, depend on its size. This means that a one-person firm might not 
have the funds to further develop one patent through a long process and, after a 
possible failure, be able to raise enough funds to continue its research on a different 
site. This possibility becomes visible by looking at the German biotech sector in 
more detail. It takes a long time, compared to other sectors, to actually develop and 
approve a product in the biotech sector. This is especially true in red biotechnology 
which specialises in the development of drugs (therapeutics and diagnostics) and 
needs huge funds to develop one drug. Thus it takes approximately 15 years to 
develop one drug, which has to be financed somehow.  
In the previous patent data analysis, it can be seen that Germany is relatively 
strong (compared to other big EU countries) in filing a total number of patents. 
Thereby one could view patents as being the first instance of R&D output and an 
indicator of a country’s ability to innovate. On the other hand, considering the 
average firm size of German firms, which is rather small in a OECD-comparison, 
one may question the above assertion about firms’ R&D investment (at least by 
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connecting a firm’s size with its ability to invest a lot into the R&D of new products) 
influencing their ability to actually produce patents. The average German biotech 
firm is rather small since around 45% of the firms have fewer than ten employees. 
Quiagen is Germany`s largest biotech firm. It has 3,500 employees worldwide, and 
its headquarters is in North Rhine-Westfalia. The number of employees has 
continuously grown within the past five years. The German biotech sector has 
experienced a growth of 3% in 2009 and employs a total of 14,950 people in 531 
dedicated biotechnology firms. The number of employees has grown parallel to the 
number of businesses (The German Biotechnology Sector 2009). Thus, one could 
argue that, especially small firms in the German sector can be seen as innovative 
ones, producing a large number of patents and that, thus, R&D investment does play 
a major role in this sector.  
 Looking again at the actual goal of firms, which is innovation through the 
commercialisation of an invention, one may find that companies working in the field 
of red biotechnology have been very active in Germany in 2009, compared to 
previous years. Thus, in 2009, eight drug candidates were approved with an 
increasing number (+2) of drugs in the third phase of the clinical pipeline and “a 
stable number of drugs in the other two phases compared to the previous year” 
(BMBF – biotechnologie.de 2009). This absolute number of actual products seems to 
be low, compared to the filed patents. Germany is not just some outlier in a negative 
sense, even though it overlaps with the UK, but it is one of the leading countries, 
even in this sense, in Europe.  
 “The developments in Europe show that the pipelines grew across all three 
 phases during 2008. Thereby more than 100 projects were added to the 
 clinical pipeline of Europe’s biotech and specialty pharmaceutical companies. 
 Critically, Europe’s Phase II product portfolio grew 15% to more than 600 
 products. Comparing the products in different stages of the pipeline), one 
 finds the UK at the leading position of total products in development. 
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 Thereby Germany finds itself at the second place, followed by Denmark and 
 France” (Ernst and Young 2005, 74–75).  
 
 This observation of only a few actual products being developed in 
comparison to the actually filed patents, emphasises that a firm's ability to spend 
money on R&D investments (e.g. through raising external funds or by investing its 
own money) may influence its ability to further develop a patent throughout all 
stages of the clinical pipeline and thus (by being a certain size) may even be able to 
handle backslides and invest in a new potential product. Building upon this position, 
R&D data by the “EU Industrial R+D Investment Scoreboard” are analysed in the 
same way as the patent data were previously viewed. The EURIS “presents 
information on 2000 companies from around the world reporting major investments 
in R&D. The set of companies it covers comprises the top 1000 R&D investors 
whose registered offices are in the EU and the top 1000 registered elsewhere” (IRI 
2008). There are no fully satisfying data available in R&D investments in the 
biotechnology sector, which would enable a comparison over the past thirty years, as 
seen in the patent analysis. Moreover, the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 
has only been available since 2004. During its first year, biotechnology was 
measured together with the pharmacy sector. Later on, these two sectors were 
separated. As a consequence, a direct comparison of the first and the later data seems 
uneven, and this work acknowledges the difficulties of comparison. As one can see 
in Table 4: Data based on Figure 6; world share and countries’ hares of biotech 
R&D investments in 2005 and 2008, the United States not only dominated the 
biotechnology sector in terms of patents, as seen before, but it also dominates the 
sector in terms of firms’ R&D spending. Thereby, 63 US biotech firms in 2008 made 
up a total of 46% of the world’s firms spending most on R&D in biotech. This 
number might be compared to the European Union, which accounted for 70 firms 
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and thereby made up 51% of the world`s most heavily investing R&D biotech firms. 
By viewing the total values of investment per firm, the huge difference between EU 
companies in general and the US firms becomes apparent. With an average biotech 
R&D investment per biotech firm of €143,5m, the strong US firms have the ability to 
invest much more in R&D than strong EU firms, which had an average per firm 
investment of €22m in 2008 (about 15% of the average R&D investment for US 
firms). It can thus be seen that the US is again an outlier in these terms, since it alone 
accounts for 75.2% (in 2005) and 81.6% (in 2008) of the world’s overall large R&D 
investments by firms (taking into account only the 2,000 largest firms). By again 
viewing the calculation of Hall and Soskice`s (2001) VoC argumentation, the US is 
again influencing the world's 0-Point meaning that the the EU average for the VoC 
calculation would be at -1.4% in both years, even though the average biotech R&D 
investment per biotech firm is around €22m which is higher than the averages of the 
big EU countries. To realise how strongly the outlier USA influences this 
calculation, one may view the corrected Table 5: Data based on Figure 7; world share 
and countries’ shares of biotech R&D investments in 2005 and 2008 without the 
USA. This Table shows the same calculation leading to the VoC argumentation in 
Hall and Soskice (2001, 37), using absolutely the same data, but simply without the 
US. This is, of course, an unrealistic calculation since the US is, in reality, an 
existing partner globally. Even though the relative measurements remain equal to 
each other, the absolute numbers do seem to be much more even now, considering 
that over 50% of the actual biotech firms are in the EU. Therefore the EU’s VOC 
calculation changes from -1.4 to around 0 in both years. Independent of this variation 
and of the US, the performance of heavy investment in R&D in firms in Germany is 
rather weak, which fits in with the observation that rather small firms dominate the 
German market. This pattern is also generally observable within other EU countries. 
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Some countries did manage to build up fi rms which invest heavily in R&D, 
compared to their overall R&D investments. Such countries are Denmark and the 
Netherlands, followed by the UK. Even though the absolute number of large R&D 
investors coming from Germany as well as the countries’ world shares of biotech 
R&D investments have grown during the past few years, its share of world biotech 
R&D investment has not grown as fast as investment in many northern countries, as 
well as Switzerland, which, together, nearly doubled the corrected world share of 
biotech R&D investment. As seen in the uncorrected version, the US grew even 
stronger in the three year period than these countries and did therefore also manage 
to raise its world share from 75% to 81%. This development leads to the fact that the 
EU developments are not that visible in the non-corrected version (only a raise of 
1.1%). The contribution of countries other than the big three, in terms of positive 
R&D investment developments for the EU average, becomes very obvious when 






Table 4: Data based on Figure 6; world share and countries’ hares of biotech R&D investments in 2005 and 2008 
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard”; 2006 and 2009 
  
Number of firms for 
calculation: Total 
number; biotech firms 
Total R&D 
Investment €m 
Total Biotech R&D 
Investment €m 
 
Average Biotech R&D 
Investment 
per Biotech Firm in €m 
World Share of 
Biotech R&D 
Investments 
Share of Biotech 
Investments compared to 
Countries’ Total 
Investments VoC  
Year: 2005           
France 112; 2 21293,45 61,01 30,51 0,7% 0,3% -2,2 
Germany 167; 6 38455,24 122,66 20,44 1,3% 0,3% -2,2 
UK 327; 27 21402,39 513,36 19,01 5,5% 2,4% -0,1 
USA 587; 44 151129,8 7019,81 159,54 75,2% 4,6% 2,1 
European 
Union 1000; 57 112876,47 1207,62 21,19 12,9% 1,1% -1,4 
World 2000; 111 370576,25 9331,45 84,07 100,0% 2,5% 0,0 
        
  
Number of firms for 
calculation: Total 
number; biotech firms 
Total R&D 
Investment €m 
Total Biotech R&D 
Investment €m 
 
Average Biotech R&D 
Investment 
per Biotech Firm in €m 
World Share of 
Biotech R&D 
Investments 
Share of Biotech 
Investments compared to 
Countries’ Total 
Investments VoC  
Year: 2008           
France 125; 7 25746,93 96,57 13,80 0,9% 0,4% -2,2 
Germany 200; 9 45097,37 178,1 19,79 1,6% 0,4% -2,2 
UK 247; 18 19672,24 331 18,39 3,0% 1,7% -0,9 
USA 531; 63 159203,43 9046,07 143,59 81,6% 5,7% 3,1 
European 
Union 1000; 70 129030,81 1555,04 22,21 14,0% 1,2% -1,4 





Table 5: Data based on Figure 7; world share and countries’ hares of biotech R&D investments in 2005 and 2008 without the USA 
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard”; 2006 and 2009
  
Number of firms for 
calculation: Total 
number; biotech firms 
Total R&D 
Investment €m 





World Share of Biotech 
R&D Investments 
Share of Biotech 





Year: 2005           
France 112/2 21293,45 61,01 30,51 2,8% 0,3% -0,7 
Germany 167/6 38455,24 122,66 20,44 5,7% 0,3% -0,7 
UK 327/27 21402,39 513,36 19,01 23,9% 2,4% 1,4 
                
European 
Union 1000/57 112876,47 1048,08 18,39 48,7% 0,9% -0,1 
World 1413/67 219446,45 2152,10 32,12 100,0% 1,0% 0,0 
        
  
Number of firms for 
calculation: Total 
number; biotech firms 
Total R&D 
Investment €m 





World Share of Biotech 
R&D Investments 
Share of Biotech 





Year: 2008           
France 125/7 25746,93 96,57 13,80 4,7% 0,4% -0,4 
Germany 200/9 45097,37 178,1 19,79 8,7% 0,4% -0,4 
UK 247/18 19672,24 331 18,39 16,2% 1,7% 0,9 
                
European 
Union 1000/70 129030,81 1555,04 22,21 76,1% 1,2% 0,4 






















World's average share of Biotech R&D investments compared to overall R&D 
investment 
Biotech R&D investment specialization (-
USA) 
 






Worlds average share on R&D investment in total investment
Biotech R&D investment specialization
2008
2004
Figure 7: Biotech R&D specialisation across nations  
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard”; 2006 and 2009 
Figure 8: Biotech R&D specialisation across nations (-USA) 




5.2.3.  VoC Calculation forthe Biotech Sector’s Performance – Publications and 
Sales 
After analysing patent and R&D data on the input side, it is also important to use 
measures of the output of an innovation process to view Germany’s performance in 
the radical sector. Schmoch and Qu (2009) state tha  the “scientific performance of a 
country may be seen as a basis for a country’s ability to technological 
developments”(Schmoch and Qu 2009, 105). Scientific performance as such is 
hardly measurable since the structures in the different disciplines are often very 
different from each other. Schmoch and Qu, therefore, emphasise that statistical 
analyses of the number and citations of scientific publications have proven 
themselves to be useful indicators of countries’ abilities to develop technologically. 
The Science Citation Index (SCI) is an international standard in the fields of natural 
sciences, techniques, medicine and life sciences”. The Fraunhofer Institute used the 
SCI and thereby showed that Germany’s specialisation in the field of biotech in 2007 
was slightly positive in relation to other areas of publication. See Figure 9: 
Germany’s specialisation with regard to the Science Citation Index (Selected fields). 
The analysis of the SCI by the Fraunhofer Institute indicates how much German 
publications specialise in the above-listed areas and shows that, in 2007, relatively 
many (compared to the overall publications in the country) publications on the topic 
of biotechnology were indicated in the SCI. This analysis is limited to one year and 
to the country level. To conduct a comparison between nations, the following 
analysis uses the same data source: the Science Citation Index Expanded which is 
published by Thomsen Reuters and was accessed via the Web of Science. Using 
these data, analyses were conducted as for the previous Figures and Tables on 




Indices: Specialisation with reference to the world average: 0 = 
average, + = above average, - = beneath the average, above +20 or 






 An analysis of the publications again shows a parallel, for all the chosen 
times (2004–08; 1994–98; 1984–88) between the USA and Germany, but this 
parallel exists not only between Germany and the US but all measured EU countries 
and the US. See Figure 10: Specialisation of countries in biotech publications with 
regard to the Science Citation Index Expanded. The relatively high world share of 
publications in the area of biotechnology influences the VoC calculation and gives it 
Figure 9: Germany’s specialisation with regard to the Science Citation Index 
(Selected fields)  
Source: Own composition of a calculation of the Fraunhofer ISI, published in 
Schmoch and Qu (2009, 10) 
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some extreme values (see Table 6: Data based on Figure 10; world share and 




Figure 10: Specialisation of countries in biotech publications with regard to the Science Citation Index 
Expanded 
Source: Own calculation using data from the (Reuter 2009) Science Citation Index Expanded in the 
selected areas of BIOTECHNOLOGY & APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY; BIOCHEMISTRY & 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY and PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACY; accessed via Web of Science 
@ Thomsen Reuters at 20.09.2010 
 
 Summarising the findings, for international comparison, the position of 
Giesecke (2000), who states that the US is outperforming any other country in terms 
of biotechnology specialization, can be confirmed by viewing Figure 10: 
Specialisation of countries in biotech publications with regard to the Science Citation 
Index Expanded. Looking at the detailed analysis behind this figure, Germany (after 
having a relatively weak start in 1984–1988) outperforms the other two European 
countries in terms of specialisation in biotech publications and also in terms of its 
world share of biotech publications. Unfortunately, the SCI does not provide the data 





World's average share of biotech publications in terms of total no. of 
countries' publications* 





resources which it would take to build up a European average. The results of the 
analysis of this publication index show that, in relation to each other, Germany is 
overall leading the three nations in terms of publications, in the two time periods of 
1994–98 and 2004–2008. Germany leads this measurement in terms of all four 
biotech measures, which are the total number of biotech publications, the whole 
share of biotech publications and the share of bBiotech publications for total 
publications, as well as the previously mentioned VoC analysis.  
 Like the analysis of patent data, the analysis of publication activities in 
biotechnology in the EU member states indicates strong growth in scientific output in 
biotechnology. The number of publications in the sectors of BIOTECHNOLOGY & 
APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY and 
PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACY have nearly doubled over the years, the 
number of biotech publications has increased tenfold. The publication intensity in 
biotechnology increased not only in absolute terms but also in relative terms as 
shown by the share of biotechnology publications compared to all publications 
calculated for the countries. This finding is close to the patent analysis as well and 
means that the overall significance of biotechnology in comparison with all scientific 




Table 6: Data based on Figure 10; world share and countries’ hares of biotech publications in the periods 1984–8 , 1994–98, 2004–08 
Source: Own composition of data from the Science Citation Index Expanded in the selected areas of: BIOTECHNOLOGY & APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY 
& MOLECULAR BIOLOGY and PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACY; accessed via Web of Science  
Year: 1984–
1988 
Total Number of 
Publications* 
Total Number of Publications with the 
Topic Biotechnology* 
World Share of 
Biotech Publications 
Share of Biotech Publications 
compared to Countries’ total 
Publications* VoC 
France 1.187 34 3,2% 2,9% -1,3% 
Germany 1.268 11 1,0% 0,9% -3,3% 
UK 837 8 0,8% 1,0% -3,2% 
USA 954 277 26,2% 29,0% 24,9% 
World 25.498 1.059 100,0% 4,2% 0,0% 
      
 Year: 1994–
1998 
Total Number of 
Publications* 
Total Number of Publications with the 
Topic Biotechnology* 
World Share of 
Biotech Publications 
Share of Biotech Publications 
compared with Countries’ Total 
Publications* VoC 
France 3.789 157 3,2% 4,1% -21,6% 
Germany 3.604 318 6,6% 8,8% -16,9% 
UK 2.787 216 4,5% 7,8% -18,0% 
USA 2.875 1.482 30,6% 51,5% 25,8% 
World 18.820 4.843 100,0% 25,7% 0,0% 
      
 Year: 2004–
2008 
Total Number of 
Publications* 
Total Number of Publications with the 
Topic Biotechnology* 
World Share of 
Biotech Publications 
Share of Biotech Publications 
compared with Countries’ Total 
Publications* VoC 
France 7.782 289 3,0% 3,7% -16,7% 
Germany 9.114 755 7,7% 8,3% -12,2% 
UK 7.643 449 4,6% 5,9% -14,6% 
USA 7.638 2.864 29,4% 37,5% 17,0% 
World 47.627 9.746 100,0% 20,5% 0,0% 
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 Another way of viewing the performance of a sector and how many products 
are actually being sold is to measure its annual sales. This measure does have the 
advantage that it does not measure an invention or the number of ideas a firm has 
like patents do, but it measures how much is actually being sold and what the value 
of these sales was. This is unlike patent data which does not differentiate between 
strong and weak patents or their potential for commercialisation and whether other 
parties are willing to pay for the final product or whether it is a flop. The annual sales 
of a biotech firm do indicate how successful these firms have actually been at selling 
their products. Compared to other financial measures, such as profits, where other 
measures such as a firm’s spending influence the figure, sales seem to be relatively 
pure indicators.  
 
 
Figure 11: Specialisation in biotech sales across nations 
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard”; 2006 
and 2009 
 
 By again viewing the data behind the VoC graph, it becomes obvious that the 
number of biotech firms included is not representative for measuring sales. Only two 






World's average share of biotech sales in total sales 
Specialisation in Biotech Sales 
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French and six German biotech firms made it into the listing for the 1,000 strongest 
R&D investing firms in Europe. This selection criterion (R&D investment) might be 
legitimate for analysing R&D investments, for an analysis of sales but such 
legitimacy disappears since there are clearly other firms in the relevant countries 
which might be stronger sellers. Bearing this in mind, not just for the French but also 
for the German firms, this limitation clearly influences the world share of nations 
which is calculated by absolute numbers. VoC is later calculated using average sales 
per firm, even though this does not lead to a roundup of the given limitation (number 
of firms) but relative sales relative per firm seem to be fairer than absolute sales 
considering that there are only two firms measured in France in 2005.  
 Viewing the average net sales per firm in millions of Euro, the countries 
remain in the same relative order in relation to each other. French firms do have the 
average highest numbers of net sales per general firm, and German, US and UK 
firms follow. Viewing the same calculation for the average net sales per biotech firm, 
one does have to acknowledge the relatively weak performance of the small number 
of French and German firms in this analysis. Where German firms just manage to 
keep up with UK firms in 2005, their average sales decrease dramatically to only 
16m average sales per firm in 2007. There is no direct explanation for this 
development available from viewing the given data; a larger sample size of German 
biotech firms might help to make sure that this development is not random. In terms 
of the VoC calculation, the UK is clearly the European country specialising most in 
the biotech sector. Thus, as mentioned before, by considering the other three 
measures, Germany does not appear to specialise in the biotech sector, when viewing 
the average net sales per biotech firm though it does (at least in 2005) still appear to 
be clearly above the EU average. It is not clear why this number dropped so 
dramatically in 2007; whether this was an effect of the financial crisis or a simple 
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random mistake due to the small sample size, will only become clearer with further 






Table 7: Data based on Figure 11; world share and countries’ hares of biotech sales in 2005 and 2008  
















Sales per Firm 
in Millions of 
Euro 






Sales per Biotech 
Firms in Millions 
of Euro 
World Share of 
Biotech Net Sales 
Share of Average Net 
Sales per Biotech Firm 
compared to 
Countries’ total 
Average Net Sales per 
Firm VoC  
France 112 2 856772 7649,8 23 11,5 0,1% 0,2% -6,1% 
Germany 167 6 1183080 7084,3 620 103,3 1,6% 1,5% -4,8% 
UK  303 27 1298605 4285,8 2839 105,1 7,4% 2,5% -3,8% 
USA  584 44 3469041 5940,1 26370 599,3 69,0% 10,1% 3,8% 
European 
Union 1000 57 4376808 4376,8 5012 87,9 13,1% 2,0% -4,2% 















Sales per Firm 
in Millions of 
Euro 
Net Sales of 
Biotech Firms 
in Millions of 
Euro 
Average Net 
Sales per Biotech 
Firm in Millions 
of Euro 
World Share of 
Biotech Net Sales 
Share of Average Net 
Sales per Biotech Firm 
compared with 
Countries’ Total 
Average Net Sales per 
Firm VoC  
France 125 7 1122020 8976,2 291 41,6 0,7% 0,5% -3,9% 
Germany 200 8 1574169 7870,8 127 15,9 0,3% 0,2% -4,1% 
UK  247 18 1347295 5454,6 2482 137,9 6,0% 2,5% -1,8% 
USA  531 63 3542441 6671,3 30013 476,4 72,9% 7,1% 2,8% 
European 
Union 1000 70 5711891 5711,9 6243 89,2 15,2% 1,6% -2,8% 
World*  2000 137 13897407 6948,7 41188 300,6 100,0% 4,3% 0,0% 
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5.3.  Summary of the Biotech Sector’s Performance 
As shown by Hall and Soskice (2001) Germany does generally not show a high 
specialisation in the biotechnology sector in terms of patents. This picture is not only 
demonstrated by patent data but may be confirmed by viewing the other 
measurements of R&D investment, publication counts, and annual sales, using the 
same basic calculation which was used by the two VoC authors. The German 
biotechnology sector does further (as also shown by Hall and Soskice) show a 
parallel picture in terms of specialisation, compared to the US in all four measures. 
Viewing only this part of the analysis, which is illustrated by the numerous figures 
and relative specialisations across the analysed nations in the biotechnology sector, 
the notion of Germany being a radical innovator can clearly be rejected and Hall and 
Soskice`s assertion that Germany lacks the ability to radically innovate and thereby 
specialises in incremental sectors can be supported. This chapter looks at the 
calculations for the VoC diagram and, by including other EU countries in the 
comparison, shows that such a conclusion be simplified. Several aspects are 
identified which call for a different conclusion on Germany’s performance in this 
sector. 
 The USA is found to be such a huge outlier in any terms that comparison with 
any other country is limited. Among the other EU countries, Germany appears (apart 
from in any relative measures) in a leading position in terms of its patent data, the 
R&D investment per firm in 2008, and its publication strength from 1994 onwards. 
Compared to other nations, Germany`s performance does not appear to be as weak as 
expected. Germany does appear to be an equal competitor, with over-time growth 
performance in this sector. Its performance in terms of net sales appears to be 
comparatively weak. This result could be a simple outlier due to the small sample 
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size, but it could also be a sign of financial crisis. Since such a kind of sign is not 
observable in any other countries’ measures, such a conclusion has not been drawn, 
but it would need further analysis. Generally, it is left to say that, as seen from the 
policy and market analysis before, German firms are rather small (which was 
supported by the BioRegio competition, enabling single researchers to start their own 
firms and supporting them in terms of patent applications). The chosen policy might 
not have been as helpful as supposed, considering that the number of filed patents 
and publications did clearly rise over time, but the R&D investments of big firms did 
not support the development for long enough. Thus it appears that even though 
Germany may be seen as a leader in terms of patents, many of the existing firms are 
not large or financially strong enough (consisting of only a few mainly academic 
members) to commercialise a product, considering a 15-year pipeline and potentially 
failure of many products. Therefore the BioRegio competition might have been 
helpful and a good start, but a further policy, focusing not only on the creation of 
start-ups but moreover explicitly on building strong alliances with large existing 
pharmacy firms (as  is the case in the US) and on also supporting larger, not only 
research but growth and WIN-oriented biotech firms, might probably have helped to 
create more final commercialised products and sales. Even though the sales 
performance in the second year is significantly under the EU average, it is outside the 
scope of this work to analyse whether this is based on the sample size or on actual 
figures. The overall performance of the German biotech sector does, in all other 
terms, appear to be above the EU average and even leading on some issues. The 
notion of Germany being a radical innovator can, therefore, not be rejected in terms 
of a biotechnology sector analysis. A growing performance of the biotech sector is 
visible, which might be the case due to further EU regulations in 2002, or due to the 
recent additional governmental support for high-tech industries. The institutional 
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framework in terms of a better VC or other finance is not given. Also, there are no 
relevant changes found in the other four spheres, since 2001. The summarised 
findings criticise the basis on which Hall and Soskice drew their conclusions. Thus, 
at least in terms of biotechnology, Germany might not be seen as a purely 
incremental innovator, but as one of the countries striving for a leading position in 



















6.  CHAPTER SIX: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 
GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND PERFORMANCE OF 
THE GERMAN SOFTWARE SECTOR 
 
By questioning the proposition that Germany, as a major example of an CME, 
performs weakly in radical sectors, such as the biotech or software sector, the 
following chapter consists (as the chapter on biotechnology before) of an 
introduction, defining software and describing the German software market, as well 
as a Review on German Software Policies. The heart of this chapter consists of key 
measures on the Software Sector’s Performance which again include measures of the 
input (patent data and R&D) and the output factors for innovation (publications and 
share of total returns). These measures are then compared with Hall and Soskice`s 
findings and are summarised in the last part of this chapter. 
 
6.1.  Defining Software and Software Policies 
The OECD defines Software as “Programs, procedures, and data associated with the 
operation of a computer system” (OECD 2008, 500). As is the case with 
biotechnology, software can also be differentiated in different areas, such as “system 
software which controls the operation of the computer (i.e., Windows, DOS,) and 
application software (i.e., Word, EXCEL, MS ACCESS, Lotus)” (OECD 2010). 
Lehrer (2000) states that Germany specialises in the second field of software. A 
discussion exists (see Lehrer 2000) on whether a specialisation in the first or the 
second kind of software would reflect a country’s ability to radically innovate better. 
Here the radical differences between the two kinds of software will not be 
differentiated since they are both a part of software and thus both represent an 
143 
 
emerging new growth sector; the degrees of radical differentiation will not be taken 
into account.  
 The software industry can be seen as part of the general ICT sector. The 
Datamonitor “is a leading business information company specialized in industry 
analysis” (Datamonitor 2002, 2). The London-based firm conducts annual analysis of 
sector performance in general and in specific countries. The 2002 Datamonitor report 
stated that:  
 “Germany has the largest information, communication, and technology 
 (ICT) market in Europe, with the software segment of this market being the 
 largest in Europe and the third-largest in the world after the US and Japan.” 
 (Datamonitor 2002, 7)  
 
 In 2002, the German software market was valued at $6.15 billion, 
approximately 20.5% of the European market. Thus even Lehrer (2000, 592) stated 
that “[o]nce again, the aggregate performance of the German software sector seems 
mediocre compared with the US, but appears satisfactory when judged by any other 
standard”. 
 By reviewing the policies of the German government in supporting the 
software sector`s development, it becomes obvious how different the government’s 
approaches in supporting the two analysed sectors are. Where the biotech sector had 
to struggle for a long time under paradoxical government actions as described in the 
chapter before,  the policies on software development were and are, up until now, not 
directly visible. Lehrer (2000) describes how “Germany’s software sector has 
benefited from policies that differed in kind from the state support programs for 
software development that were attempted in France, Britain, and Japan”. Thus the 
German government did not invest in “mission-oriented state support, relying on pre-
defined industrial goals and concentrated resources”, but “[i]n contrast, the more 
‘diffusion-oriented’ government support policies for software in Germany are 
144 
 
generally credited as more effective (Malerba and Torrisi 1996)” (as cited in Lehrer 
2000). 
 Broadly-speaking, the government’s policies can be divided into three 
phases. The first phase was characterised by the BMFT’s efforts to strengthen 
university research and education in the field of software since the early 1980s. The 
BMBF called this the Initiative zur Förderung der Softwaretechnologie in 
Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft and Technik (Initiative to promote the software technology 
in economy, businesses and technique), and 95 projects were supported in the period 
from 1995 to 1998/1999. Approximately 34 million Euro from the government and 
another 25 million Euro from the German economy were invested. This was 
followed by two similar projects, in 1999/2000 and in 2002–2006. 
 The central view of these policies changed slightly from the first stage 
supporting software in academia to build a base for the industry; a second phase 
connected academics and industry with each other and a third phase actually 
promoted start-ups and directly influenced the industry through academia. The large 
German software firms or growth-oriented medium-sized firms were strongly 
integrated into the whole process. This policy focus is supported by other projects, 
such as the previously mentioned establishment of the Neuer Markt and, with this, 
the “general high-tech boom in Germany” (Lehrer 2000), and also the establishment 
of the Virtual Competence Centre for Software Engineering by the BMFT and the 
Fraunhofer institute which is supposed to “provide information about the most 
advanced and most appropriate software engineering concepts, methods and tools” 
(VSEK 2010). There were hardly any policy papers or future strategy plans from the 
federal government available, stating software as a key industry of the German 
economy until 2010; unlike the papers existing for the biotechnology sector. The 
goals which were observed as being set in the biotech sector and the direct policies to 
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cluster biotech labs in German areas is not paralleled in the same way in the software 
sector. Even though some general cluster policies such as Hightech Strategie-
Spitzencluster Wettbewerb also count software firms as their winners, they do not 
specifically support the software industry, but let all high-tech firms compete with 
each other independently of their industrial background. 
 
6.2.  VoC Calculation of the Software Sector's Performance 
This section leads to an analysis of the German software sector, focusing on the 
previously analysed four key measures of patent data, R&D investments, as well as 
publications and sales in software firms. 
6.2.1. VoC Calculation of the Software Sector’s Performance – Patents  
By analysing patent data, it is important to bear in mind that the EPO does not grant 
software patents as such. It does “not grant patents for computer programs (‘software 
patents’), or computer implemented business methods that make no such technical 
contribution” (SWOAT 2010, 3). The EPO’s procedure for granting patents (only in 
a case where they make a technical contribution) is very different from the USPTO`s 
practices. Thus, the USPTO does grant patents which would probably be rejected by 
the EPO. “Under the EPC a computer program claimed as such is not a patentable 
invention (Art. 52(2) (c) and (3) EPC). Inventions involving computer programs that 
implement business, mathematical or similar methods and do not produce technical 
effects (e.g. because they solve a business problem rather than a technical one) are 
not patentable, and no patents will be granted for such invent ons in Europe” 
(SWPAT, 2010). By fulfilling certain conditions, software patents are also being 
filed at the EPO. Examples here are the pop-out-context-m nu “EP249293”, granted 
to Philips, or the Microsoft Patent “EP0618540” (SWPAT 2010). By analysing EPO 
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data alone, it is the case that all patents being granted had to fulfil the same criteria.
The EPO does not list software patents as such in its data base. Therefore, the 
following patent analysis had to be conducted using general ICT patents,6 which do 
potentially include software patents. The results of the VoC calculation, as shown in 
Figure 12: Specialisation in ICT patents across nations is, in consensus with Hall and 
Soskice`s assertions, negative and, therefore, it may be concluded that, in terms of 
patents, “[i]n sum, ITC is not a large sector of the German economy by international 
standards” (Lehrer 2000, 588). Germany is, therefore, not as strongly specialised in 
the production of ICT patents as in the production of other ones. This is the same 
result as for the biotech sector. Again, in accordance with the Biotech results, 
Germany does not perform badly considering the absolute world share of ICT 
patents. Germany is the leading country within the EU, being responsible for nearly 
50% of the EU ICT patents granted in all three measured timeframes. Therefore, by 
comparing Germany with the other countries’ performances, and after taking into 
account Japan as an additional strong non-EU nation in this field, Germany takes the 
first place in terms of world share for granted patents in all the measured periods. 
Therefore, it is to be concluded that, even though, according to Hall and Soskice`s 
calculation, Germany is not specialised in the ICT field, and even takes last place in 
the international comparison they conducted, in terms of its absolute world share, it 
has to be recognised as a highly competitive country, being amongst the leading 
three nations in the world. By discussing the software field as such within ICT, even 
                                                
6 ICT-related patents are currently identified using the following codes of the International Patent 
Classification (IPC): Telecommunications G01S, G08C, G09C, H01P, H01Q, 
H01S3/025,043,063,067,085,0933,0941,103,133,18,19,25), H01S5, H03B, H03C, H03D, H03H, 
H03M, H04B, H04J, H04K, H04L, H04M, H04Q; Consumer electronics G11B, H03F, H03G, H03J, 
H04H, H04N, H04R, H04S; Computers, office machinery B07C, B41J, B41K, G02F, G03G, G05F, 
G06, G07, G09G, G10L, G11C, H03K, H03L; Other ICT G01B, G01C, G01D, G01F, G01G, G01H, 
G01J, G01K, G01L, G01M, G01N, G01P, G01R, G01V, G01W, G02B6, G05B, G08G, G09B, 
H01B11, H01J(11/,13/,15/,17/,19/,21/,23/, 25/,27/,29/,31/,33/,40/,41/,43/,45/), H01L (Patent, 2010). 
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Lehrer (2000), who actually criticises the German ICT and general developments in 
radical sectors, appreciates that “[as] for the software industry per se (…) this is by 
far the fastest growing segment of Germany’s ITC sector, with recent growth rates of 
approximately 15% annually” (Lehrer 2000, 588). These growth rates of the German 
software industry are, according to Lehrer, accompanied by a huge need for 
employees in the industry and result in the manifestation of “a phenomenon not seen 
on this scale in Germany for decades: a dire labor shortage” (Lehrer 2000, 587). The 
developments described by Lehrer in 2000 have continued to the present time. 
Leimbach (2010), who still talks about a labour shortage in the sector, found 45,206 
firms in the software sector in 2004 and about 54,101 firms in 2007. The number of 
employees also grew from about 504,000 in 2004 to about 564,000 in 2007. As for 
the biotech sector, the software sector is also dominated by small firms; its largest 
and most prominent representative is the SAP AG & Co KG.  
 
 
Figure 12: Specialisation in ICT patents across nations 
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard”; 2006 
and 2009 







World's average share of ICT patents in total no. of countries patents 







Table 8: Data based on Figure12; world share and countries’ hare of ICT patents in the periods 1984– 8, 1994–98, 2004–08.  
Source: Own illustration, using OECD’s European Patent Office data 
  Total Patents Total ICT Patents World Share of ICT Patents 
Share of ICT Patents in comparison to Countries’ 
Total no. of Patents VoC World 
Year: 1986/1987         
France 8146 1991 7,5% 24,4% -2,8% 
Germany 20921 4048 15,3% 19,3% -7,9% 
Japan 17037 6931 26,2% 40,7% 13,4% 
UK 7022 1958 7,4% 27,9% 0,7% 
USA 25488 8266 31,3% 32,4% 5,2% 
European Union 48107 10102 38,2% 21,0% -6,2% 
World 97081 26438 100,0% 27,2% 0,0% 
  Total Patents Total ICT Patents World Share of ICT Patents 
Share of ICT Patents in comparison to Countries’ 
Total no. of Patents VoC Calculation 
Year: 1996/1997         
France 11871 3071 5,6% 25,9% -6,6% 
Germany 33144 7653 14,0% 23,1% -9,4% 
Japan 29659 13910 25,4% 46,9% 14,4% 
UK 8826 2880 5,3% 32,6% 0,1% 
USA 49210 18730 34,2% 38,1% 5,6% 
European Union 77122 19529 35,7% 25,3% -7,2% 
World 168484 54769 100,0% 32,5% 0,0% 
  Total Patents Total ICT Patents World Share of ICT Patents 
Share of ICT Patents in comparison to Countries’ 
Total no. of Patents VoC Calculation 
Year: 2006/2007         
France 16705 4304 5,7% 25,8% -3,1% 
Germany 47812 9502 12,7% 19,9% -9,0% 
Japan 42660 16192 21,6% 38,0% 9,1% 
UK 11000 3180 4,2% 28,9% 0,0% 
USA 64614 18843 25,2% 29,2% 0,3% 
European Union 114840 26154 34,9% 22,8% -6,1% 
World 259247 74860 100,0% 28,9% 0,0% 
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6.2.2.  VoC Calculation of the Software Sector's Performance – Research and 
Development Investments 
The previously described R&D Scoreboard which annually lists the 1,000 strongest 
R&D investing firms in Europe and the 1,000 strongest firms in the rest of the world, 
has identified 13 (in 2005) and 16 (in 2008) German software firms amongst 
Europe’s 1,000 strongest R&D investing companies. In 2008, these firms did invest 
more total money into their R&D than the 15 French and the 25 UK firms together. 
With 92 and €115m per firm invested, these big German software companies have 
invested more than the French and the UK firms have invested together, in both 
years, See Table 9: Data based on Figure 13; world share and countries’ hare of 
software R&D investments in 2005 and 2008. 
 In terms of absolute numbers, the Japanese numbers cannot be expected to 
be very representative since Japan is only represented by 2 firms in 2004 and 0 firms 
in 2008. Bearing in mind the filed patents in these years, as analysed before, it must 
be concluded that, in the face of very strong competition on the side of the USA 
(79% of the overall world share on R&D investments), the Japanese firms which 
were selected (as non-EU firms) in this extreme US context, could simply not have 
managed to maintain such a high level of investment. In real life, Japan is not only 
competing with the US (which is an extreme case compared to any other country) but 
also with the EU countries. A database, which would have selected the 1,000 
strongest R&D investors in Europe and Asia, would have identified more Japanese 
software firms in a more appropriate way. In relation to the US, the Japanese 
measures cannot be seen as representative in showing Japan’s ctual performance in 
comparison to EU firms. Even though Germany does have a relatively high world 
share in terms of R&D investments, compared to other EU countries, it does, as for 
the ICT patents before, not show a high specialisation in this area and takes the last 
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place in a comparison of the three EU countries in both years in terms of the share of 
software investments in comparison to the countries’ total investments. This can be 
seen when viewing Figure 13: Specialisation in software R&D investments across 
nations, which shows the VoC calculation based on each country’s average share of 
software investments compared to countries total investments minus the world’s 
average share of software investments compared to countries’ total investments. 
With nearly a 10% share in software investments compared to the country’s total 
investments, the US shows very high specialisation in this sector. The US (having a 
world share of nearly 80% of the total captured R&D investment in software firms, 
showing that it has many huge firms), as for the Biotech sector, strongly influences 
the world averages and, thereby, leads to a mirroring picture with any other country. 
The absolute numbers do indicate that, besides the huge outlier of the USA, the other 
countries, led by Germany are competitive in their own measures and do show 
growth in terms of total R&D investments from 2005 to 2008.  
 
 
Figure 13: Specialisation in software R&D investments across nations 
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard”; 2006 
and 2009 







World's average share of software R&D investments in compariosn with total 
no. of countries' R&D investments 
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Year: 2005               
France 112; 17 21293,45 724,76 42,63 4,0% 3,4% -1,5% 
Germany 167;13 38455,24 1199,75 92,29 6,6% 3,1% -1,8% 
Japan 237;2 70075,21 446,07 223,04 2,5% 0,6% -4,2% 
UK 327;45 21402,39 848,42 18,85 4,7% 4,0% -0,9% 
USA 587;82 151129,80 14287,54 174,24 79,0% 9,5% 4,6% 
European 
Union 1000;100 112876,47 3066,48 30,97 16,9% 2,7% -2,2% 
World 2000;189 370576,25 18094,76 95,74 100,0% 4,9% 0,0% 
        
  











World Share of 
Software R&D 
Investments 





Year: 2008               
France 125;15 25746,93 852,55 56,84 4,4% 3,3% -3,1% 
Germany 209;16 45097,37 1846,79 115,42 9,6% 4,1% -2,3% 
Japan 256;0 93903,07 0 0 0 0 -6,4% 
UK 247;25 19672,24 822,67 32,91 4,3% 4,2% -2,2% 
USA 531;54 159203,43 14956,63 276,97 77,6% 9,4% 3,0% 
European 
Union 1000;77 130412,32 3835,06 49,81 19,9% 2,9% -3,5% 
World 2000;137 300414,34 19273,98 140,69 100,0% 6,4% 0,0% 
Table 9: Data based on Figure 13; world share and countries’ shares of software R&D investment 
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard”; 2006 and 2009 
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6.2.3.  VoC Calculation of the Software Sector's Performance – Publications and 
Sales 
The Science Citation Index Expanded is again used to measure Germany’s 
performance in publications, but this time for the software sector. By analysing the 
relative specialisation of software publications compared to other publications, the 
US outperforms all other nations, as seen in Figure 14: Specialisation of countries in 
software publications with regard to the Science Citation Index Expanded. The US 
does also show pretty impressive growth in terms of publication specialisation 
throughout the three measured timeframes.   
Only Germany shows equally consistent growth in its software publications 
in relation to other publications in the measured fields. In relation to the other 
countries, it does, surprisingly, show the highest specialisation in this sector. An 
explanation of this pattern might be found in the previously described government 
policy which, contrary to government policies in the other two EU countries and 
Japan, from the early 1980s established a strong academic base for the software 
industry in Germany. This emphasis on academic strength and later on supporting 
university-company relationships may be seen also as the basis for the steadily 
growing number of scientific publications in the software sector, in relation to other 
areas.  
 As seen in the absolute counts of biotech publications before, the number of 
software publications does also appear to be very low in the first year, compared to 
the other EU countries and the following years. The absolute numbers, as illustrated 
by the total number of publications with the topic software and also the world share 
on software publications rose enormously in the two time periods which followed. 
Germany managed to publish nearly 10% of the world’s publications on software in 
the period from 2004–2008 and, thereby, shows very strong specialisation in terms of 
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software publications of about 30% on total publications in the relevant area in the 
same period. For this time period, Germany managed to be above the calculated 
world average, which does appear again to be strongly influenced by the high US 
specialisation, which represents nearly 40% of the world’s publications or four times 
as many publications as Germany. 
 It is not conclusive whether the number of publications, which showed a 
positive picture for German software firms in an EU comparison, and which goes 
hand in hand with the positive picture shown in terms of total R&D investments and 
patent counts, also indicates a high number of actual productivity, and more 
importantly, sold products. The further analysis of software firm sales will draw a 
clearer picture of the sector’s overall performance.   
 
 
* in the area of COMPUTER SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS and ENGINEERING 
Figure 14: Specialisation of countries in software publications with regard to the Science Citation 
Index Expanded 
Source: Own illustration, using data from the Scientific Citation Index Expanded for the periods 
2004–08, 1994–98, and 1884–88 






World's average share of software publications in comparion with total no. of 
countrie's publications* 






Total Number of 
Publications* 
Total Number of Publications with 
the Topic Software* 
World Share of Software 
Publications 
Share of Software Publications in 
comparison with Countries’ Total 
Publications* VoC 
Year: 1984-1988          
France 8.702 229 2,4% 2,6% -12% 
Germany 318 22 0,2% 6,9% -8% 
Japan 10.035 135 1,4% 1,3% -14% 
UK 8.925 76 0,8% 0,9% -14% 
USA 12.616 3.496 36,8% 27,7% 13% 
World 63.222 9.505 100,0% 15,0% 0% 
      
  
Total Number of 
Publications* 
Total Number of Publications with 
the Topic Software* 
World Sshare on Software 
Publications 
Share of Software Publications in 
comparison with Countries’ total 
Publications* VoC 
Year: 1994-1998          
France 18.962 1.510 4,3% 8,0% -10% 
Germany 18.026 2.388 6,7% 13,2% -5% 
Japan 20.950 1.160 3,3% 5,5% -13% 
UK 9.730 693 2,0% 7,1% -11% 
USA 36.946 13.747 38,7% 37,2% 19% 
World 195.758 35.508 100,0% 18,1% 0% 
      
  
Total Number of 
Publications* 
Total Number of Publications with 
the Topic Software* 
World Share of Software 
Publications 
Share of Software Publications in 
comparison with Countries’ Total 
Publications* VoC 
Year: 2004-2008          
France 26.199 3.405 5,2% 13,0% -13% 
Germany 21.075 5.987 9,2% 28,4% 2% 
Japan 23.963 2.774 4,2% 11,6% -15% 
UK 17.016 1.755 2,7% 10,3% -16% 
USA 39.210 24.198 37,0% 61,7% 36% 
World 250.433 65.418 100,0% 26,1% 0% 
Table 10: Data based on Figure 14; world share and countries’ hares of software publications with regard to the Science Citation Index Expanded  
Source: Own illustration, using data from the Scientific Citation Index Expanded for the periods 2004–08, 1994–98 
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 Viewing the nation`s specialisation in software sales, the picture of 
Germany being most specialised within the three EU countries, which was indicated 
by the section on publications, can be confirmed. Over all, the US is once more the 
most specialised country in this measure as well. It is followed by Japanese firms, 
which, as mentioned before are not well represented in the used dataset and are, 
therefore, not even represented by a single firm in 2008. This representation is due to 
other reasons than a weak performance in the sales of Japanese software firms per se.  
 
 
Figure 15: Specialisation in software sales across nations 
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard”; 2006 
and 2009 
 
By viewing the average net sales of software firms, Germany is again leading 
in comparison with other EU countries. German firms have as many sales in m€ as 
the French and UK firms together. These numbers have to be viewed carefully. The 
measured firms are large companies. These results would probably look different i  
more and differently-sized firms from each country were viewed. By viewing the 
world share of software sales, Germany is the only country which shows a significant 
increase in its share. German firms managed not only to hold but to increase their 






World's average share of software sales interms of  total sales 
Specialisation in Software  Sales 
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sales from 2005 to 2008 even in comparison with other sectors’ sales. They increased 
their sales more significantly than firms in other industries and even managed to 
increase their share of average net sales per software firm in terms of the country’s 
total average net sales per firm in m€ from 10.5 to 11.3 million. Thus the analysis of 
net sales shows a positive picture for the performance of German software firms.  
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Table 11: Data based on Figure 15: world share and countries’ hares of software sales  
Source: Own illustration, using data from “The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard”; 2006 and 2009 
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Share of Average Net Sales 
per Software Firm in 
comparison with Countries’ 
Total Average Net Sales per 
Firm VoC  
Year: 2005                 
France 112 18 856772 7649,8 3981 221,2 3,2% 2,9% -9,1% 
Germany 167 13 1183080 7084,3 9652 742,5 7,8% 10,5% -1,5% 
Japan 237 2 1888390 7967,9 3704 1852,0 3,0% 23,2% 11,3% 
UK  303 30 1298605 4285,8 7721 257,4 6,2% 6,0% -5,9% 
USA  584 81 3469041 5940,1 90885 1122,0 73,2% 18,9% 6,9% 
European 
Union 1000 100 4376808 4376,8 23429 234,3 18,9% 5,4% -6,6% 
World 2000 190 10942777 5471,4 124167 653,5 100,0% 11,9% 0% 
        
  
Total Number 
of all Counted 
Firms 
Total Number 





Millions of  
Euro 
Average Net 
Sales per Firm 
in Millions of 
Euro 







Software Firm in 





Share of Average Net Sales 
per Software Firm in 
comparison with Countries’ 
Total Average Net Sales per 
Firm in VoC  
Year: 2008                  
France 125 15 1122020 8976,2 3609 240,6 2,8% 2,7% -11,1% 
Germany 209 16 1574169 7531,9 13665 854,1 10,5% 11,3% -2,4% 
Japan 256 0 2740655 10705,7 0 - 0,0% - - 
UK  241 25 1347295 5590,4 8987 359,5 6,9% 6,4% - 7,3% 
USA  525 54 3542441 6747,5 96568 1788,3 73,9% 26,5% 12,8% 
European 
Union 1000 77 5711821 5711,8 29194 379,1 22,3% 6,6% -7,1% 
World 2000 137 13897347 6948,7 130761 954,5 100,0% 13,7% 0% 
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6.3.  Summary of the Software Sector's Key Measures 
As for the German Software sector, there appears generally not to be high 
specialisation in terms of ICT patents and also R&D investment. Viewing the other 
two measurements of publication counts, and annual sales, the VoC calculation does 
show that Germany (even though it is still mirroring the US) is the EU country 
leading in terms of specialisation. The argumentation of Hall and Soskice (2001) can 
still be confirmed, since even though the countries are compared, and not directly, 
the picture is still mirroring. As for the biotech sector, considered in the previous 
chapter, viewing only this part of the analysis, which is illustrated by the figures 
relating to relative specialisations across the analysed nations in the software sector,
the notion of Germany being a radical innovator can clearly be rejected by viewing it 
in comparison with the US. Hall and Soskice`s conclusion that Germany lacks the 
ability to radically innovate and specialises in incremental sectors can be supported. 
Viewing the other countries’ specialisations in the cross-national comparison on 
specialisation, Germany takes a leading role among the EU countries. Viewing the 
absolute numbers behind the VoC analysis seems to be even more relevant and 
exciting than before. From this perspective, Germany appears not just to be strong, 
but the leading EU country in this field. It produced between 12.5% and 15% of the 
world’s ICT patents in the three measured time frames, raised its world share for 
software R&D investment to nearly 10% of the world share of investments in 2008 
(raising its share more than any other country); it has almost 10% of the world’s 
publications in the sector, publishing less only than the US, but as much as France 
and the UK together; after the US, Germany did also show the highest world share 
(from 7.8% in 2005 to around 10% in 2008) in software sales. Germany is not only 
found to be in a stable but a leading position for all measures in terms of an EU 
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comparison with the other two EU countries. Hall and Soskice`s assertion that 
Germany specialises in incremental innovation cannot be confirmed by these 
findings. It does appear, that an in-depth view opens up different perspectives and 
emphasises a critical view of the VoC calculation. The chosen policies in the 
software sector are very different from the policies in the biotech sector. Considering 
the growth of the measured data over time, the chosen approaches might have been 
helpful to support this development. The three steps of the government policies, 
starting with support of academics (establishing a strong research and training system 
in universities) and later its connection with industry can be argued to have positive 
effects, considering the high rates of publication and patents. Even though the 
software sector is (like the biotech sector) dominated by smaller firms, the active 
support of larger firms in terms of alliances, and of the growth of small firms, being 
supported by the government and the established alliances, seem to be of importance, 
considering the sales rates and the R&D investment rates. Government policies, even 
though they might have been implemented with less attention from the public and 
without picturing the sector as a key industry in the first instance, can be considered 
to have been very successful. In summary, Liecke`s (2009) findings on the German 
software sector being a “Hidden Champion” within the overall German economy 
may be confirmed. The notion of Germany being a radical innovator cannot be 
rejected, and, moreover, surprisingly it is confirmed by the measured data.  
 This previous chapter represents the first step towards understanding the 
reasoning behind VoC theory and assessing whether or not it can explain the 
trajectories of innovation found in a nation. The past chapter has discussed whether 
the changes in sectoral policy making might have influenced the ability of firms to 
prosper in this sector. It appears that, for example, in the case of biotechnology, 
various burdens were established through non-regulation, defamation and 
160 
 
obstruction, but were not given much public attention as negative emotions as well. 
In the case of the software sector, it appears that the sector was not well represented 
in the past. This has clearly changed recently. The reputation of the two sectors has 
increased, but their interests are still of secondary order compared to old, well 
established sectors which are well supported by lobbying e.g. in Bundestag (check 
the political consultancy Acatech). 
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7.  CHAPTER SEVEN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN 
GERMANY: CAPABILITIES FOR RADICAL 
TRAJECTORIES OF INNOVATION 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis has identified several propositions for 
theoretical approaches. This chapter aims to examine the institutional changes in 
Germany since reunification. The results of the findings are discussed in the 
following chapter, aiming to identify answers to the first two research questions.  
 In 2014, Berlin celebrated the 25th anniversary of German reunification. This 
celebration reminded Germans of the fall of communism in the eastern parts of 
today's Federal Republic. Since the fall of the Berlin wall, a particular kind of free, 
American capitalism has been perceived to be superior to other forms of socio-
economic systems (Ulrich 2014). In a country that is still feeling the aftermath of the 
recession following the global crisis of 2008, this celebration of capitalist superiority 
seemed strange to many observers. The public debates about economic restructuring 
(Zeit 2015) and (non-) growth that emerged at about the same time, seem to have 
become part of everyday life for members of all social classes (Schaper 2014). A 
particular Zeitgeist meeting a strong desire for sustainability was and still is driving 
public debates. Political parties (Kroker and Klös 2008; Özcüre et al. 2011) have 
tried to respond to these developments. Diverse discussions about finance (Sievers 
2014; Neuhann 2014; Meyer-Rüth 2014), in line with a desire for restrictions to 
financial markets on an EU level, and in terms of the black zero on a national level 
(Oltermann 2014; The Economist 2014); social policy and the labour market (SPD-
Parteivorstand 2013; Arni u. a. 2014; Knabe, Schöb, and Thum 2014) have emerged. 
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In November 2014, legislation was passed, that set the first national minimum wage 
of 8.50 Euro per working hour for employees. Germany`s Liberal Party (FDP) and 
employers` associations have criticised this bill and other recent policies by the 
government ("Investitionsschwäche in Deutschland" 2015). They have argued that 
federal chancellor Angela Merkel has reversed her previous course of action 
concerning the national innovation system ("Deutschlands Spitzencluster" 2014). 
These critiques have predicted economic stagnation arising from Germany`s non-
investment and non-growth strategy. In Europe’s Economic Suicide, Paul Krugman 
(2012, A19) strongly criticises German fiscal austerity as driving depressed EU 
countries "off a cliff". His article gained public attention internationally and adds to 
the debate on the role of German policy making in the EU and the current Greek 
crisis (Lewis 2015; Tompson, Price and Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2009; Troianovski 2015). The political and socioeconomic 
developments, sketched so far, highlight the importance of Soziale Marktwirtschaft 
(BAVC 2009; Vogt 2010) not only in Germany but also for the whole of the 
European Union at this time (Scharpf 2010).  
"Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have finally managed to write 
the commitment to create a European social market economy (SME) into the 
hard letter of Art. 3(3) of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU. So the finalit  of the 
European political economy is going to be redefined by the ideas that have 
shaped the socially inclusive and institutionally coordinated SMEs (...)" 
(Scharpf 2010, 211–12).  
 
 These observable developments stand in sharp contrast to some propositions 
underlying one of the most famous and still taught theories in European Management 
Classes: Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theory. VoC theory assumes a liberalisation 
of the German CME (Eichhorst 2014; Herrigel 2014). A second contradiction 
appears in the proposition that Germany is an incremental innovator which is 
dominated by welfare production regimes (WPR) leading to inequaity. Compared to 
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other EU countries, my previously illustrated finding is that Germany appears to 
perform well in at least two new and emerging markets (Datamonitor 2011; Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research 2010; Lang, Schneider and Bauer 2012; 
Leimbach 2010). Since Germany is described as a major example of a CME in terms 
of VoC, this observation contradicts the general proposition that CMEs have weak 
performance in radically innovative sectors. Radical Innovation is one "(...) which 
entails substantial shifts in product lines, the development of entirely new goods, or 
major changes to the production process (...)" (Hall and Soskice 2001, 38). On the 
institutional level, the German labour market and, with this, the nation's collective 
skill formation system have undergone severe changes over the past 25 years. This 
has been as a result of cultural evolution, and these slow internal changes of the 
German political economy in the area of skill formation leave Germany with 
coordinated LMIs and a skill formation framework. Due to international pressure, the 
German CG system has developed into an internationally recognised and transparent 
standard. The CG system is still characterised dy employee participation and 
stakeholder orientation, including our present understanding of soziale 
Marktwirtschaft7 which is incorporated into the German Corporate Governance 
Kodex (Ringleb et al. 2014). At the heart of the debate about which institutional 
outlook might lead democratic capitalist nations towards comparative economic 
advantage, this chapter aims to determine the directions of changes in German LMIs, 
skill formation, and the outlook of the German job market during different political 
regimes over the past 25 years. Comparative institutional advantage is defined as 
"(...) the institutional structure of a particular political economy [that] provides firms 
                                                
7"Der Kodex verdeutlicht die Verpflichtung von Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat, im Einklang mit den 
Prinzipien der sozialen Marktwirtschaft für den Bestand des Unternehmens and eine nachhaltige 
Wertschöpfung zu sorgen (Unternehmensinteresse)" (Ringleb et al. 2014, 5:1). 
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with advantages for engaging in specific types of activities there" (Hall and Soskice 
2001, 37). In a second step, changes in German CG in the context of financial 
globalisation are discussed. The third part of this chapter look at the institutional 
sphere of industrial relations and aims to discuss the proposition, arising from VoC, 
about corporation's influence over policy making. The relationships between actors 
within the German economy are discussed. It further aims to give meaning to the 
interconnection between changes in both LMIs and the skill formation system and 
what this means for international competition. The theoretical intention is to modify 
VoC theory so that it no longer offers such a simplified view of a CME's inability to 
create radical innovation. It is important to illustrate the functioning of different 
capitalist nations, with different actors within each society (non rational/ all-knowing 
workers, employee, and employer associations/and their associated research 
institutes, educational systems, as well as government policy). In this context, the 
given chapter focuses on the first two research questions.  
 This chapter aims to identify possible changes within the institutional spheres 
of the German CME. It focuses on such changes which might influence the skill 
formation system of the country, but also the decision making within firms. The 
following analytical part of this chapter consists of an analysis of changes in German 
institutions. The conclusion partly reflects on RQ IV and refers to its implications 
and theoretical contributions. Limitations are shown and further questions raised. 
 
7.1.  Skill Formation, Labour Market Changes, Job Market and 
the German Welfare State 
A clear picture of the assumed relationship between CMEs' institutional spheres and 
trajectories of innovation in the context of VoC has been drawn and discussed in the 
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previous literature review. Several research questions have been identified. In an 
attempt to shed light on these, this chapter discusses the historical developments in 
skill formation, LMIs/ social policy as it influences the job market and skill profiles 
available for firms. The longitudinal view is from 1989–2014, 25 years (since 
reunification).  
7.1.1.  Changes in German Labour Market Institutions since 1990 
With 41.6 million people employed in 2012, there have never been so many people 
employed in Germany before. In this context, the numbers of employees covered by 
social security contributions have increased (Jeder Job zählt 2013). Since then, the 
numbers of people in employment living in Germany have further increased and they 
reached another high of 43 million people in October 2014 (Erstmals 43 Millionen 
Erwerbstätige im Oktober 2014 2014). While employment has increased over the 
past ten years, unemployment as a percentage of total citizens has decreased. The 
question arises about how Germany has achieved these high numbers. The two 




Figure 16: Employees covered by social security (employees and seasonally adjustment) contributions 
per quarter since 1991 and elected governments 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
Figure 17: Percentage of unemployed people compared to total number of German citizens 
Source: Own illustration using data from Eurostat (2014) 
 
 Compared to previous developments in the labor market, such an outlook is a 
surprise. In the face of reunification, various scholars (see e.g. Buttler, Schoof and 
Walwei 2006; Schneider 1999) who would have expected a rather strong increase in 
employment during the 1990s were disappointed. Contrary to expectations, the 
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increase of 0.3% between 1993 and 2003, and this was rated the lowest average 
growth by OECD in 2006 (OECD 2006). In Arbeitsmarkt- and Beschäftigungspolitik 
nach der Wiedervereinigung Feil, Tillmann and Walwei (2008) refer to OECD’s 
(2005) emphasis on an increase in employment as the one central construct for the 
full development of Germany’s potential for economic growth performance. 
Therefore, the question of how Germany might have achieve high employment, 
whilst paying social security contributions and, therefore, supporting the welfare 
system needed to be addressed. In terms of labour market policy, Feil et al. (2008) 
describe government action as focusing on two key themes: attempts to avoid the 
emergence of new unemployment and attempts to reduce existing unemployment. In 
this context, the regimes in power (differentiated into the Kohl, Schröder and Merkel 
regimes for reasons of simplicity), have initiated a variety of political reforms. In 
Table 12: Political Regimes and Reforms in the Federal Republic of Germany since 












                                                
8 Esp. Arbeitsrechtliche Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz 
9 Code of Social Law 
10 Law for the promotion of employment 
11 "Korrekturen in der Sozialversicherung and zur Sicherung der Arbeitnehmerrechte" 
(Bandesgesetzblatt 1998) 
12 Law for the regulation of part-time work and fixed-term contracts of employment. 
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of a German  
Federal 
 Government 
Re-election of Federal 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
CDU (Christian Democratic 
Union of Germany) in a 
coalition with FDP 
















Voting out of Helmut Kohl and 
the CDU 
11.1995 – first attempt at a Bündnis für 
Arbeit 
 
09. 1996 – Agenda for the promotion 
of economic growth and employment – 
Programm zur Förderung von 
Wachstum and Beschäftigung8  
– Continuation pay for employees on 
sick leave reduced from 100% to 80% 
of average salary 
– Lay-off protection reduced. Firms 
with less than ten employees 
(previously five) received no general 
protection against dismissal 
– The conclusion of temporary and 
short-term employment contracts made 
easier by changing the labour law 
regulation to promote employment 
12.1997 – Formal introduction of 
Sozialgesetzbuch III9 as the successor 
of Arbeitsförderungsgesetz10  
 
05.1998 – Kohl signs the EU contracts 














































Election of Federal Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder  
SPD (Social Democratic Party 
of Germany) in a coalition with 
Die Grünen (The Greens) 
12.1998 – Laws for the correction of 
social insurance and to secure the 
rights of employees approved11  
(Bundesgesetzblatt 1998) 
01.1999 – Continuation pay for 
employees on sick leave reinstated and 
increased from 80% to 100%, – Lay-
off protection re-increased  
Steuerreformen 2000 – 
Reforms of corporate taxation in 2001 
 
2001 – Teilzeit- and Befristungsgesetz12  
 
11.2001 – Job-AQTIV Laws 
 
2002 Hartz I, II, III, IV Laws  (see 




– Mini and Midi Jobs (400 Euro) 
– Reduction of the period for which 
unemployment benefit 1 is payable (12 
months) 
– Jobcentres introduced and divided 
from Agentur für Arbeit 
– Combining unemployment and social 
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13 Eligibility passport/certificate of competency 
14 Laws for reformatting the labor market 
15 Unemployment benefit 2 for long-term unemployed 
16 Pakt für Beschäftigung and Stabilität in Deutschland zur Sicherung der Arb itsplätze, Stärkung der 




















insurance into one. Aiming for 
improved flexibility of the labour 
market (Dingeldey 2010) 
01.2004 – Bandesagentur für Arbeit 
(Jobcentre) can legally target 
agreements with individuals e.g. 
concerning individual job choice 
01.2004 – Partial abolition of the 
Großer Befähigungs-nachweis13 as a 
right to take up and pursue activities as 
self-employed persons 
12.2003 – Gesetz zu Reformen am 
Arbeitsmarkt14(Bundesgesetzblatt 
2003) 
12. 2004 – Removal of standard 
entitlement to unemployment benefits 
12. 2004 – Introduction of 




















 Election of Federal Chancellor 
Angela Merkel CDU (Christian 
Democratic Union of 














Coalition with SPD 
03.2006 – Acht Punkte Plan including 
future strategies for Research and 
Innovation 
 
01.2008 – Reduction of unemployment 
insurance 
01.2008 – Increase of the period for 
which unemployment benefit I is 
payable to older employers (above 50 
years – 24 months) 
 
2008 – Beschäftigungssicherung 
durch Wachstumsstärkung 
2008– 09 Konjunkturprogramm I16  
e.g. 2009 – Umweltprämie  
2009–10 Konjunkturprogramm II 
e.g. 2010 – ZIM (Zentrales 
Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand) 
11.2014 – Schwarze Null was approved 
by the federal government 
01.2015 – A minimum wage of 8.50/ 
work hour introduced for the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
Table 12: Political regimes and reforms in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1990  
Source: Own illustration using various sources cited in the text 
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 After the formal reunification of East and West Germany in 1990, the former 
federal chancellor Helmut Kohl was re-elected as representing the CDU in a 
coalition with the FDP (free/liberalist party). Following reunification and an 
extensive level of unemployment in Germany in 1991/92, a liberalist view of the 
labour market was to argue for more flexibility of the labour market and a higher 
degree of income inequality as the solution to encourage higher employment 
(Snower and Merkl 2006; Sturn and van Treeck 2010). It was argued that higher 
flexibility would weaken employees’ power in wage negotiation and would, 
therefore, lead to lower wages for employees and thus job creation even though of 
consistent measures of inflation. In 1995, the Kohl regime aimed to introduce a first 
version of Bündnis für Arbeit, which incorporated the IG Metall as well as other 
trade unions and employer associations. In 1996, the evolving Bündnis aimed to 
trade in trade unions’ wage-moderating powers in exchange for committed job 
creation by employers. Since the federal government was not willing to renounce 
modifications of social policy, German trade unions recalld their agreement 
(Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung, and Wettbewerbsfähigkeit 2003). The Kohl regime 
further introduced the Programm zur Förderung von Wachstum and Beschäftigung17 
in 1996, characterised by measures such as reducing continuation pay for employees 
on sick leave from 100% onto 80% of average salary and reducing lay-off protection. 
Firms with fewer than ten employees (previously five) received no general protection 
against dismissal, and the conclusion of temporary and short-term employment 
contracts was eased by changes to labour law regulation to promote employment. 
Such reforms led to nationwide demonstrations against social cut-offs in health and 
social pension insurance and, in 1998, the government was voted out –the first time a 
                                                
17 Esp. Arbeitsrechtliche Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz 
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German Federal Government has been completely voted out. In terms of labour 
market reforms, the Schröder regime can be divided into two periods. During the first 
period between 1998 and 2001, laws for the correction of social insurance and to 
secure the rights of employees were approved18 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1998) followed 
by reforms of corporate taxation and the introduction of laws for the regulation of 
part-time work and fixed-term contracts of employment. These attempts were shortly 
followed by Job-AQTIV laws, the founding bricks of the 2002 Hartz I, II, III, and IV 
reforms (see Schubert and Klein 2011). The accompanying Agenda 2010 and its 
extensive reform of German social- and labour-market policy have and are still being 
discussed (DIE WELT 2014; Dingeldey 2010; Fahr and Sande 2009; Krebs and 
Scheffel 2013; Schütz 2012) controversially throughout society. By combining 
unemployment and social insurance into one, introducing Mini and Midi Jobs (400 
Euro) and reducing the period for which unemployment benefit I is payable to 12 
months, the government`s aim was to establish a low-pay employment sector and 
improved flexibility in the labour market (Dingeldey 2010). Structural problems with 
the Bandesanstalt für Arbeit (Trampusch 2002) were targeted by dividing the agency 
into two independent institutions (Agentur für Arbeit19 and Jobcenter20), which were 
enabled to legally target agreements with individuals e.g. concerning individual job 
choice, leaving unemployed without any standard entitlement to unemployment 
benefits. Additionally, the Agentur für Arbeit and the Jobcenter were enabled to 
promote self-employment financially, with additional social insurance payments and 
various training options. A partial abolition of the Großer Befähigungs-nachweis21 as 
a right to take up and pursue activities as a self-employed person and the 
                                                
18 "Korrekturen in der Sozialversicherung and zur Sicherung der Arbeitnehmerrechte"  
(Bandesgesetzblatt 1998). 
19 Responsible for newly unemployed people receiving unemployment benefit I. 
20 Responsible for long-term unemployed people receiving unemployment benefit II. 
21 Eligibility passport/certificate of competency. 
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establishment of alternatives to the common GmbH, e.g. ICH- AG and GbR22 meant 
that easy ways to become self-employed got introduced. Obviously, these 
unexpected reforms of Schröder's second legislation period created massive protests 
and were followed by the re-election of a CDU/FDP regime led by Angela Merkel in 
2005. Instead of further direct labour market reforms, Merkel presented a Acht 
Punkte Plan including future strategies for research and innovation aimed at changes 
such as cluster formation, the establishment of national champions, cooperation 
among these firms, and increases in R&D investments in innovation and new 
technology/renewable energy. Such government intervention in the National 
Innovation System of Germany represented a shift of thought away from increasing 
labour market flexibility and employment creation leading to higher growth and 
towards R&D investments in innovation leading to growth and, in turn, an increase 
in employment which could then facilitate social security and the welfare state. 
Schröder’s self-sacrificing reforms which established a low-pay employee sector 
might be considered the enabling foundation for this development (Dustmann et al. 
2014). Merkel further increased the period for which unemployment benefit I is 
payable to older employers (above 50 years – 24 months) and was re-elected in 2008. 
Following the global crisis of 2008, the Merkel government introduced a package of 
regulation called Beschäftigungssicherung durch Wachstumsstärkung (Securing 
employment by increasing economic growth) supporting German key industries like 
the automobile industry and eventually allowing these sectors to overcome the global 
crisis in a fair shape. In 2010, Merkel continued launching research and innovation 
and introduced ZIM (Zentrales Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand) which focuses on 
innovation in small and medium large firms dominating the German market economy 
                                                
22 Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts as a German version of the English Ltd. 
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and inhibiting a majority of employees. Since Merkel’s re-election in 2013 and the 
complete removal of liberal democrats (FDP) from the Bundestag, the introduction 
of a nationwide minimum wage of 8.50 Euros was decided upon and introduced in 
January 2015. The effects of such a reform, as well as the aim to hold on to a Black 
Zero (Meyer-Rüth 2014) in Federal Governments household, is being critically 
observed and extensively criticised by employer associations and their research 
institutes e.g. Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (IW) (CESifo-Gruppe München 
– Der flächendeckende Mindestlohn von 8.50 Euro gefährdet bis zu 900.000 
Arbeitsplätze 2014; Knabe, Schöb and Thum 2014). 
 Government policy drifted away from employment creation as being the 
source of growth, towards R&D investments in innovation as a facilitator for 
economic growth and employment, in turn. 
7.1.2.  Changes in German Skill Formation 
In Capital and Competence – Can one be achieved without the other? (Kapital and 
Kompetenz – ist das Eine ohne das Andere zu haben?), Vielberth (2004) raises the 
question of whether businesses could exist without skilled labour and concludes that 
businessmen can only be successful by not only optimally using skills inherent to 
their workforce but by assessing the additional knowledge which continuously 
emerges in all fields of the economy and applying this new knowledge to their own 
businesses, meaning to continuously let their workforce increase their skills by 
incentivising learning and training. Such an approach appears to make sense 
especially in times of globalisation and increasing competition. The underlying 
concepts of Human Capital (Becker 1962; Becker 2009; Becker, Murphy, and 
Tamura 1994; Heckman 2000), as well as those on a knowledge society and learning 
organisation (Bennett and O’Brien 1994; Foray and Lundvall 1998; Lundvall and 
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Johnson 1994; Nielsen and Lundvall 2003) as being important for economic 
performance (Hitt et al. 2001; Lundvall et al. 2002b) are obvious. When it comes to 
the Political Economy of Skill Formation (Green 2013; Brown, Green and Lauder 
2001; Busemeyer and Iversen 2012; Vlandas 2013; Lucio et al. 2007), authors such 
as Marius Busemeyer and Christine Trampusch (2012a) who have studied a number 
of CMEs that share collective organisation as the main characteristic of their 
vocational training system find that, in countries such as Germany, "(...) firms, 
intermediary associations, and the state cooperate in the process of skill formation in 
initial vocational training". As mentioned during the theoretical introduction, the 
paradoxical reasoning of the VoC approach assumes that CMEs such as Germany 
inhibit firm-specific skills, rigid LMEs and therefore specialise their performance in 
so called incrementally innovating sectors. Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012a, 10) 
find that "[t]he distinction between (...) general and specific skill systems is very 
broad (...)" and therefore not satisfying. Research in the area of skill formation as a 
driver of specialised national production necessarily needs to focus on different 
levels. In order to properly operationalise the concept of skills, a micro-level 
approach, focusing on this construct, as an ability inherent to thinking and feeling 
creatures, needs to be developed in the first place. Therefore, topics such as needs, 
motivation, feelings and basic rules of human decision-making need to be addressed 
from a psychological perspective (Green 2013) bringing constructs of Human 
Capital Theory (Heckman 2000) and instruments of Human Resource Management 
(Marsden and Belfield 2010) into the picture with regard to skill formation 
(Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012).  
 The ways in which these skills are adopted and later applied in the work place 
by people, as well as the question of why these specific skills are being applied at 
that specific workplace, draws on the historical evolution of the nation’s standard 
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employment relationship (Bosch 2004) and most recent developments in times of 
global crisis (Heyes 2013) need to be assessed in the second instance. The question 
of who might be the drivers of the formation of skill equilibria should then be asked, 
reconsidering the role of Trade Unions (Mahnkopf 1992) in CMEs. Consideration of 
which skill equilibria might be needed in the future (Hilbert and Schömann 2004; 
Lowry, MoIloy and McGlennon 2008; Schmidt 2004) and how skill formation might 
than be established, should be given. Since, from a macro perspective, "[p]olicy 
debates across advanced industrial economies are stressing the centrality of skills and 
training to compete in the new ‘knowledge economy’" (Lloyd 2002, 64) an 
assessment of the ascribed and the actual found role of the political economy of skills 
and skill formation variation for national performance needs to be done. In this 
context the propositions on CMEs arising from VoC that they inhibit certain skill 
levels and LMIs and their relationship towards each other, as well as production 
specialisation and "cross-national variation in skill profiles and the association 
between firm-specific skills and levels of employment protection" (Edland and 
Grönland 2008), need to be re-considered. An alternative simplistic relationship 
between the influence of LMIs on the political economy of skill formation and 
further on the sectoral specialisation of innovation, all supported by incentives from 
federal government, is proposed and needs to be further assessed.  
 As previously shown by the examples of the Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel 
regimes, labour market politics in Germany has changed throughout the past two 
decades. Lowering the unemployment rate is no longer seen as the key to promoting 
the economy. Therefore LMIs have not continuously been reformed since 2005. In 
contrast, recent policy-making aims to promote innovation, which is seen as a 
solution for national economic performance and also lowering unemployment rates. 
Another focus of the Merkel regime lies in promoting national skill formation 
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(BMBF 2012a) especially in scientific areas, such as mathematics, informatics, 
natural science and technology. These fields are argued to be of high relevance for 
new and emerging technologies as well as economic sectors, such as 
nanotechnology, software, biotechnology and renewable energy which are associated 
with the term radical innovation. Changes in policy-making illustrate shifts in the 
understanding of the relationships between LMIs, skill formation and innovation, as 
interrelated concepts. The current outlook of German LMIs has found its basis in 
Merkel's incentives for national skill formation (such as Hochschulpackt 2020 and 
MINT) which have been created to complete Germany’s first high-tech-strategy 
(Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2010). Aiming to promote national 
competitiveness and innovation, the German government has (besides other 
instruments e.g. the promotion of Clusters, university-firm linkages in R&D, 
governmental R&D investments in emerging markets) made it a task to promote 
national skill formation in chosen fields. Even though the OECD reports mention the 
high specialisation of Germany (compared to other nations) in MINT degrees, within 
Germany in August 2017 the industry was short of up to 274,600 mint workers for 
the first time. Due to demographic changes and Germany’s further specialisation in 
high-tech areas, MINT graduates find their way into industry and the job market 
without problems (see Berger 2017; Berger et al. 2017). 
 The paradoxical reasoning in the VoC approach assumes that CMEs such as 
Germany inhibit firm-specific skills, rigid LMEs and therefore specialise their 
production in so-called incrementally innovating sectors. Busemeyer and Trampusch 
(2012a, 10) find that "[t]he distinction between (...) general and specific skill systems 
is very broad (...)" and, therefore, not satisfying. Research in the area of skill 
formation as a driver of specialised national production does necessarily need to 
focus on different levels. For this reason, I am choosing to take a more differentiated 
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view on skill formation. Instead of a dichotomist division between general vs. firm-
specific skills, I am looking at sector specific developments in a second step. Within 
the given context, this dissertation focuses on the inability of CMEs to create radical 
innovation; therefore, I focus on sector-specific changes within the sphere of general 
skills (for which theory argues to create radical innovation). One of the main 
characteristics of the German skill formation system is the collectively organised 
dual apprenticeship system. For the past ten years, the German government (Merkel 
regime) has continuously emphasised the role of university level education (Nickel 
2011). The Hochschulpakt (Higher Education Pact for more university entrants) 
(Band and Länder 2007; Band and Länder 2011), Exzellenz Initiative (Excellence 
Initiative for Cutting-Edge Research at Institutions of Higher Education) (Band and 
Länder 2009), MINT (short for Mathematics, Informatics, Natural Science and 
Technology) (BMBF 2012a) and the Pact for Research and Innovation (Pakt für 
Forschung and Innovation 2014) has shaped the outlook of German skill formation 
towards a generalisation of skills. In terms of general skills, Figure 18 below 




Figure 18: Graduates by field of education: Tertiary Type A and advanced research programs, all 
educational programs, total over all fields of study 
Source: Own illustration using data from OECD.Stat. Dataset Graduates, all graduates in all fields for 
TertiaryType A and advanced research programs; data extracted on 16 Dec 2014 11:33 UTC (GMT) 
 
 
Figure 19: Total numbers of graduates in science and engineering for five countries 
Source: Own illustration using data from OECD.Stat. Dataset Graduates, all graduates in two fields 
(Science, Engineering) for Tertiary Type A and advanced research programs, per country and year; 




 As previously mentioned this thesis advocates a sector-specific view. 
Following the German federal government’s policy incentives, one would not only 
expect to find an increase in the numbers of university graduates but specifically 
increased numbers of graduates in science. This expectation can be confirmed by 
looking at Figure 19 below. 
 
 
Figure 20: Relative specialisation of graduates in selected fields and countries 2000/2001 and 
2011/2012 
Source: Own calculation and illustration using Dataset Graduates by field of education from 
OECD.STAT for Tertiary Type A and advanced research programs. 
 
 This increase in university graduates in science appears to be strong enough 
to indicate shifts in the outlook of the nation's overall educational specialisation. In 
this context, Germany is the only country in comparison that has managed to further 
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specialise its university graduates in science, as illustrated in Figure 20: Relative 
specialisation of graduates in selected fields and countries 2000/2001 and 2011/2012. 
The skill formation system is creating increasing numbers of general skills. 
Within the context of an increase in university graduates, there is further 
specialisation in science graduates. 
7.1.3.  Changes in the German Job Market: Where does the Work Force end up 
in Industry? 
Due to the demographic changes, German firms now demand more new graduates 
than twenty years ago. So larger parts of the previously described university graduates go 
into Germany͛s well-established incrementally innovating firms without increasing the 
actual employment numbers in the sectors ʹ due to an increased retirement rate. In the 
previous part of this thesis, I found that the relative specialisation of graduates in the 
machinery sector has decreased, in spite of continuously growing numbers of graduates. 
For this reason, one could argue that the overall employment e.g. in sectors such as 
manufacturing (related to the machinery sector as a potential employer) has decreased. 
This suggestion can clearly be supported by looking at numbers of actual employment per 
sector in Germany: Figure 21: Employment in Germany by sector in total/thousands. The 
previously described increase in Germany's science graduates in terms of proportion 
of total graduates was illustrated. Referring to the theoretical framework of skill 
formation shaping comparative economic advantage, I argue that we find that 
continuously increasing numbers of graduates end up in radically innovative sectors. 
With this, I mean sectors which focus on newly emerging technology (potential 
employers of science graduates). The demographic change outside the analysis can 
be considered by looking at changes in the relative specialisations of radical sectors 
in terms of total employment, in comparison with national total employment. This 
thesis takes a very specific view in the analyses by complementing OECD data with 
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sector-specific data extracted from the two German sector representatives’ nnual 




Figure 21: Employment in Germany by sector in total/thousands  
Source: Own illustration using OECD data (2015) 
 
 
Figure 22: Growth rate of sectoral employment in comparison with total employment as different 
from 2004/2005 to 2010/2011 
Source: Own illustration using data from biotechnologie.de (2014); BMBF – biotechnologie.de, 2013, 
2012, 2009, 2007; BMWi, 2014, 2012, 2010 
 
 
 Whereas we can observe well-expected growth in the service and 
construction sector's employment, the two young and "radical" sectors, biotech and 
software are slowly increasing their employment in relation to the nation's overall 
employment rate from 2004/05 to 2010/11. Throughout the observed timeframe, the 
ICT sector became Germany’s second largest employment sector after the machinery 
sector with software service and production being the ultimate reason for the sector’s 
growth (BITKOM 2015).  
 Germany’s graduates increasingly end up in radically innovative sectors. 
Since 2005, Merkel’s government  has focused policy on the national innovation 
system. One set of policy aims to strongly support university spin-offs and start-ups 
in general, but especially technology-oriented university spin-offs, with a focus on 
high-tech industries. These can receive special financial and other support for the 
first (up to) five years of their existence (see e.g. EXIST-Gründerstipendium 2012). 
As a result of this new regulation, we can find increased numbers of start-ups and 
small but innovative new firms in the technology sectors as well as increased levels 
of investment in these firms (Ernst and Young 2014). These new firms fit in well 
with the overall NIS of Germany, which is characterised by high numbers of small 
and medium large firms as on large firms in comparison to the outlook in other 
countries such as the UK or US (BMWE 2014).  
 Increased numbers of science graduates end up in Germany’s radically 
innovative sectors, such as biotech and software. The overall outlook of SMEs 
dominating these new and emerging sectors is reinforced by the government’s focus 




7.1.4.  Changes in German Social Policy and the Welfare State 
Contrary to most of propositions arising from VoC, the proposition relating to 
WPRs dominating CMEs and creating inequality does not follow the usual 
arguments found in comparative capitalism. In contrast to this proposition, in 
Chapter 8 The social superiority of the Rhine model, Michel Albert (1992) defines a 
set of three spheres which aim to symbolize: social solidarity – in short, security: 
"How are citizens provided from the major risks (illness, unemployment, family 
breakdown, etc.?" (Albert 1992, 147); inequality: "What remedies are brought 
against the most obvious cases of neglect? How much help is available and in what 
form to the neediest members of society?" (Albert 1992, 1 47); and an open society: 
"(…) how easy (or how difficult) is it for different individuals to climb the 
socioeconomic ladder, to improve their lot?" (Albert 1992, 147).  
 
 In this context, his understanding of inequality is very similar to that of Hall 
and Soskice. Albert comes to a very different conclusion to that arising from 
VoC:"[I]t can be plainly demonstrated that social solidarity and competitiveness in 
the market place make excellent bedfellows" (Albert 1992, 148). 
Albert refers to different measures which can still be observed: Health costs, 
Social security, and the logic of egalitarian societies – narrower income spectrum 
and a proportionally larger middle class. In the third sphere, America does continue 
"to demonstrate a capacity for social absorption and integration far superior to that of 
Rhine countries, Japan including" (Albert 1992, 158). In contrast to Albert, VoC 
argues that Germany is expected to perform weakly in terms of equality. The 
position arising from VoC can only be understood in the context of its theory and 
main argument. In this context, VoC theory gains its overall relevance (in contrast to 
previous institutional approaches) from its simplicity and the ease of understanding 
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the dichotomy between institutional spheres, leading to certain kinds of innovation. 
Thus, if we wanted to divide the world into two regimes of production and if we 
wanted to argue for a division of work between the two of them, emphasising the 
instability of the second model with the less attractive kind of capitalism, we would 
need some kind of argument which lets me explain why this second less attractive 
model might still exist, in some nations, but will disappear in continuous 
globalisation. Here we find the WPR. Neglecting Esping-Andersen's (1990) famous 
findings or moreover twisting these to an extent to which it fits the overall argument 
helps authors who ascribe to VoC. Only the sphere of inequality and only gender 
inequality, more specifically, is chosen to represent the negative effects of WPRs in 
Germany. All other spheres described by Albert or Anderson are simply ignored. The 
spheres of employment protection, unemployment protection and wage protection 
are further argued to influence citizens’ decision-making in terms of their education 
and job choices and to, therefore, lead them to establish firm-specific skills (which 
are assumed to be of low pay) and thereby, again, create some kind of inequality. 
The notion of a human as a rational agent underlies these propositions. In this 
government environment and atmosphere of corporate intervention the workers are 
thought to be acting in rational ways (see e.g. p. 150), and this simplistic view of 
human decision-making still substantiates the relevance of labour market formation 
and social policy. Using these propositions, VoC theory draws a thoroughly 
complementary picture for contrasting CMEs and LMEs. In Partisan Power, 
Economic Coordination and Variations in Vocational Training Systems in Europe, 
Marius Busemeyer and Raphaela Schlicht-Schmalzle (2014) argue for a variety of 
skill formation systems within the national market economies. They highlight the 
interconnectivity between educational regimes and a nation’s welfare regime (see 
also West and Nikolai 2013 for education as a key component for the welfare state). 
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With this, they argue in the reverse direction as VoCs. The relationship between 
WPRs, skill formation as well as WPRs and inequality appears to be questionable. At 
least one can not only find more extensive welfare regimes in Germany but 
simultaneously growing numbers of university-level graduates. One might also find 
not only a higher percentage of GDP spent on social insurance in Germany (than the 
US) but a larger middle class in proportion and lower differences between the poor 
and the rich. The underlying belief arising from VoC of a rational worker necessarily 
needs to be rejected. As described by Green (2013, 5), skills themselves are defined 
as "personal qualities with three main features: they are productive of value, 
expandable, and social". According to this definition, skills can, therefore, not be 
expected to be acquired in a rational way as assumed by VoC. There is no such thing 
as rational choice in workers’ decision-making for participation in education and 
training, nor does a single rational worker exist who can act in a rational way – 
besides imaginary figures in business and society such as Homo Faber (Frisch, 1997) 
or Homo Economics (Dixon, 2012; Häring, 2001).  
The relationship between potential WPRs and education in Germany is 
questioned. The relationship between a potential WPR and inequality is questioned 
as well: since when does higher spending on welfare result in inequality? The belief 
in a rational-acting human being (apart from in fantasy and economics) is rejected. 
 
7.2.  Corporate Governance, Industrial Relations and Financial 
Globalisation in Germany 
The previous section has dealt with the potential input factor of created skills. This 
section deals with the interrelationship between skills available to corporations and 
corporations’ strategic decision-making for product market choice. Waves of 
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globalisation are shaking up and possibly changing national institutional frameworks. 
In the context of institutional change in highly industrialised Western nations, a 
literature review was undertaken in this dissertation on comparative corporate 
governance (CG) in general. Additionally, it added an institutional perspective and 
evaluated the link between CG and innovation. There was a focus on making sense 
of existing theories' arguments and interconnecting their logics. The interrelating 
variable of collective skill formation (SF) was brought into the picture in the 
previous chapter. This chapter of the dissertation evaluates the derived argument on 
CG-SF linkage for innovation in the German context, featuring insights into CG in 
large, but also market-dominating, SMEs within the national innovation system 
(NIS). The interrelationship between large corporations, SMEs, employer 
associations and lobbying societies and their possible influence on government 
policy-making in terms of innovation-related policy, which, in turn, leads to a firm's 
product market strategies, is broadly discussed focusing on the case of the German 
automobile industry and its support for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). The question raised relates to the possible influence of Anglo-
Saxon shareholders in the context of current negotiations. Electro Mobility and 
Networked Driving are being identified as the two radical innovations currently 
being worked on within the German automobile industry. These are further analysed 
within the following chapter on Germany’s actual radical innovation performance.  
 German CG, industrial relations and the influence of financial globalisation 
upon these two institutional spheres has widely been discussed in literature. Critiques 
of the German model have emerged internationally, but also within the country. 
Whereas, on an international level, most discussions in political economy question 
the institutional stability of the CME especially its transparency and accessibility, in 
the context of inner-national discussions, diverse topics were focused upon. Some of 
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the most difficult headwords might be the Deutschland AG, Mannesmann Prozess, 
and Heuschrecken. These are three words which are still used in the context of 
German CG. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section summarises 
critiques of German CG and industrial relations complementing an inner German and 
international perspective. Deutschland AG is used as a symbolic case of inter-firm 
relationships in terms of labour and capital. In the second section, the Mannesmann 
Prozess is used as a symbol for political and legal development in German CG. In 
the third section, the inner-German discussion on liberalisation of CG, shareholder 
value and Heuschrecken is focused upon. 
7.2.1. Change in German Corporate Governance and Industrial Relations - 
Deutschland AG 
Comparing CG strategies, summarises the different approaches to CG as developed 
during the Literature Review. As previously mentioned, Germany follows a 
stakeholder strategy. In Krise in der Deutschland AG: Der Fall AEG, Dirk Ipsen and 
Jens Pfitzinger (2003) clarify that the principal-agent-argument which is often used 
in CG from an American perspective might fail to recognise the interests of conflict 
within the collective action of a corporation's board of directors in Germany. The 
German CG structure is characterised by insider-control due to high numbers of 
corporate shares being owned by banks and other corporations. Since employees are 
represented and supposed to actively shape the future action of corporations, the 
structure of German CGs is different from LME models. In this context, coordination 
is not only important within the national market economy but within one corporation 
in terms of recognising and representing the interests of different stakeholders. This 
coordination within a firm, leaving investors such as Hausbanken with insights and 
influence in terms of their investments is argued to lead to "long-term-oriented action 
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(...) where credits are given by patient actors rather than by impatient investors at the 
stock market" (Crouch and Voelzkow 2009, 4). The investment behaviour of these 
kinds of investors is risk-averse, while a stock-market would lead to larger amounts 
of risk-capital (Dore 2000). Corporate Governance has become a commonly-used 
phrase in Germany, referring to the regulation and control over corporations which 















 The numbers of publications on German CG have increased throughout 
recent years. The Max Planck Institute played an important role in introducing a 
German perspective into the international debate from 2000 onwards. Researchers 
such as Jürgen Beyer, Anke Hassel, Wolfgang Streek, Martin Höpner, Sigurt Vitols, 
Gregory Jackson, Stefan Eckert, Dirk Ipsen and Jens Pfitzinger, Rainer Zugehör, and 
Britta Rehder co-worked on this topic within the institute. Even though the topic of 
Figure 23: Comparing CG strategies  
 Source: Own illustration using diverse sources (e.g. Hausch, 2004)
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the CG structures of firms is of high relevance, one needs to recognise its limitations 
in the context of German trajectories of innovation. The market economy is 
dominated by SMEs (Hausch 2004), which are called the innovative motor of the 
nation (BMBF 2011). The debate surrounding Deutschland AG symbolises the 
influence of large corporations. The late 1990s gave rise to inner-German critiques 
on the highly influential network which arguably was or even still might lead 
German industry (Stuhr 2001). It is argued that a small number of men not only 
dominate the largest corporations' boards of directors but that this leads to 
interrelations between large corporations, with other interests than the one the 
corporation has in mind. In this context, boards of directors are meeting places for 
capitalist interests with macroeconomic interests. This network of inter-corporate 
relationships is often considered to be one characteristic of coordinated capitalism. In 
Deutschland AG a.D.: Deutsche Bank, Allianz, and das Verflechtungszentrum des 
deutschen Kapitalismus, Jürgen Beyer (2003) describes how large corporations and 
banks have established their labour and capital networks over the decades. He 
reasons this by pointing out the risk-averse pattern of large banks and the strategic 
advantage of corporations due to their ability to receive low interest rates in times of 
crisis. This system gave German corporations an advantage compared to e.g. US 
firms. La Porta et al. (2000, 18) summarise by stating that it "is easy to classify 
Germany as bank-centered because its banks influence firms through both debt and 
equity holdings and its stock market is underdeveloped". With Deutschland AG, the 
inner-German discussions went further than to the point of banks or private families’ 
influence on firms’ strategic decision-making. Moreover, a feeling of an emerging 
conspiracy theory arose in public (Manager Magazin 2002) focusing on a search for 
the powerful individuals who would lead the German economy. In this context, the 
publicly-illustrated interwoven relationship between federal chancellors Gerhard 
190 
 
Schröder drew a lot of criticism. In some interviews Schröder would even call 
himself the CEO of Deutschland AG, advocating this model as a symbol of 
Germany’s social democratic style of capitalism. Critiques argued that this 
interrelationship between Schröder and corporate representatives neglected the 
interests of employees. In various publications, Martin Höpner illustrates how the 
network of capital and labour relations throughout the 30 largest corporations has 
been greatly diluted over recent years. He argues that financial globalisation has 
allowed this development, by offering banks different perspectives of investment 
banking (Höpner 2007; Höpner and Krempel 2006). Polemically, the foreign 
acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafore is occasionally called not only the end of 
Deutschland AG but moreover the end of Rhenish capitalism in German CG.  
 Coming back to the meaning of Deutschland AG, one can not only identify 
the relationships between boards of directors or financial interrelationships between 
banks and corporations but moreover a personal network with certain key players – 
important personalities in the economy and politics. Within Germany, the 
relationships between certain key players are actively developed in elite education 
systems which start as early as high school and continue throughout university 
education and firm-level careers. In this context, private corporations have 
established and are supporting private schools which are mainly attended by children 
of firm owners and politicians’ children. Depending on the political orientation of a 
family, the family chooses the right school – providing the right network for their 
child. This starts as early as elementary school and continues up to graduation from 
one of the most elite private boarding schools: Schloß Salem, Louisenland, and 
Marienau might be identified as three of the ten most influential private boarding 
schools within Germany. The elite path continues through university-level education 
when the right scholarship foundation is chosen. Foundations like the Foundation of 
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German Industry focus on increasing students’ understanding of the German 
economy. The foundation has long been financed through large German corporations 
but is increasingly supported by federal government. Certain alumni and mentoring 
programs support graduates of one or other foundation after entering the job market. 
Other networks such as the traditional Baden Badener network continue to form 
individual personalities and networks between individuals with different 
backgrounds to the level of the boards of directors of firms. Even though we might 
find an erosion of the so-called Deutschland AG within the market economy, the 
networks and ideological machineries building relationships between certain families 
are continuing to shape future elites aiming to strengthen the traditional networks – 
though this is maybe in a different and not so obvious form.  
7.2.2.  German Corporate Governance Regulation: Mannesmann Prozess 
The German stock companies act which is currently valid and was originally passed 
in 1965 (Bandesministerium fer Justiz and für Verbraucherschutz 1966) includes 
regulation for corporate governance which has become a part of German 
supplementary penal. It can, therefore, be enforced. Following the debates about a 
liberalisation of German CG structures, Hans-Böckler Stiftung published Grundsätze 
ordnungsmäßiger Aufsichtsratstätigkeit (Arbeitskreis Mitbestimmung beim DGB 
Bandesvorstand and Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 2011) in order to create a call for the 
participation of employees on the decision-making processes of large German 
corporations in 1998. Hans - Böckler is one of Germany’s 11 scholarship 
foundations. It is opposed to the Foundation of German Business (employer side) as 
a union-close foundation. Hans-Böckler not only provides scholarships, including 
finance and idealistic training for students following the foundation's ideals but is, 
moreover, an employee close research institution which is actively advocating 
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participation. This part of the foundation is opposed to the employer-oriented 
research institutes. Hans-Böckler has aimed to secure well-established employee 
rights within German corporations even in the face of possible changes. Shortly after 
their call KonTraG (KonTraG 1998) was passed. This law basically enforces CEOs 
to install a system which recognises risks for the firm. It widens the liability of 
CEOs, and boards of directors aiming to encourage corporations to behave 
responsibly in terms of long-term goals for the firm. In 2002, federal government 
passed TransPuG (TransPug 2002), in order to increase transparency in corporate 
action. The international critique of German corporations acting in ways which are 
not transparent was thus acknowledged. In 2002, the German Corporate Governance 
Kodex was published (Ringleb et al. 2014). It not only relates German CG to a clear 
stockholder-orientation (now enforced by the law) but addresses this enforcement 
through the system of soziale Marktwirtschaft. In this context, a German corporation 
and also a corporation at the stock market is expected to act with a long-term 
orientation, bearing the interests of diverse stakeholders in mind. The German 
Corporate Governance Codex was followed shortly by changes in the German stock 
companies act. In 2005, Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz (Mandesministerium für Justiz and 
Verbraucherschutz 2005), which encourages international accounting and reporting 
standards, was passed. The Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz23 (VorstOG 
2005) changed § 87 Abs. 1 of the German stock companies act and aimed for more 
transparency in terms of CEOs’ earnings. In this context, only transparency about the 
earnings gives employees and politics the ability to enforce the Corporate 
Governance Kodex which aims, among other things, to relate CEO earnings to 
relation to their own, industries’ and firms’ performance. All of these reforms aimed 
                                                
23 Transparency Law for the Compensation of Corporate Executives 
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to let German CG become more transparent and have arguably led to the first 
acquisition of a top 30 corporation by a foreign concurrent. The Mannesmann 
Prozess (2004–2006) gained international attention. It raised questions about the 
appropriate level of management compensation and the meaning of merger and 
acquisition by foreign corporations (FAZ 2006). The scandal around the key players 
in this process and the high amounts of annual rewards has not only gained public 
attention but led to the enforcement of VorstOG. Even though VoC argues for a 
liberalisation of German CG in times of financial pressure and especially in times of 
crisis, a different development is visible in German corporate stock market policy-
making. In the context of e.g. management salaries, two more bills were passed in 
2009. These bills were all passed for stock market corporations only. The usual, 
family-owned medium-sized German firm is excerpted from this regulation. In this 
context, policy makers believe that it is the right of corporate owners to establish 
whatever salary they wish to for their CEOs. A stock market corporation is expected 
to behave in the interests of the overall economy. German policy makers clearly 
ascribed this duty to stock market corporations only following the global crisis. 
Manager salaries did, therefore, need to be restricted. In 2009, further changes to § 
87 AktG led to a gradual lowering of CEOs’ and boards of directors’ salaries. 
Furthermore, § 107, AktG was changed. Thus it is no longer allowed to discuss the 
contracts of CEOs within special committees of the boards of directors but only 
within the plenum. In this context, the roles of these laws are relevant signals in the 
context of the growing relevance of stock markets. 
7.2.3.  German Corporate Governance and Innovation 
Contrary to the theoretical expectations (Hall and Soskice, 2001) two flagships of 
radical innovation within the German automobile industry can be identified as 
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Electro Mobility (EM) and Networked Driving (ND). These two projects are not only 
German ideas; the German automobile sector is heavily investing and aiming to 
develop a lead position within these fields (news 02, Abendblatt 2015; Schlick et al. 
2011; Telekom 2015; Wirtschaftswoche 2015).  
 This section, gives a short overview of the developments of these two key 
projects and illustrates that the steps which have been undertaken by German 
corporations on their way to achieve a lead positions in these two radically 
innovative areas are not rapid and ground-breakingly disruptive, but incremental, 
slow and well-coordinated among stakeholders. Even though radical innovation can 
be found, the institutional foundations in which actors achieve this innovation are 
found to be of a coordinated nature. The German Association of the Automotive 
Industries (VDA) presents the current standing, past and future developments of ND. 
VDA is divided into six levels (0: driver only; 1: assistant; 2: partly automatic; 3: 
highly automatic; 4: fully automatic; 5: driverless), and each of these goals must be 
reached ultimately for driverless driving – which would allow a driver to enter a
vehicle in one place, fall asleep and leave the vehicle in another place while driving 
over public and private streets at different speeds. Smethurst (2015) describes in 
detail why such a stepwise development is not only needed for technology and 
security reasons but is absolutely important for keeping all stakeholders at all levels 
of the firm (including suppliers – who will need to develop parts, employee 
associations like IG Metall for the potential future need of employees) informed and 
active within the process of opinion-making. Similar developments are observable in 
German electro mobility. Even though technically the German automobile firms have 
developed a relatively broad range of 29 electronic vehicles which are already sold 
on the market (Krähling 2015), practically speaking, these vehicles are mostly hybrid 
forms. Federal government and the German automobile industry have opened four 
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showcases (Bandesregierung 2014) with a sum of 140 projects and 9,000 electronic 
vehicles to actively test current vehicles while further developing these. In both 
streams of research, the government appears to be closely involved with the German 
automobile industry. The largest market for German electronic vehicles in 2016 and 
2017 is China (Puls 2017). The association of German manufacturers (BDI), which 
includes VDA, seems to be less active in lobbying and cooperating with the 
government. In this context, VDA has recently moved its headquarters from 
Frankfurt to Berlin in order to have a better reach for German policy makers (Diemer 
2015), while BDI’s headquarters remain in Frankfurt, close to the represented 
industry. This might have something to do with the way VDA finances itself. VDA is 
not merely financed through membership fees, but by initiating events and fairs such 
as the IAA (Internationale Automobilausstellung). This fair is primarily a window 
for automobile manufacturers. It allows producers to show their new cars to the 
public and is a good advertiser. It is also about public opinion-making. A success at 
the IAA will be seen by millions. An opinion well presented at the IAA might shape 
someone's opinion. The current key topic in electro mobility and networked driving 
is pushing for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In this 
context, diverse ranges of people are invited to VIP meetings, VIP areas, etc. Here 
we find managers, politicians but also students from the foundation of German 
business and potential future management offspring. Diemer (2015) further 
illustrates how well organised the VDA is, not only in terms of lobbying within the 
German federal government, but it sees one of its principle tasks as representing 
German automobile and supply (more than 600 large, but also SME firms) 
manufacturers and suppliers on an EU level in Brussels. Diemer illustrates very well 
how legislation at an EU level is passed, and how VDA aims to influence 
representatives of different nations. VDA’s main task is described as being to 
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influence policy-making before a bill is published for discussion and starts at a point 
of formation of opinion (Diemer 2015, 17) in the EU commission, parliament, and 
council. Figure 24: Lobbying throughout every level of legislation illustrates this 
process. 
 Looking back in history VDA has contributed to different topics and has e.g. 
argued and lobbied extensively against a salvage policy for broken cars in 1999 
(which was never passed). In 2008, VDA argued vociferously against EU regulation 
of CO2 emissions. This topic led to a defeat of VDA’s lobbying work. Diemer 
(2015) argues that this decision hit the German automobile sector quite hard leaving 
manufacturers in an insecure position. Lobbying on the EU level was increased 
afterwards. As illustrated by Greenpeace (2013, 2007) and confirmed by Diemer 
(2015), VDA is able to directly consult the federal chancellor of Germany in order to 
apply pressure for certain policies, e.g. in 2013, Angela Merkel stood up for VDA’s 
interests by directly contacting the President of the Council of the European Union 
(Irish) in an attempt to tip over the 95 gram/km CO2 rule for new automobiles from 
2020. The nationality of the President of the Council of the European Union is 
relevant. VDA members have manufacturing plants all over Europe. Due to this, the 
complex is able to influence the opinion of diverse EU Parliament members. If one 
wants, foe example, to secure its numbers of employees in the Czech Republic then 
that person would need to support the opinion of VDA. This is not the case for 
Ireland. As illustrated in Figure 25: VDA member's production sites, there is not a






Figure 24: Lobbying throughout every level of legislation  
Source: Diemer (2015, 18), translated by the author 
 
 Currently, VDA is extensively and aggressively pushing politicians and 
public opinion towards an agreement for a TTIP. VDA is arranging IIA (one of 
Germany’s largest trade shows) around this topic, arguing that such an agreement 
would enable German and US firms to produce their electronic vehicles with the 
same plug – which would save millions of Euros (Diemer 2015). While aiming to 
become a market leader in high tech industries, VDA does not have an opinion about 
the different systems of patenting software at the European and American patent 
offices (Diemer 2015; Krähling 2015; Smethurst 2015) under TTIP.   
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Figure 25: VDA members’ production sites across Europe 
Source: Diemert (2015, 4) 
 
 This is in obvious, sharp contrast with the German and European software 
sector which has developed statements against TTIP – or at least supporting 
significant changes in this agreement. It might further be important to notice that 
VDA is not the only organisation pressuring for its own interests. In contrast, 
American corporations already play an important role in government action. In this 
context, one can find reports which confirm the role of industrial expansion for the 
US spy affair. It appears that these attacks have not only been conducted in order to 
gain information about sector developments but have informed certain persons in 
Germany who have then aimed to influence key policy or opinion-makers.24  
 This section aims to provide a very short overview of how large German 
corporations, e.g. in the automobile sector, represented by the VDA, aim to influence 
government policy-making in all matters that might be of importance for them. It is 
                                                
24 Search Wikileaks for: FY 2008/ 2009 BIOTECHNOLOGY OUTREACH STRATEGY AND 
DEPARTMENT RESOURCES; Report RL34493 Nanotechnology and U.S. Competitiveness: Issues 
and Options; FAST CARS AND HOT TIMES IN SOUTHWEST GERMANY (Powell, 2007). 
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further illustrated how the complexity of developing innovation in automobiles 
represents the interplay between coordination and radical innovation in Germany. 
 The example of German car manufacturers represents the slow processes of 
innovation which can be influenced by policy-making. Even though there have been 
some early attempts to mass produce electric vehicles in Germany e.g. in the case of 
Hotzenblitz25 (Die Welt 1998), German incumbents did not mass produce an 
electronic vehicle until 2013 (Spiegel 2011). The product developed by Hotzenblitz, 
a young entrepreneurial German firm, failed for several reasons. A lack of start-up 
finance due to the German bank-based financial system and a lack of consumer 
demand in 1993–96 were some important reasons for the failure of Hotzenblitz, 
which was sold for 36000DM26 in its basic version. In 2003, Martin Eberhard and 
Marc Tarpenning founded Tesla Motors, with the strategic goal to create affordable 
mass market electric vehicles. In 2009, Tesla had delivered 147 cars, a similar 
number of cars to the bankrupt27 Hotzenblitz GmbH in Germany in 1995. At this time 
Tesla was primarily financed by Elon Musk and had survived several rounds of near 
bankruptcy. In 2010, Tesla Motors launched an initial public offering at NASDAQ. 
Its "initial public offering of 13,300,000 shares of its common stock at a price to the 
public of $17.00 per share" (Tesla Team 2010) raised US $226 million for the 
company. The obvious differences in financial institutions seem to have led German 
car manufacturers into a poor position in this radically innovative field. In spite of 
the failure of Hotzenblitz and the arguably disruptive nature of Tesla's technology, 
German automakers are still hoping to achieve a superior position in the markets for 
electro mobility and networked driving in the long run. In Identifying trends in 
                                                
25 Hotzenblitz was produced from 1993–1996 by Hotzenblitz Mobile GmbH & Co. KG in Ibach (area 
called Hotzenwald).  
26 app. 18,000Euro 
27 German Länder had to pay off 8 million in debt for the insolvent corporation.  
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battery technologies with regard to electric mobility: evidence from patenting 
activities along and across the battery value chain, "relevant International Patent 
Classification (IPC) codes are assigned to the different value chain steps and used to 
analyze the worldwide patent developments" (Golembiewski et al. 2015) for batteries 
related to electric vehicles. Golembiewski et al. suggest an interesting picture in 
patent applications. Contrary to expectations, due to the previously presented figures, 
the USA is not in a lead position when it comes to the development of battery 
patents. Germany is in third place behind Japan and South Korea. Since electric 
mobility is a convergence of at least three fields, there is no plain patent class 
existing.  
 The highly coordinated and stakeholder-oriented nature of the German market 
economy with a high degree of governmental intervention is very visible in the case 
of the German automobile industry. German automobile firms have developed a 
relatively broad range of 29 electronic vehicles which are already sold on the market 
(Krähling 2015), but practically all these vehicles are mostly hybrid forms. Federal 
government and the German automobile industry have opened four showcases 
(Bundesregierung 2014) with a sum of 140 projects and 9,000 electronic vehicles to 
actively test current vehicles while further developing these. In both streams of 
research, the government appears to be closely involved with the German automobile 
industry. The federal government’s high-tech strategy, as well as the Federal 
Government Joint Unit for Electro Mobility and the National Platform for Electro 
Mobility, are some of the government units aiming to achieve an industrial lead 
position for German industry in this technological field (NPE 2011). In April 2016, 
the federal government announced support for the German automobile industry to the 
tune of up to 1.2 billion Euro on a buyer's premium for electronic vehicles 
manufactured by VW, Daimler, and BMW, including 300 million Euro designated 
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for building charging points in Germany. Charging points fit the standardised 
German plug-ins (Tesla obviously did not participate in the process of standardising 
their plugs). This plug in system has been developed and agreed on by all 
stakeholders in Germany, and many European automobile manufacturers. The 
intervention of federal government is in line with the federal government’s high-tech 
strategy (Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2010). Similar action was 
observed in the biotech and software sectors. 
 This chapter has briefly led the reader through the relationship between CG, 
LMIs, SC and innovation. It has also provided an overview of the case of the 
Germany national corporate governance system of stakeholder orientation, which 
influences the process through which the automobile sector is producing its 
innovation, in cooperation with federal government, suppliers (within VDA) and 
employees (represented by IG Metall). It has also illustrated what VoC calls a 
production regime by illustrating how VDA aims to influence politics.  
 
7.3.  Résumé: Directions of Change in Germany’s Political 
Economy of Skill Formation, CG and its Trajectories of 
Innovation 
The illustrated direction of change in Germany’s political economy of skill 
formation, meaning the LMIs’ and skill formation systems' developments cannot be 
simplified into calling out a liberalisation of the system. Furthermore, in this study, 
incremental, slow change of the labour market regulation has been shown to happen 
through political incentives and shifts in expectations of the political parties. In terms 
of skill formation, an increase in general skills is clearly observable. By looking at 
these developments more specifically, I find a political focus on science and 
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technology. These policy effects in the field of science are clearly observable. 
Following the VoC argument, one would expect Germany to perform weakly in 
radical innovation, but to liberalise due to crises. This expectation cannot be 
confirmed in terms of liberalisation. Even though we find an increase in alternative 
job organisation defined by Zeitarbeit, other incentives such as 1 Euro Job, passed 
under the Schröder legislation have already been reversed.  
 The focus of this chapter’s argument has been on giving a rich description 
and making sense of the paradox appearing in developments in Germany. In terms of 
making sense of the propositions, the theoretical background has to be enhanced, and 




8. CHAPTER EIGHT: ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first section provides a 
comparative analysis of the German NIS with Japan, France, and the Nordic 
capitalists. The second section reflects on changes in German NISs in times of crisis 
and provides an analysis of Germany’s high-tech performance from a comparative 
perspective. Implications of the findings for the theoretical framework are provided 
in the third section, developing an enhanced framework. In this context, the 
institutional relevance of the creation of innovative capabilities is re-organised. The 
last section develops implications for the study of innovation. 
The institutional frameworks of coordinated market economies, such as 
Germany, are expected to foster the creation of incremental innovation in the nation's 
firms. The group of coordinated market economies is composed of diverse 
continental European nations plus Japan. LMEs are expected to stay relatively stable 
over time, but a liberalisation of the institutional framework of CMEs, especially in 
times of crisis, is expected by the theory. The implications of such a theoretical 
change in the institutional framework on nations' trajectories of innovation have been 
discussed in the theoretical framework of this dissertation. This chapter aims to 
discuss the question of how the actual trajectories of innovation in Germany have 
changed throughout time from a comparative perspective. This chapter discusses the 
third Research Question in more detail and then summarises the implications of this 
dissertation in terms of existing theory. 
 Research Question III: What is the ability of German firms to produce 
radical innovation from a comparative perspective? A comparative analysis of 
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Germany with other countries is crucial for this dissertation, since the institutional 
frameworks of the countries e.g. within the group of CMEs, are of a diverse nature. 
Besides continental European countries, Japan is classified as a CME. Section 8.1.1. 
gives a comparative analysis of the German and the Japanese NISs in order to create 
an in-depth understanding of the institutional similarities, as well as government 
policy and differences which might affect each nation's national trajectories of 
innovation. Japan is chosen for its relevance in terms of its ability to create radical 
innovation as illustrated in the fifth and sixth chapters. The second crucial case is the 
neighbouring country to Germany, France. France is of comparable size and 
geography. Its dirigiste institutional frameworks are different from those of the 
German CME. It is of high interest how these different systems, together with 
differences in policy-making, might have an effect on the nations' trajectories of 
innovation – in spite of the similar geography, size and industrial history, and 
operating within the EU legal framework. Section 8.1.2. presents a discussion of this 
issue. Besides the continental European countries and Japan, a group often referred 
to as the Nordic capitalists is classified as of a coordinated nature. Section 8.1.3. 
reflects on the group of Nordic capitalists. Different approaches to the study of 
comparative capitalism give the Nordic countries a special position in theory. This is 
illustrated in Figure 26: Comparison of Key Approaches in Literature, which 




Figure 26: Comparison of key approaches in literature 
Source: Own illustration using given sources 
 
Section 8.2 summarises these briefly illustrated comparative sectins, by drawing a 
picture of national high-tech performances in comparison with each other, within the 
group of CMEs and in comparison to LMEs, and discussing RQIII. Section 8.3, 
Implications on the Theoretical Framework, constructs an alternative theory which 
reflects on the complex relationships which have been found and described 
throughout this thesis. The last section constructs a summary of the analysis and the 
implications which have arisen.  
 
8.1.  A Comparative Analysis of German NISs  
This section evaluates the validity of different approaches to comparative capitalism 
in terms of their ability to explain national variation in innovation behaviour and 
performance in the context of the current global crisis with a focus on Varieties of 
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Asian Capitalism. The works of Whitley (1992), and Hall and Soskice (2001) are 
considered to be key literature for the comparison of Western and Asian national 
institutional frameworks.  
8.1.1. A Comparative Analysis of German and Japanese NISs 
For this purpose, two country cases, Germany and Japan are chosen as examples 
representing Asian and Western capitalism (Sako and Kotosaka 2012; Streeck 2008). 
As argued by Hall and Soskice (2001, 20, both countries might be categorised as 
Coordinated Market Economies (CME) but still show clearly differentiated 
institutional features of non-liberal capitalism (see Streeck and Yamamura 2001; 
Yamamura and Streeck 2003). As argued by Whitley’s (1992) institutional pluralism, 
the differences between the two CMEs might be found in terms of their ability to 
sustain distinct institutional outlooks that manage to produce innovation in times of 
global crisis. Whitley further argues that where institutions are “relatively 
homogenous and mutually reinforcing” (1992, 247), as in Western economies such 
as Germany but also Japan, fundamental change of the business systems can only 
take place through external shocks. These two countries are chosen as examples of 
distinct nations within the same group of CMEs. Continual innovation is seen as 
“key to the sustained competitiveness of nations, industries, and firms” (Dodgson 
2009, 604).  
 The findings of this dissertation suggest that the two nation’s institutional 
frameworks do not, as suggested by VoC theory, become even more liberal in times 
of crisis. As suggested by Morgan and Goyer (2012) in their analysis of national 
financial systems, the two countries retain their national differences e.g. in terms of 
their financial systems, but also their resilient national innovation systems. As for 
Asian capitalism, Lundvall, Intarakumnerd and Vang (2006, 3–5) examine Asia’s 
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Innovation System in Transition, emphasising the role of institutions and change. 
Vogel (2006, 11) presents a review of changing Japanese capitalism and outlines a 
model of institutional change constructed on the shoulders of the VoC approach and 
economic sociology in Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry Are 
Reforming Japanese Capitalism. More recently, Walter and Zhang (2012) have 
examined East Asian Capitalism, again focusing on institutions, institutional change, 
and rigidity in times of crisis in an attempt to reconsider the VoC approach, as well 
as Vogel (2006). While Walter and Zhang (2012) argue for viewing each Asian 
country as distinct, illustrating a variety of country cases, they do use the 
summarising term “East Asian Capitalism” for comparison with Western economies. 
In the Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems, Witt and Redding’s (2012) 
Institutional Comparison, Clusters, and Implications for Varieties of Capitalism and 
Business System Theory, further differentiates Asian capitalism as embodying the 
concepts of social capital, culture, informality and multiplicity. They find five major 
clusters of Asian capitalism and Japan stands alone within this analysis. The distinct 
character of Japan within Asian capitalism has previously been recognised by others, 
such as Dore (1998): Asian crisis and the future of the Japanese model. It is argued 
that even though Japanese capitalism appears to feature its own distinct institutional 
system, this system is embedded within the Asian capitalist cultural and institutional 
system and thus influences other Asian countries’ developments. Witt and Redding 
(2012, 15) argue that “[f]urther exploitation of the institutional structures and internal 
dynamics of Asian Business Systems and extended comparison with the western 
nations” would be necessary for further understanding the distinctiveness of each 
Asian Business System itself. In response to recent debates in the fields of Asian 
capitalism and VoC, this thesis, therefore, compares the two CMEs, Japan and 
Germany as representatives of Asian and Western capitalist nations. VoC and the 
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Business Systems (BS) approach are considered key literature in terms of 
institutional theory in the field of comparative capitalism, focusing on national 
innovation behaviour. Compared to the National Innovation System (NIS) approach, 
which explicitly focuses on the production of knowledge and innovation in society, 
VoC and BS focus on national institutions, categorising country groups depending on 
the degree of coordination among national actors. They further analyse changes in 
these institutional spheres and the impact of certain institutional characteristics on a 
nation’s production/innovation behaviour. While Hall and Soskice divide the world 
into two groups of countries, Whitley’s approach on BS is more differentiated. 
Whitley (2000) does distinguish six groups of BSs. In contrast to the NIS approach, 
and in line with the field of political economy, as described by Ibata-Arens`s (2003) 
The comparative political economy of innovation, the VoC and BS approaches focus 
on the firm level, observing firm behaviour in national institutional contexts. Thus, 
“[i]n sum, firms have a number of choices in developing innovative competences and 
selecting innovation strategies that are guided by dominant institutions” (Whitley 
2002, 523).  
 In his book, Business Systems in East Asia, Whitley (1992) studies the 
development of Asian business systems and proposes three interrelated components, 
namely: the nature of the firm; market organisation; and employment practices and 
authority system. Whitley (1992) distinguishes the Japanese Kaisha from the Korean 
Chaobol, and the Chinese family business. He argues for a stronger influence of pre-
industrial institutions in East Asian business systems, and suggests that “the 
relatively high level of ethnic and cultural homogeneity within these countries and 
the heterogeneity between them (…) have generated strongly distinctive types of 
business system (…)” (Whitley 1992, 218). He reviews this in contrast to the West 
where "institutional pluralism within countries and the institutional commonalities 
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across them (...) have reduced both the distinctiveness of national business systems in 
the West and their explanation in terms of national divergent institutions" (Whitley 
1992, 218).  
 In Innovation in Times of Crisis: National Systems of Innovation, Structure, 
and Demand, Filippetti and Archibugi (2011, 179) illustrate that “the effects of the 
economic downturn in terms of firms` innovation investment are not the same across 
European countries”. Nations with stronger innovation systems, such as Germany, 
seem to emerge from the crisis with a relatively stronger position, whereas the UK 
and France as representatives of liberal and Dirigiste market economies (DME), “are 
likely to lose additional relative positions” (Archibugi 2011, 189). Filippetti and 
Archibugi argue for this to be due to the nation's specialisation in the high-tech 
sectors and developments of the financial system. Their findings seem to be counter 
intuitive to the VoC argument in terms of LMEs being superior to CMEs in terms of 
a specialisation in radical innovation.  
 Reading VoC, one would generally not expect CMEs to sustain better growth 
than LMEs in times of crisis, as LMEs are arguably superior in terms of radical 
innovation. Although the German and Japanese political economies are lumped 
together as CMEs in contrast to LMEs in the VoC typology, a conspicuous variation 
in their patterns of institutional change and innovation behaviour is still visible. 
Despite belonging to the same category of CMEs, the Japanese system is 
distinguished from the German system in that it is embedded in different cultural and 
historical backgrounds (Whitley 1992; Hofstede 2003). In Culture and the Business 
Systems of Asia, Redding, Bond, and Witt (2012) comlement Whitley’s work on 
Asian capitalism by establishing clusters of Asian cultures and the each culture’s 
impact on national organisations. As for Japanese culture, similarly to Witt & 
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Redding’s (2012) observations in terms of its business systems, the country takes a 
unique position.  
 In contrast to the argument arising from VoC on Japan being a coordinated 
market economy, Vogel argues that the Japanese institutional system has undergone 
fundamental change (2006, 10). He argues for a liberalisation of the Japanese model. 
Sako and Kotosaka (2012) suggest that the Japanese financial system has slowly 
“shifted its goal and function from being part of the Japanese institution of relational 
banking towards being more part of an equity-based finance system (…)” (Sako and 
Kotosaka, 2012 155). They further argue that, in the labour market, the changes are 
much more drastic – “unlike the financial markets, layering and conversion in labor 
market institutions are stronger and appear irreversible”. In this context, employees 
lose their power in working councils and also in terms of wage bargaining (Sako and 
Kotosaka, 2012, 156), while the power of managers in large corporations and the 
influence of policy maker’s grows. Therefore, internal firm decisions are 
increasingly made top-down and less through consensus. In terms of government 
strategy, Japan has, similarly to Germany, launched an Innovation Strategy in 2007 
called Innovation 25.  
 The German High Tech Strategy appears to be very similar to the Japanese 
one. It also focuses on the educational sphere and, with this, basic research on 
universities and their connections to firms. It also emphasises the importance of high 
tech research, entrepreneurships and clusters (Nishiyama 2008). In this context, 
Japan has launched partnerships with the EU – especially encouraging innovation 
and financing R&D (INCJ 2009, 1). Whereas “Innovation is mostly financed by the 
public sector in the EU (…) in Japan 80% of research expenditure comes from the 
private sector”. It is hoped that cooperative networks between Japan and the EU will 
encourage innovative clusters, but also “bring together private equity and venture 
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businesses from Japan and Europe in order to create a positive synergy” (INCJ 2009, 
1). A quarterly view of GDP in Germany, Japan, France, and the UK illustrates well 
the difficulties of Japan throughout the financial crisis and also before, as described 
by Vogel (2006). It illustrates Japan’s positive economic development closely after 
the crisis, in comparison to other nations. This thesis argues that Japan’s positive 
performance as observed in GDP growth rates after the global crisis was partly due 
to its government’s changed focus on innovation. Not only did the Japanese GDP 
growth increase after the crisis, but the nations R&D expenditures as a percentage of 
national GDP are still at a higher level than the equivalent expenditures of the other 
illustrated countries. Japan has not only invested more in R&D in relation to GDP 
than other nations, but it seems that these investments have had the highest numbers 
of high-tech patent applications to the EPO when making a comparison. As for 
specific radical sectors, such as the software sector (Hall and Soskice, 2001) The EU 
Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (2006, 2009 and 2011) unfortunately does 
not, as mentioned before, provide a clear picture of Japanese performance. The 2012 
EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard offers a comparison of the 1,500 largest 
R&D investing firms. Choosing France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA for a 
world comparison leaves us with more than two thirds of the captured firms for the 
2011 R&D investments (1,045 firms within these five countries). There is a very 
different picture of Japanese firms’ performance here. Large Japanese firms account 
for 10 per cent of the globally spent R&D investments in 2011 and for almost 20 per 
cent of the sector’s sales. The European Commission changed the categories criteria 
in 2011. The selected category for software firms is now called “software and 
computing services”. For Japan, two large firms, Fujitsu and NEC, accounted for 
about 75,000 million Euros of sales in 2011. The VoC column in the tables 
demonstrates each nation’s specialisation in the sector.  
212 
 
 Hall and Soskice used this calculation (2001, 41–41) to illustrate the relative 
specialisation of LMEs in radical sectors and CMEs in incrementally innovating 
sectors. In the first two tables, Germany clearly illustrates a stronger specialisation in 
the software sector than the EU average. In terms of the VoC calculation, this table 
allows Japan to appear as the one nation’s most specialised in software sector sales 
and R&D investment in 2011, just after the giant USA. As mentioned before, the 
2012 "EU Industrial R&D Scoreboard" data need to be reviewed carefully, since the 
database only “contains economic and financial data of the world's top 1500 
companies ranked by their investments in research and development” (European 
Commission 2013, 5). The selection criterion of high spending on R&D often fits 
large firms better than smaller firms. These firms are mainly found in the United 
States, whereas European firms are, on average, smaller. European high tech sectors 
are characterised by small firms, which cooperate with each other as well as with 
universities and independent research institutions in terms of their R&D. Their own 
R&D spending is, therefore, lower than their actual activities, and obviously, those 
firms’ sales are not captured in the Scoreboard. This is clearly visible in the 2012 
edition of the R&D Scoreboard, where only 500 European, but 1,000 other (more 
than 500 US) firms meet the criteria for the selection process – compared to 1,000 
EU and 1,000 other chosen firms in the previous years). The selection criteria for the 
Scoreboard do not, therefore, let the instrument capture data which fully illustrate the 
high-tech sector’s performance, in general. In this context, it is sufficient to conclude 
that Germany and Japan have coped well with the global crisis in terms of their 
national innovation systems. The expectation of CMEs suffering more than LMEs in 
times of crisis, due to their supposed inability to cope with new market needs in 
terms of new technologies cannot be supported.  
213 
 
 Even though the two countries are generally categorised as CMEs, both 
nations have previously developed differently with Japan adjusting to a more liberal 
financial system and therefore, coping differently with the global crisis. Apart from 
both countries being relatively successful in terms of GPD development, patent 
applications to the EPO, their R&D investment as a percentage of GDP and within 
the radical sector of software, a clear difference between the national performances is 
visible. In terms of R&D investments as a percentage of GDP, the Japanese 
performance slightly decreases (having had the highest level before and after the 
crisis) from 2008 to 2009, and the German performance increases. As for all the 
countries, high-tech patent applications to the EPO decreased for Japan and 
Germany; for Japan, the numbers decreased by 17,000 applications per annum from 
2004 to 2008, whereas the German numbers only decreased by 7,000 applications 
per annum still leaving the two countries in the highest ranks. The sales and R&D 
investment measures for the case of the software sector are almost contrary 
depending on the Scoreboard selection criteria, but leave both countries in strong 
positions – though,of course, well behind the USA.  
 Carney, Gedajlovic and Yang (2009) point out that the global crisis starting in 
2008 was a product of the previously praised model of liberal or Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism. The two coordinated market economies of Germany and Japan seem to 
have coped well with the crisis in terms of their GDP development as well as R&D 
investments in high-tech, and patent applications. Even though both nations are 
bunched together as CMEs, they do show different institutional frameworks and 
different ways of coping with crisis. The previous analysis illustrates partly contrary 
developments in the chosen measures, still leaving both countries and their 
innovation systems in strong positions in comparison to others. This suggests that 
alternative models of capitalism, such as the German or Japanese ones, should be 
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given closer attention. The two governments’ chosen strategies to further R&D 
investments in times of crisis to “large investment projects such as alternative 
sources of energy, transport as well as the public service” (Ietto-Gillies 2010, 910) 
appear to support the idea of national innovation systems in the face of lacking 
financial support for innovation from stock markets. On the other hand, the 
vulnerability of the shareholder-oriented financial system and the loss of 
coordination in LMEs have undermined the kind of security which is necessary for 
navigating a global crisis. It is clearly visible that external pressures of the global 
economic crisis on the German and Japanese NISs have not led to a decrease in 
innovation in a cyclic manner. With the new focus on high-tech industries as well as 
alternative energy programs, policy makers in both governments have tried to 
overhaul their innovation systems. While both countries have, throughout time, 
incrementally changed their institutional outlook (as argued in Hall and Thelen 2009; 
Vogel 2006), policy makers have also managed to push for a more radical emphasis 
on innovation due to external pressures in times of crisis. In How National are 
Business Systems? The Role of States and Complementary Institutions in 
Standardizing Systems of Economic Coordination and Control at the National Level, 
Whitley (2005, 212) finds that “[T]he growing internationalization of markets has 
,been seen as reducing the strength and the complementarity of national institutions 
especially in the more coordinated market economies such as Germany and Japan”. 
In contrast, this chapter does not find a reduction in institutional complementarity but 
changes. The main institutional features of both countries and especially of the 
German market economy have, despite policy changes, stayed unchanged even in 
times of global crisis. Such differences in their institutional outlooks appear to 
influence their ways of coping with global crisis and supporting their national 
innovation systems. Due to government intervention and innovation policies, the 
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resilience of the NIS, and its ability to adapt to a new crisis situation, which is not 
considered by VoC, becomes visible. It seems as if both countries do not become 
more coordinated nor liberal in terms of market economy due to external pressure, 
but find more individual ways of coping with the global crisis (see Morgan and 
Goyer 2012). A further analysis and international comparison of each national 
sector’s performance would be necessary to draw conclusions about the two nations’ 
specialisations in either radical or incremental sectors. In observing the changes in 
the software sector, Hall and Soskice’s general implication of specialisation in 
incremental innovation and lack of ability to produce radical innovation, cannot be 
supported by this thesis. 
8.1.2.  A Comparative Analysis of German and French NISs  
The French innovation system is characterised by a process of ongoing change, as 
well as the academic debates trying to finally define the complex French system. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, the French NIS was often described as “an interventionist 
philosophy (“technological Colbertism”, cf. Laredo and Mustar 2001)” (as cited in 
Muller, Héraud and Zenker 2009). Mustar and Larédo (2002) analyse the 
disappearance of the Colbertist state model in more detail. Similarly to Germany, in 
2009, the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research launched a strategy to 
promote innovation. As described by the Directorate-General of Global Affairs 
(2010) the newly established National Research and Innovation Strategy focuses on 
three key sectors: bio-, eco-, and nano-technologies. This emphasises certain sectors 
due to France`s attempt to achieve a leading European and international position in 
these sectors. The French focus on these three sectors indicates the areas in which it 
realistically sees the potential to achieve a leadership position. This focus on certain 
spheres can be observed in other places as well. Amable and Hancké (2001), 
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Directorate-General of Global Affairs (2010), and Goyer (2001) describe how the 
French government focuses on supporting some large firms, identifying national 
champions which are expected to lead their industries at an internationally 
competitive level. Therefore, some of the literature argues that the French 
government forgets about SMEs but can still achieve leading positions and 
outperform other nations in the emphasised sectors (Amable and Hancké 2001). 
Nevertheless, the Directorate-General of Global Affairs (2010) emphasises that, 
since 1999, the French government is also emphasising its support for the creation of 
start-ups. Nationwide business incubators and systemic university-industry 
partnerships have been established to promote the creation and growth of innovative 
start-ups. In addition, Muller, Héraud and Zenker (2009, 1) describe how “Unlike 
federal states, no clear legal distribution of roles is fixed and as a result, complex 
multi-level/multi-actor processes in the design and implementation of policies can be 
observed”.  
 In comparison with France, the German high-tech strategy emphasises the 
importance of small- to medium-sized businesses. Whereas French policy supports 
the international competition of some large firms (national champions), and the 
creation of new innovative businesses, the German way of thinking appears to be less 
ambitious and more indigenous. The ascribed goal of German policy to focus on 
medium-sized businesses is due to the attempt to promote employment and wealth 
within the country. International competitiveness of the German high-tech sector is 
often due to the accumulation of the performance of many SME firms, and not due to 
single large, internationally-leading firms (Simon 2007, 11). Simon describes how all 
industrialised nations manage to give rise to large firms which inhibit the ability to 
internationally compete and to export. He does further argue that the German 
economic system is characterised by its “Hidden Champions”, some SMEs which 
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dominate world markets. SMEs do, therefore, play a different role in Germany than 
in France and a different role for policy makers. It can be argued that the variation in 
government policy, focusing on hidden champions (SMEs) in the German and 
national champions (large firms) in the French case, is due to this. Another difference 
found in literature is that the French NIS is continuously described as an ongoing 
changing system whereas the German innovation system has been described as stable 
towards external pressures. The argument of external and internal pressures is used in 
this context for different reasons. It is argued that, due to institutional 
complementarities, Germany continues in a stable institutional framework, whereas 
the same argument is used in the French case (Kang 2010; Muller, Héraud and 
Zenker 2009) to explain its continuous change process. The missing link in the 
French case is the notion of “institutional complementarities” which is argued to be 
the reason for institutional stability in other market economic models such as the 
coordinated or liberal model (Hall and Soskice 2001). In their Introduction to 
Varieties of Capitalism, Hall and Soskice do not further describe the French system, 
but refer to other authors such as Hancke and Culpepper (see 35, and 275 ff.) in the 
same book. France is viewed as a third model of capitalism or at least not a CME or 
LME. Thus, Hall and Soskice suggest that there:  
 “may be a ‘Mediterranean’ type, but the discussion of alternatives to liberal 
 market economies and coordinated market economies is perfunctory, and the 
 emphasis upon institutional complementarities makes it unclear how 
 effectively, for example, a coordinated system of corporate finance would 
 function with a competitive labour market” (Howell 2003).  
 
 In the same book, Hancke and Culpepper investigate deeper into two 
institutional spheres of the French national economy. Hancké (2001) discusses the 
developments of the French system in a 15-year period from 1980– 95. In 
summary, he suggests that the changes in the French system have enabled French 
firms to compete for foreign capital on the newly grown stock market in Paris and 
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thus enable an opening of the financial system. In the same book, Culpepper (2001) 
analyses and compares the French vocational training and educational system with 
the German system. He concludes that French firms “are able to get away with a 
flexible Fordist production model, in which they use the educational system to 
provide general skills and then train only in firm-specific skills at the firm level” 
(Culpepper 2001, 297). In a VoC context, France is described as an alternative model 
which has changed its outlook significantly within the last decade by liberalising at 
least its financial system (Hancké 2001; Lee and Yoo 2007, 454). Lee and Yoo 
illustrate the persistently important role of the state in the French NSI. They do 
further illustrate how the institutional frameworks of major examples of LME (USA) 
experience a strong influence from the state. Within the sphere of industrial relations, 
the French system is (similarly to the German system) also characterised by trade 
unions, employee federations and works councils (ETUI 2012; Piganiol 1989). Thus, 
Amadieu (1995) describes certain problems in this sphere which nowadays can still 
be partly observed in spite of European integration. The Brussels-founded NFP 
organisation, ETUI, which was founded and financially supported by Hans Boeckler 
Stiftung and the European Union have summarised key figures and statistics on 
workplace representation throughout Europe since 2012 (ETUI 2012). ETUI 
illustrates, in 2012, what has been previously described by Amadieu in 1995 – a rate 
of 98% of collective bargaining coverage with “too many levels of collective 
bargaining”, but only an 8% proportion of employees in unions standing in for “too 
many and inefficient employee representation bodies. The Dirigiste nature of the 
French economy encourages inter-firm coordination, but also interaction with the 
state. Thus there is an attempt to make decisions through consensus internally in a 
firm but also through inter-firm relationships and state-firm interaction.  
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8.1.3.  A Comparative Analysis of German and Nordic NISs  
The debate on the superiority of certain capitalist models has been intensified in 
times of global crisis. Due to the crisis, and in context of the VoC approach (Hall and 
Soskice 2001), a new focus on national innovation behaviour influencing overall 
economic success can be observed (Archibugi, Filippetti and Frenz 2012). In the 
given context, this chapter focuses on variety in national institutions as it influences 
the innovation behaviour of the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden). Referring to VoC, each nation’s innovation behaviour is 
descriptively analysed using patent data, in the following chapter.  
 Following the traditional approaches for comparative capitalism (see e.g. 
Esping-Anderson, Whitley) one would argue for Nordic countries to be characterised 
by egalitarian capitalism. Following the VoC approach, a proposition on welfare or 
WPRs being interrelated with incremental innovation and inequality due to 
corporations' influence on the government, social policy and labour market policies 
increasing firm-specific skills, is indicated. This proposition has previously been 
discussed in the literature review. A very different picture is drawn by authors such 
as Robert Boyer in New growth regimes, but still institutional diversity (Boyer, 
2004). Boyer argues that the social democratic institutions underlying Nordic 
capitalists lead towards a good and homogenous general education. As previously 
argued, a well-established knowledge base is the foundation for numerous 
approaches to innovation (NISs). Boyer follows these approaches in arguing for this 





Figure 27: Social Democratic Configuration 
Source: Boyer (2004, 18) 
 
 In Figure 28, one can clearly observe the five countries’ p rformances in 
filing patents with the EPO. In this context, Iceland appears to be too tiny a nation, 
Norway seems to focus its economy on different sectors (the natural resources which 
are available to its inhabitants make it difficult to compare), but Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland do prove themselves capable takeoff taking on a share in the high-tech 
world markets. Even though their share is quite small when compared to other CMEs 
such as Germany or Japan, it appears to be relatively high if compared to other 
LMEs such as Canada, New Zealand or Australia which have larger populations. 





Figure 28: World share of patent applications in selected fields by country of residence of i v ntor – Nordic market economies  
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8.2.  German High-Tech Performance: A Comparative 
Perspective in Times of Crisis 
In terms of Germany's ability to create innovation in high-tech sectors, this chapter 
gives an overview of the German NIS from a comparative perspective. This section 
consists of four parts and is followed by a further section which focuses on German 
high-tech performance. The following chapter aims to return to the VoC proposition 
of CG relating to innovation. This chapter focuses on a general description of the 
German NIS in times of global financial crisis starting in 2008. The crisis is of 
importance due to the argument arising from VoC of a liberalisation of CMEs in 
crises. Therefore, the general knowledge and science-creating system of the CME is 
in focus. In a second section (7.3.2.), implications from the analysis of the NIS in 
times of crisis are discussed. In a third section (7.3.3.), the CME is brought into 
comparison with a second, economically strong and culturally very different Asian 
CME: Japan. Both NISs are compared in times of crisis. In section 7.3.4., the 
German and the dirigiste French NIS system and their reactions in times of crisis are 
looked at briefly. A fifth section (7.3.5.) uses the comparative perspective to briefly 
bring the Nordic countries into the picture. This section merely discusses the 
proposition arising from VoC of welfare being related to incremental innovation.  
 Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) view the European union as one unit of 
analysis within which they observe the impact of a global crisis, whereas the VoC 
approach differentiates between the performances of CMEs and LMEs, and Redding 
et al., as well as Witt and Redding (2012) do further differentiate Asian capitalism 
into certain clusters. Each approach within the field of comparative capitalism 





development of national economies and innovation behaviour. These different 
approaches to comparative capitalism are taken into account in the context of the 
changes in Germany. The global economic crisis has already passed through its third 
round. Streeck and Beckert (2011) demonstrate that the impact of the crisis varies 
substantially across nations. Thus, contrary to fundamental academic approaches, 
such as the VoC approach, they do not argue that neoliberal economies are more 
successful (see e.g. in Petersdorff-Campen, Streeck, and Beckert, n.d.). In times of 
crisis, the two authors emphasise the importance of national economies being in need 
of market regulations and ethical guidelines, in constructing trust and stability for the 
actors in their NIS. This argument of stable NISs enabling their actors to continue 
investing in innovation and technological capabilities throughout times of crisis is 
consistent with Filippetti and Archibugi (2011), as well as Williamsc (2012).  
8.2.1. German NIS in Times of Economic Crisis – Changes 
Since 2005, the German government has established a variety of policies, new to the 
country. Thus, it is the first time the federal government has established a high-tech 
strategy; emphasising regional high-tech clusters, large scale investments in R&D on 
innovation, and also focusing on establishing an internationally competitive 
university and research landscape. It is clearly visible that the external pressures of 
the global economic and the European crisis on the German NIS have not led its 
ability to innovate to decrease in a cyclic manner. Schumpeter’s arguments on 
creative disruption can be observed here. Due to the new situation, the German 
politicians and policy makers have managed to change their focus, away from 
passively accompanying economic developments and supporting the long-established 





role in supporting the development of national innovation systems. The new 
opportunities which occurred due to the crisis have been recognised along with 
Germany’s strengths in terms of a stable and knowledge-based economy with highly 
skilled labour in a government coordinated environment (Hall and Soskice 2001), 
and these have been taken as strengths of the system. With the new focus on high-
tech industries and new technologies, as well as alternative energy programs, 
sponsored by the government, the German policy makers have tried to overhaul other 
nations in economically difficult times. The results of these policy changes, which 
mainly took place since 2007 – in times of the global economic and current EU debt 
crisis – have been significant. BUFI (Bundesministerium fuer Bildung and 
Forschung 2008) describes how the country’s position in terms of its research and 
innovation landscape has dramatically shifted during recent years to become one of 
the most attractive ones worldwide. Overall the percentage of R&D investments 
compared to GDP has clearly increased from 2005 (2.51%) to 2010 (2.82%). The 
government’s goal is to increase these investments to 3% of GDP by 2020. In this 
manner, the German economy has managed to use the global crisis to its advantage. 
As shown by the 2009 Innobarometer survey, Germany (together with Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) has managed to achieve a position as an 
innovation leader (Kanerva and Hollunders 2009) In response to the above 
illustration about changes in the German NIS in times of crisis, RQI “Has the 
German NIS transformed throughout the past years?” can clearly be answered with a 
“Yes”. In the face of the global financial crisis and the following European 
sovereign-debt crisis, the German NIS has clearly transformed. It has, therefore, 





changes which took place in the NIS. It does appear to have remained a coordinated 
market economy. 
 The German government has done a lot to support new, high-tech sectors. As 
Casper et al. (1999) and Lehrer (2001) have described before, the German 
government has continued to focus its attention on the development and support of 
new industries. In particular, the policy changes for the biotechnology sector appear 
to be dramatically different in comparison to their roots. In contrast, the software 
industry appears to still obey open issues, e.g. due to the differences between the 
world’s patent office guidelines for patenting software. This issue is not that much of 
a problem for the German government, as it is a topic which needs further discussion 
in the European Union. At first glance, the policy changes made by the government 
seem to have had a real impact on the development of both of the two sectors. As 
mentioned before, the government policies in the software sector are diffusion-
oriented (Lehrer 2000) and thus they are sometimes seen as being more effective. 
Thus, where small research-oriented firms dominate the German biotechnology 
sector, the large international firm SAP has established itself as a leading firm in the 
software sector. The very different starting points of the two sectors (biotechnology 
and gene manipulation being stigmatised as evil in Germany) have called for these 
different policy strategies. It is questionable whether diffusion-oriented policy 
support would have had any positive effect on the biotechnology sector in the 1980s. 
It might be argued that, due to the very different national cultures and market 
structures in Germany compared to the USA, such step-wise policy development was 
the best method of successful development within the country; it led existing 





other OECD nations in the 1980s; it can now be identified as one of the leaders of the 
European Union in these two radical sectors. Therefore, the simple differentiation 
between CMEs and LMEs in the VoC approach needs to be re-thought. There might 
be more diversity within one country than between countries. The proposition arising 
from VoC that institutions and institutional complementarities are the ultimate factor 
for establishing a nation’s sectoral specialisation should be rethought. As suggested 
by Taylor (2004) it can be supported that a s ate’s influence on the innovation pattern 
of a country might be stronger than is sometimes assumed.  
 Taylor’s suggestion of the role of the state being of importance for innovation 
behaviour cannot be rejected in this thesis. There seems to be a relationship between 
policy changes and innovation behaviour in sectors. No policy can be found which 
directly supports neither “radical nor incremental” innovation. Therefore the 
dichotomy might be softened. Talking about the state’s policy support for certain 
sectors appears to be a better description of what happens in reality. The sectors 
which are strongly supported in Germany are new ones at the beginning of their life 
cycles with lots of potential to generate new workplaces and economic success. 
Therefore, it might even be concluded that Hall and Soskice’s five institutional 
spheres are not sufficient for explaining the differentiation between nations and for 
explaining innovation behaviour itself. The question of the role of the state and the 
role of government policy and policy change is relevant for the VoC field. The 
proposition arising from VoC of relative stability also needs to be rethought. There 
are massive changes going on in the innovation behaviour of nations. It also needs to 
be questioned whether these changes can still be described as path dependent. This 





behaviour can be found, which can no longer be referred to as path dependent. 
Whether this goes in hand with institutional change is a question which cannot be 
answered at this stage. In this context, institutional change and changes in innovation 
behaviour are better viewed as independent concepts.  
8.2.2.  Implications for the German NIS 
In the context of Schumpeterian thinking, German policy makers used the crisis as a 
chance for something new and to get ahead of the competition (Warschat 2009). This 
intention could not have been achieved without direct implications for the NIS. Three 
key transformations of the German NIS can be found:  
Focus on high-tech and new technologies  
 Ietto-Gillies has already emphasised that, in times of crisis, governments 
should support “large investment projects such as alternative sources of energy, 
transport as well as the public service” (Ietto-Gillies 2010, 910). This is what actually 
happened in the German case. As illustrated above, the German government used the 
crisis as an opportunity to specialise its policies on new technologies and thereby 
tried to overtake the research of other nations in economically difficult times. This is 
an obvious change in the German NIS, which previously focused on established 
sectors, adopting more incremental approaches to innovation (as argued by Hall and 
Soskice 2001). 
 Supporting Regional Clusters, communication of various actors in the cluster 
and competition in between national clusters 
 For their new strategy of specialising in new and high-tech industries, policy 
makers acknowledge the importance of an NIS. The EU and the German government 





and Clusters 2008) and actively support the formation of high-tech clusters 
throughout Germany. Some cluster policies have been mentioned above 
(Bundesministerium fuer Bildung and Forschung 2008; Bandesministerium fuer 
Bildung and Forschung 2012; Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2010). 
The German structure of a federal government and independent state governments, 
as well as research institutions, such as the Fraunhofer or Goethe Institute, 
cooperating with universities and focusing on basic research within these clusters and 
between them, is a basic element of the recent transformation of the German NIS. 
Supporting national research and training institutions and their communication with 
other research institutions and the industry. 
 One of the strengths of the German NIS is its stable economic environment 
and the highly-educated human capital within this. No high-tech strategy would work 
out, if the German government did not manage to activate enough labour for it; 
therefore, the government has developed a variety of strategies to support basic 
research and, at the same time, to generate more highly skilled labour 
(Bundesministerium fuer Bildung and Forschung 2012). On the other hand, there is 
already a lack of labour visible. Therefore, the governmenthas  already launched a 
“Blue Card” in order to allow Germany to attract more qualified workers from 
abroad (FOCUS 2012; Tagesschau 2012). 
 The global financial and European sovereign debt crisis has had severe 
impacts on global and national economies. In regard to the German NIS, three 
measures of innovation, namely R&D investments, patent counts (input), and 
publications (output) are used as indicators of the development of the system. It has 





of R&D spending on innovation by industry as well as the federal government 
reached a new height in 2010. In terms of patents and publications, Germany has 
managed to establish itself as one of the leading contributors worldwide. The impact 
of R&D investments on a firm`s ability to create innovations, in general, has been 
discussed and illustrated by many researchers (see e.g. Pianta and Bogliacino 2007). 
In the context of this thesis, the various sources of R&D spending in the German 
economy, in general, as well as the development of industry-specific investments, 
and an international comparison over time are chosen for analysis. As illustrated in 
Figure 29, the R&D investments in Germany have continued to grow over time, even 
in times of crisis. It is obvious that the government and industry are the largest 
sources of finance for R&D. One might argue that (in spite of times of crisis) this 
could be the case for many leading OECD nations. Figure 30 illustrates the two 
largest sources (government and industry) of R&D spending in the context of 
equivalent international figures. The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 
includes data from the 1,000 largest R&D investors in Europe/ or alternatively the 
rest of the world. It does focus on the 1,000 largest firms within either the EU or the 
rest of the world and illustrates their R&D investment behaviour. Therefore, it is not 
representative of one whole national economy since only a country’s largest (in 
comparison to other EU firms) nations are observed. The largest proportion of the 
German economy is driven by small- and medium-sized firms. Their development is 
obviously neglected in the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. Therefore, 
the illustrated data can be taken as an indicator of the development of NISs, but not 
as a complete truth in terms of how exactly industrial investment has developed. 





on the five chosen countries (France, Germany, UK, USA, EU) and total R&D 
investments in millions of Euro/year (2005, 2008, 2010). It illustrates the 
developments of R&D investments amongst the largest firms in each country. It is 
clearly visible fromthis that the German industrial R&D investments have 
continuously increased in recent years, though the data only relate to the large firms 
in the captured countries. As mentioned before, a major proportion of German firms 
are small- and medium-sized. One might argue that these firms may not be such 
strong R&D investors in times of crisis. 
 
 
Figure 29: Total R&D investment per country (2006, 2009, 2011) 
Source: Own illustration using the 2006, 2009, 2011 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 
 
 In this context, General Electrics (2012) clearly illustrates, in its European 
SME investment Barometer, that within the four strongest European 
macroeconomies (Italy, France, Germany, UK) German small- and medium-sized 










































EU Germany France Italy Finland 
United 
Kingdom 
2005 0,66 0,76 0,77 0,52 0,99 0,62 
2006 0,65 0,76 0,75 0,53 0,97 0,63 
2007 0,66 0,76 0,75 0,52 0,94 0,62 
2008 0,68 0,83 0,77 0,52 0,94 0,63 
2009 0,75 0,92 0,84 0,55 1,10 0,69 









Public R&D expenditure as % of GDP 
invest into R&D. Therefore, the trends observed for investment in Figure 30 can be 
confirmed in an international comparison. Compared to other leading OECD nations, 
German industry is quite strongly and continuously stable, increasing its investments 
in R&D, throughout times of economic, financial and European crisis. In a 
comparion with EU countries, the development of German public spending on R&D 
is notable. It appears that, in times of crisis, public spending is an important source of 
German R&D investment. This government strategy – invest in times of crisis – 
promoted attempts to overtake other nations in technological developments, and was 
possible and sensible only in the context of an otherwise stable national economy. 
  
 
 It might even be argued that this government strategy was also the source of 
the increasing industrial R&D investment since industry (especially small- and 
medium-sized firms) might orientate depending on government policies. Germany 
Figure 30: Public R&D expenditure as % of GDP  





has not suffered under the crisis in terms of its ability to produce innovation 
(represented by the outcome factors for publications and patents). Not only in terms 
of patents, but also in its publications per citizen, the German economy has even 
managed to overtake the giant USA. The illustrated counts are in relation to the 
population. Thus, the USA does obviously still have a higher total number of 
publications and patents. In terms of its NIS, relative counts show quite well that the 
NIS is strengthened and that the governent has been successful in not only 
establishing a culture of knowledge and basic research (as this has always been a 
strength of the country’s NIS before) but moreover interconnects basic research with 
industry and independent research institutions, establishing regional (high-tech) 
clusters.  
 The chosen policy changes by the German government appear to have been 
successful. Considering the previous chapter, recognising the global crisis as an 
opportunity and government’s taking an active role in supporting the developments 
of key technologies seem to have resulted in a positive effect. The neo liberal 
argument that a capitalist economy is economically successful when it is not 
coordinated by government, but corporations and banks can act freely in society 
according to their will, does not seem to be relevant to the production of the most 
important factor for economic success – innovation. The opposite seems to be the 
case. Diverting on to another related topic, in terms of the VoC debate (Hall and 
Soskice 2001) that CMEs such as Germany are weaker at producing radical 
innovation (e.g. high-tech industry) and stronger at specialising in incremental 
innovation (e.g. automobile industry), a counter-intuitive development is apparent 





base, and highly skilled labour, the coordination of industry, by workers’ councils 
and the government – leading to long-term employment, coordinated bargaining, and 
high worker participation– as well as the strong inter-firm and inter-institutional 
relations, are found to be supportive for the country’s specialisation in high-tech 
industries.  
 Two implications for future government policies are suggested. Firstly, the 
increase in government spending on R&D, focusing on high-tech and new sectors is 
found to be positive for system development. It is suggested that such spending and 
programs to support new technologies should be continuously increased in the future 
leading the CME to establish even more internationally competitive high technology 
clusters. Such a suggestion is significant particularly in the context of current 
discussions about federal government debates about supporting vs. cutting off 
government subsidies (Deutsche Welle 2012). The solar industries fear that such cuts 
in times of crisis would erase a large number of solar energy firms in Germany. 
Further investments in R&D in this field might even manage to catapult the sector 
into a more competitive position internationally. A major future problem of the 
German NIS, due to an aging society on the one hand and further specialisation in 
high-knowledge-based industries on the other, is the lack of skilled labour. A second 
implication specifically relevant to German policy is clearly demonstrated by the 
need for more trained and highly educated staff, especially in the areas of natural 
science (as described in the previous chapters (see Tutmann 2011; OECD 2007; 
Preisendörfer 2008, BMBF 2008)). A larger number of nurseries (also for children 
under three years) and flexible work contracts, as well as a women’s quotas in 





potential in society after the Norwegian model (Storvik and Teigen 2010). Additional 
scholarship possibilities and on the job trainee/university programs for 
children/young people especially from non-academic families, and migrants could 
also lead to more skilled labour. Streeck (2008, 149) argues for a disorganisation of 
the German capitalist system, meaning the liberalisation of the German institutional 
spheres. Since Hall and Soskice’s book was originally published in 2001, the five 
mentioned institutional spheres, which are argued to characterise Germany as a 
coordinated market economy, have largely stayed stable. Even in times of crisis, the 
sphere of industrial relations is characterised by strongly coordinated bargaining and 
works councils. The internal structure of firms is mainly characterised by consensus 
decision-making and network monitoring. During the past five years, the government 
has established policies on the remaining three institutional spheres, aiming to 
support German high-tech industries and, with this, the development of employment 
in SMEs in high-tech areas. On the sphere of vocational training, the federal 
government and the states signed the Hochschulpackt 2020 in the summer of 2009. 
This program is tailored to suit the market needs of the German economy in terms of 
skilled labour and to enable the German universities and research landscape to 
compete internationally. This emphasis is not only necessary for further production 
of innovation but also necessary due to the already emerging lack of skilled labour in 
Germany. In terms of inter-company relations, the government has actively 
supported the formation of high-tech clusters throughout Germany since 2009 
(BMBF 2008, 2012; Die Bandesregierung 2010). The German NIS is structured by a 
federal government and independent state governments, as well as research 





universities. Therefore, basic research within clusters and cooperation with 
companies is a basic element of recent government incentives to innovate against the 
crisis. In spite of the liberalisation of the German financial system, firms’ R&D 
investments are still highly dependent on banks and the government. As such, 
shareholder value approaches, as well as stock markets, in general, are being looked 
at critically. The government has been strongly pushing investments into R&D since 
2009. Due to these government policies (see Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research 2010) investments have been available to firms, especially to new, high-
tech firms and to entrepreneurs throughout times of crisis. The German government 
has, for the first time, constructed a high-tech strategy, emphasising regional high-
tech clusters, large-scale investments in R&D, and an internationally competitive 
university research landscape. By focusing on the NIS approach, the government has 
led the CME to its current position of economic success (as visualised in Figure 31: 
GDP growth rates per country) even in times of crisis (DAPD 2012). The relative 
strength of the German system in terms of GDP growth is, among other things, 
dependent on innovation behaviour.  
 In terms of innovation behavior, the VoC approach draws a parallel picture 
between the innovation behaviour of CMEs and LMEs, such as the USA and 
Germany or Japan. Whitley (2002, 500) mentions, that “the variety of (…) 
innovation strategies within each kind of market economy is sometimes greater than 
the contrast between CME and LME would suggest. In the German case we not only 
observe GPD growth, but, as illustrated in Figure 32, the total expenditure on 
Research and Development in terms of the nation’s GDP has also increased, 









Figure 31: GDP growth rates per country [Growth rate same period previous year, s.a.] 
Source: Extract from Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (2012): Main 
Economic Indicators (edition: November 2012); ESDS International, University of Manchester 
 
 
Figure 32: Total intramural R&D expenditure as percentage of national GDP  
Source: Extract from Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (2012): Main 








































































































































































































































Euro area (17 countries) 
Germany (including  former 










 In times of global competition and ongoing crisis, a country’s ability to 
produce radical innovation is argued to be of high relevance for its wealth creation. 
High-tech industries and new sectors such as the software or biotech sector are meant 
to represent radical innovation (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Using The EU Industrial 
R&D Investment Scoreboard, one can specifically observe that, in the German case, 
not only general R&D investments have increased, but also the investments in this 
radically innovating sector (see Investments in research and development in 
countries’ software sector 2005, 2008, and 2010.) Germany increased its world share 
of R&D expenditure in the software sector from 6.6% (2005) to 11.6% (2010).  
 The R&D Scoreboard is not representative for Japanese firms since Japan is 
only represented by two firms in 2004 and 0;1 firms in 2008 and 2010. The R&D 
Scoreboard only uses the 1,000 largest non-EU countries’ firms for data collection. 
As such, the countries are in direct competition with the USA (79% of the overall 
world share of R&D investments). It is argued that the Japanese firms have not 
managed to compete with US firms in terms of. In reality, Japan is not only 
competing with the US but also with EU countries. A database, which would have 
selected the 2,000 strongest R&D investors in Europe and Asia, would, therefore, 
have identified more Japanese software firms. The input factor for R&D investment 
influences innovation performance. Patent applications can be understood as an input 
factor as well – a filed patent may never lead to a new product on the market; on  
may also consider it as the output of an innovation process symbolising the strength 
of a national innovation system in one sector. In these terms, Germany, as well as 





Table 13: High-tech patent applications to the EPO by priority year at the national 
level in total). In fact, Germany and Japan show the highest total counts.  
 As one more indicator illustrating the strength of a national economy’s 
specialisation in one sector, the output factor of total sales in one industry can be 
viewed. This might represent the outcome of an innovation process: a product which 
is implemented in the market and sold successfully. With increasing numbers of 
software firms and net sales, the German economy produces almost half of the EU 
net sales in the software sector. Beside the giant US software industry, German firms 
have managed to acquire an increased percentage of the world share of software sales 
since 2005 from 7.9 to 9.1 per cent in 2010. Similar developments are visible for 
biotech sales, as illustrated later on. In sum, German institutional frameworks as well 
as government policy changes in the face of a global crisis, focusing on further 
investment in high-tech industries and radically innovating sectors such as software 
or biotech, as well as supporting the research landscape and linking it with university 
research and industry, seem to have led the country to a better economic position 
after the crisis than before. In terms of innovation performance in high-tech sectors, 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 give an overview of how the German, but also the Japanese 
high-tech strategy (discussed in the following section) might have had effects on 
each nation’s performance in the area of patents. The two charts which illustrate data 
from the EPO which have been calculated for the countries’ world shares of patents 
in the selected sectors, illustrate the diverse innovation behaviours of LMEs and 
CMEs themselves, within the two groups. Similarly to the previous chapter, we can 
again find that Germany outperforms the UK, which is a counter intuitive finding 





sectors associated with radical innovation, nor do we find that CMEs generally 
perform weakly in these sectors. In 2011/2012, Germany took a world share of 
around 10 percent in all observed high-tech sectors. Japan even outperformed 
Germany in ICT and nanotechnology. This finding leaves us with some questions. 
First of all, even though we look at absolute numbers and each country's world share  
 on high-tech patents it cannot be found that changes in a CME’s institutional 
framework lead to shifts in trajectories of innovation. Even though the political 
intervention and (negative) attitude towards new technology might have influenced 
Germany’s performance in certain high-tech sectors like biotech, the CME still 
appears to be a highly coordinated nation. Furthermore, the ascribed relationship 
between radical/incremental innovation and coordination is rejected as one can 
observe different attitudes towards innovation within nations. This might be 
discussed in the overall conclusion. 
 
 
Table 13: High-tech patent applications to the EPO by priority year at the national level in total 
numbers  
Source: Extract from Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (2012): Main 
Economic Indicators (edition: November 2012); ESDS Inter 
 
GEO/TIME 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
European Union  
(27 countries) 22.173 21.326 20.928 20.653 19.596 15.489 
Germany (including  
former GDR from 1991) 44.18 40.507 39.182 39.978 37.736 29.96 
France 30.303 29.777 29.804 30.661 29.983 25.976 
United Kingdom 23.87 23.066 21.023 19.975 17.834 14.868 
United States 39.108 36.941 32.863 29.191 26.686 : 
Japan 60.136 52.817 50.892 46.291 43.237 : 































































































































































































































Figure 34: World share of patent applications in selected fields by country of residence of i v ntor – coordinated market economies 
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8.3.  Implications of the Theoretical Framework 
Government policy is found to be of high relevance for skill creation, labour market 
rigidity, and industrial relations as well as corporate governance and the functioning of 
financial institutions in Germany. Some of the most relevant changes in the institutional 
framework of Germany were led by national or EU government policy making. During his 
second legislation period, Gerhard Schröder introduced major shifts in the German labour 
market by changing employment and especially unemployment and social protection 
(Knuth 2006; Trampusch et al. 2005). The package of reforms, called Agenda 2010 led 
Schröder in June 2005 to call parliament for a vote of confidence. The parliament did not 
have confidence in Schröder’s action. Before the government was due to revote, Schröder 
introduced the Hartz-legislations (Schubert and Klein 2011; Schütz 2012; Fahr and Sunde 
2009). In order to align with EU university education (Nickel 2011; Wächter 2004), but 
also to prepare for direct competition with the US economy (Charlier and Croché 2007), 
Germany entered the Bologna Process. In 2005, the majority of German universities was 
able to offer Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees instead of a Diploma. Angela Merkel used 
these previous developments in the general skill creation system and labour market by 
emphasising a complete national innovation system (Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research 2010; Lang, Schneider ans Bauer 2012; Kaiser 2008). In 2006, she introduced a 
high-tech strategy (Bundesregierung 2006) focusing on 17 fields of research, e.g. biotech 
and renewable energy. A major concern of the German high-tech strategy was to establish 
industry-university linkages in research and development. Due to the large amount of 
SMEs dominating the German market economy, R&D cooperation with universities was 





by federal government in order to create clusters (BMBF 2006; BMBF 2013; BMWE 
2015) which still exist in Germany. The establishment of regional clusters was not 
only supported by federal government, but also by Länder governments as well as 
independent research associations e.g. Fraunhofer. The coordinated nature of 
German firms, traditionally emphasising stakeholder value and long term 
investments is argued to be one strength in the process of establishing regional 
clusters. In order to create the skill base necessary for the future high-tech nation of 
Germany, federal government introduced further reforms of university level 
education (BMBF 2015). Between 2005 and 2014 the percentage of high school 
graduates registering at university rose from 37% to over 50%. Due to further focus 
on MINT (BMBF 2012a ; Bund and Länder 2007; Bund and Länder 2011) policy for 
the encouragement of mathematics, informatics, natural science and technology in 
education, Germany (in contrast with France and the UK) continuously increased not 
only the numbers of students at university but also the students pursuing a MINT 
degree. Numbers of patents per county, R&D investment and employees per sector 
illustrate that we can well argue for an effect of government policy on the ability to 
create radical innovation, in spite of the previously described developments. The 
influence of government policy on the national institutional framework and 
innovation as its output is clearly visible.  
 It is important to clarify that the institutional framework of Germany is still 
distinct and of a coordinated nature even though there has been a change towards 
high-tech R&D. Government and national players are clearly supporting a 
stakeholder-oriented CG system (Pfitzer, Oser and Orth 2003; 





to the EU financial debt crisis, calls for the regulation of stock markets, etc. became 
louder (Moshirian 2011). The German government introduced a minimum wage of 
€8.50 in 2015 which was increased onto €8.84 in January 2017 (tagesschau.de 2016). 
While employer representatives were striving to demolish the introduction of a 
minimum wage, representatives of employees welcomed the introduction as a first 
step towards support of the working class after the introduction of Hartz legislation. 
Employment numbers reached an all-time high in 2015 and unemployment an all-
time low since the reunification of Germany (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2016). In, 
Der Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen 2005–2015, Agentur für Arbeit illustrates these 
developments. Theory needs to acknowledge the role of government but also 
employer and employee representatives in the coordinated market economy of 
Germany. The government's influence not only shapes the outlook of national 
institutions but also offers developments in the product market choices of firms in the 
nation. The creation of financial support e.g. in terms of competition and skill 
equilibria might lead the product market choice not only of start-ups but also of 
traditionaly oriented firms more towards future industries. The theoretical 
framework underlying comparative capitalism needs to change away from a purely 
institutionalist notion to acknowledging the role of government and employee/ 
employer representatives. The dichotomist notion aims to explain the creation of 
radical innovation as associated with liberal capitalism and this needs to change as 
well. Friedrich List asks WHO would produce new goods, WHY this person decides 
on a certain product and HOW the production can be supported. List's questions 
might be out of date but are highly relevant in our current discussion. The role of 





has only partly been recognised. Religionssoziologie (sociology of religion) was a 
field of research which began to emerge in Germany, following the lectures of Max 
Weber (Weber 1904), Georg Simmels Philosophie des Geldes, (Simmel a.o. 1900) 
and Stark and Bainbridge (1986) in The Future of Religion. The common belief of 
authors in this field is that, even though religion might be a private issue behind 
closed doors, the value system behind one's system of religious beliefs influences 
personal action. The paradoxical actions of German policy in the case of 
biotechnology represent one example for religious beliefs’ influence on government 
policy-making, in terms of the limited ability of firms to develop skills or attract 
financial support. Following Hofstede (1983; 1984) and Trompenaars (Trompenaars 
and Hampden-Turner 2011; Smith, Dugan and Trompenaars 1996), various authors 
(Rossberger and Krause 2013; Tatschl 2013) argue for a cultural influence on 
leadership, innovation or decision-making. In terms of decision-making 
psychologists such as Hans-Jürgen Pfister argue that human decision- making is 
irrational (Jungermann, Pfister and Fischer 2010) in terms of trust, feelings and sense 
of fairness. Cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens 1982; Schlicht 1984; 
Knobloch-Westerwick 2007) and group thinking effects influence these areas (Hart 
1990; Weis and Wiesmann 2014). This dissertation does not aim to discuss the 
cognitive processes of individuals, but one important implication of this dissertation 
on existing theory is the recognition of irrationality and imperfection in the human 
being/worker. In this sense, this thesis argues for a limited view of a potential worker 
in terms of his/her choices relating to skill formation and investment in future work. 
A worker’s choice to pursue apprenticeship training versus general education at the 





beliefs dominating the group which the individual is part of, cognitive dissonance 
might lead to irrational choice. Even though government, employee and employer 
representatives might be able to influence institutional foundations, the human being 
needs to be viewed as another complex variable in the process of innovation in the 
CME, Germany. The worker can potentially have some propositions about the future 
job market as well. Due to the worker’s own abilities and propositions due to own 
position the worker will make a decision on his/her future skill development. No 
"normal" worker can have a complete overview of all national institutions 
influencing the future product market choices of firms, e.g. in order to find a secure 
working place.  
 The third force influencing a firm`s product market choice in the suggested 
theoretical model is globalisation. Globalisation not only puts pressure on national 
government policy in terms of competitiveness, it is creating a globalised educational 
system (at least on a university level), a globalised financial market and a globalised 
product market. Research on national trajectories of innovation must, therefore, 
change in the future, taking into account the national level in terms of focusing on 
international relations and their influence on one nation. A reorganisation of the 
theoretical framework states a newly suggested focus on skill equilibria. Skill 
equilibrium is not merely influenced by government and policy, but by globalisation 
and individual choice.  
 Future developments in MNCs might make use of the different national job 
markets and skill equilibria, and the different national regulations for financial 





potentially growing influence of MNCs over national governments, which could 
result in competition. 





Figure 35: Reorganisation of theoretial framework. 
Source: Own illustration 





Figure 36: Potential future organisation of institutional frameworks and MNCs  
Source: Own illustration 
 
















Figure 37: Enhanced theoretical framework on how the CME institutions in Germany support firms competing in rapidly changing markets 
Source: Own illustration referring to Hall and Soskice (2001) 
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8.4.  Theoretical Implications for the Study of Radical 
Innovation 
The stakeholder orientation of German firms influences a firm’s attitude on how 
to create innovation. Even though it is not found that coordination directly 
determines one certain trajectory of innovation, I argue that coordination – n 
terms of stakeholder orientation – determines a firm’s attitude in the process of 
innovating. The German automobile sector is found to be forced to produce 
radical innovation in an incremental way, due to the high degree of stakeholder 
orientation, which is necessary in the national framework and in terms of 
acquiring reliable long-term partners (e.g. suppliers).  
 Whereas Schumpeter's notion of disruptive change for radical innovation 
might be strived for e.g. in the USA, this is something which German 
manufacturers actively aim to avoid. For them, disruptive change implies the loss 
of something pre-existing, the destruction of something of value. German 
manufacturers prefer a different approach to creating innovation. If possible, this 
approach follows a staircase formation, which leads manufacturers from one step 
of innovation towards the next, with the clear goal of one highly innovative 
technological development in mind.  
 The stepwise approach to innovation offers a series of advantages and 
disadvantages compared to a disruptive approach. Our way of looking at 
innovation is strongly influenced by Joseph Schumpeter's theory on creative 
disruption. This theory is often raised in the context of product life cycles, 
business cycles and it is often implicitly argued for in terms of radical innovation 





introduction of electricity, or most recently the introduction of the CD. Each 
introduction is argued to have made an earlier discovery useless. It destroyed one 
industry/product and created a new one, which gives citizens a higher value.  
 
 
Figure 38: Networked driving stepwise approach  
Source: Own illustration using Smethurst (2015) 
 
 As previously described, Schumpeter's view on entrepreneurs (as agents of 
change) and creative disruption fits well into the context of existing economic 
theory. The NIS approach or VoC approach provides the institutional framework 
within which the entrepreneur creates a firm and later this firm is managed and 
chooses certain product market strategies depending on the institutional 
framework and degree of national coordination. Throughout the case study of 
Germany, it was found that the institutional spheres, together with national policy-
making, trigger a certain approach to creating innovation in Germany. It was 
found that the CME is highly innovative. VDA describes a different approach to 





is striven for. Manufacturers aim to create innovation in a way which enables 
them to offer safety to workers and suppliers due to their stakeholder-oriented 
approach. In this context, IG Metall (as representing employees) and suppliers 
(through VDA) are informed about future developments. Skill creation (therefore 
through IG Metall) can be fitted to future demands. Suppliers can develop fitting 
technologies in order to continue their relationship with the manufacturer even 
when there are changing demands for future products. This approach does not 
mean that development of innovation is not conducted in a cyclic manner as 
argued by Schumpeter. Research and development activities are distinct from a
firm's processes for entering a product market, and this again needs to be 
differentiated from the firm`s product market strategy (not every development 
needs to be implemented). In terms of patenting in the area of automated vehicles, 
contrary to possible expectations, Germany is in a leading position. As Bardt 
(2017) describes, German manufacturers account for about 80 percent of patents 
in the area of automated driving. Corporations such as Google or Tesla only 
account for up to seven percent of patents, in spite of the increasing position of 
Ford Motors in terms of patents in this area.  
 The stepwise approach to national innovation provides some advantages 
compared to creative disruption. First of all, it is implied that if one type of 
innovation needs to be taken out of the market, one can return to a previous step 
of technological development. Furthermore, even though one sector might choose 
to continue developments in one direction, these developments do not necessarily 





was not implemented at the time of creation. Creative disruption might take place 
underneath the visible developments in the product market.  
 It is important to mention that not every radical innovation automatically 
leads to disruption of a market. Disruptive innovation after Christensen is an 
approach to innovation management which describes a certain process of a firm's 
strategic choice in order to gain market value. Current developments in literature 
intermix Schumpeter's notion of creative disruption of a market with Christensen's 
approach. There is a clear differentiation between radical, incremental, disruptive 
and stepwise innovation: 
Radical innovation: Young and growing, ground-breaking, industry changing 
Incremental innovation: Old industries, slow changes, not significantly new, e.g. 
variation of colour or taste 
Disruptive innovation: after entering the market and reaching a certain size: 
 
"[e]ntrants then move up market, delivering the performance that 
incumbents’ mainstream customers require while preserving the 
advantages that drove their early success. When mainstream customers 
start adopting the entrants’ offerings in volume, disruption has occurred" 
(Christensen, Raynor, and McDonald 2015).  
 
Stepwise innovation: an approach to innovation management that purposely 
chooses a stepwise process of innovating in order to reach a higher goal or radical 
innovation but avoids disruption of existing structures.  
 An aeroplane is a highly innovative method of transport but it does not 
exclude automobiles or ships: product markets might have differentiated but one 
can now choose between the three. Even though Schumpeter divides ideas into 
inventions and innovations, as well as further differentiating between different 





(entrepreneurs vs. creditor) he does not account for national differences in aiming 
to implement innovation in the market. The NIS approach focuses on science and 
knowledge creation; it provides a much deeper understanding of the development 
and implementation of innovation on the national scale. In National Innovation 
Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Richard Nelson describes how the development 
of the aircraft took place as a non-destructive innovation, requiring high 
technology.  
 
"The rise of scientific understanding supporting aircraft design reflects a 
similar story. Again the technology, or a primitive version of it, came first, 
and the "science" or engineering discipline developed to support it. Thus the 
frail apparatus that the Wright brothers managed to get airbone for a few 
seconds in 1903 had very little well-understood ‘science’ behind its design, 
the promise of those early flying machines gave rise to the modern 
disciplines of aerodynamics and aeronautic engineering" (Nelson 1993, 7) 
 
Acknowledging the role of science and technology for innovation, stepping back 
from beliefs in magically-appearing creative explosions of radical innovation 
leaves us dismantled when analysing the ability of VoC to explain national 
innovation. While the majority of propositions on innovation arising from VoC 
can be rejected, it has been found that the relationship between coordination in 
terms of stakeholder orientation might be an explanation not for incremental 
innovation, but for an incremental approach to create a highly innovative national 
innovation system: the stepwise approach aims for a secure process to 
acknowledge the interests of diverse stakeholders in an attempt to achieve success 







9. CHAPTER NINE: CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS 
 
This concluding chapter illustrates the key findings raised by the research 
questions. In a second section, the theoretical and practical contributions which 
derive from the findings are discussed. In the third section, the limitations of this 
thesis are illustrated and used to illustrate future fields of research which are to be 
explored. A concluding remark closes this doctoral dissertation. 
 
9.1.  Key Findings 
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach is still of high relevance for 
discussions in the field of political economy (Lazonick 2007; Coffey and 
Thornley 2009; Coen 2010; Ebenau, Buff and May 2015). The discussions on the 
VoC approach have drifted away from the pure original propositions. However, 
the underlying assumption of liberalisation leading to increased performance in 
radical innovation continues to survive in political debates and industrial thinking. 
The past chapters of this dissertation have debated the research questions and 
developed an enhanced theoretical framework. Some important findings from the 
past empirical chapters are briefly described here, answering the research 
questions. This dissertation has focused on the question of institutional (non-)
change within the German market economy. In particular, the question of whether 





on radical trajectories of innovation is discussed in respect of the first two 
research questions: 
Research Question I: 
In what ways have the institutional foundations underlying the German 
NIS changed since reunification?  
 
Research Question II: 
 How do government policies and regulation affect the institutional 
 foundations of the German NIS? 
Following the identified assumption of liberalisation of CMEs, the typical CME, 
Germany, is expected to change its institutional framework and to liberalise over 
time. In order to evaluate this expectation, this doctoral dissertation analyses the 
institutional changes in the German labour market, skill formation, the job market 
as well as corporate governance and financial institutions. The question of 
institutional change gained relevance in the light of the global financial crisis. 
External pressure, due to crisis, was expected to enforce the assumed changes. It 
is found that, in terms of labour market policy, however, the government's policy-
making drifted away from a belief in employment creation as being the source of 
economic growth and low levels of unemployment, towardso R&D investment in 
innovation as a facilitator for economic growth and, with this, levels of 
employment. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the German labour market has 
not simply become more flexible. The past chapters illustrate the contradictory 
policy-making of different political parties, especially in terms of social policy 





Schröder. The later Schröder regime led to a re-organisation of the LM. A low pay 
sector was established. The regime of Angela Merkel, however, established a 
minimum wage. The German skill creation system is leading to increased 
numbers of general skills. Within the groups of university graduates, a further 
specialisation in science graduates is found. In this context, Germany is 
developing differently compared to other EU nations. This development might be 
due to the government’s active support for MINT. Looking at the job market, we 
find that increased numbers of science graduates end up in Germany’s r dically 
innovative sectors, such as biotech and software. Again, the government seems to 
play an important role in shaping the overall outlook of SMEs, which are 
dominating these new and emerging sectors. 
Following financial globalisation, Germany is expected to shift corporate 
governance activities towards a shareholder-oriented model. This expectation 
cannot be confirmed. Furthermore, government and employer associations in 
Germany appear to be interested in creating a stakeholder-oriented CG system. 
The distinct structure of German CG, which not only dominates stock listed firms 
but also large (more than 500 employees) GmbHs and other firms, is shaping 
German firms' attitudes towards employees, suppliers, and their surroundings. The 
institutional foundations of Germany have clearly changed since re-unification. 
Following this institutional change, they are still found to be of a coordinated 
nature. The institutional complementarity in terms of a re-enforcement within 
each other could be re-thought as a societal desire for safety, equality and long-
term relations. It is obvious within the political processes, that those political 





e.g. through lax unemployment protection, were quickly removed or not voted for 
in following elections (Kohl, Schröder). Thus, while employer associations were 
supporting the establishment of a low-pay sector in Germany, labor unions and 
wider society were not. The argument of VoC theory that corporations would 
control the welfare system in Germany and would re-enforce its mechanisms is 
more of a conspiracy theory. The approach can be extended by acknowledging the 
important role of labour unions in shaping economic development. As described 
by the Institute of German Industry, strong unions are important for bargaining 
coverage, whereas weak unions lead to weak coverage and thus to the intervention 
of the government in collective wage agreements for industries. Government law-
giving processes are much slower than labour unions. Therefore reform backlog 
often leads to aggression towards national governments (Lesch, 2017). These 
processes can be observed in the French case of labour market reforms initiated 
by president Macron in 2017 (Schubert 2017; Wagner 2017).  
This dissertation finds that corporations in Germany work in a 
stakeholder-oriented way, and widely accept the social and welfare system. 
Institutional (non-) change is influenced by policy-making. Political parties are 
influenced by democratic processes, and representatives of all sides of society. 
Following the first two research questions, the third question addresses the 
performance of German firms in radically innovative sectors: 
 
Research Question III: 
How does German capitalism perform in terms of firm capability to 





In order to answer this question, the biotech and software sectors in 
Germany were analysed as a first step. It is illustrated that even under the same 
conditions, using the same data in the same timeframe, Hall and Soskice (2001) 
could have come to different conclusions. The influence of innovation policy on 
sectoral developments is considered. The thesis finds that Germany’s performance 
from a comparative perspective is in a leading position in Europe. A wider 
comparison of Germany’s performance in high-tech sectors shows that the CME 
is outperforming all liberal market economies apart from the non-comparable 
USA. German firms are well able to prosper in the area of so-called radical 
innovation. The crucial case of a major example for a CME leading in radical 
innovation contradicts VoC theory. One more finding is that VoC scholars may 
well have discovered this at the time when the theory was established. The data 
source used by Hall and Soskice has been published in diverse articles and books 
previously. In the process of drawing the sectoral specialisation picture, the 
relevant scholars could have noted the good performance of Germany. Analytical 
and methodological flaws of the VoC approach have been found in this doctoral 
dissertation. 
To establish an influential theory of political economy is a lot like writing a 
sound melody that sticks in the listener’s brain forever. Therefore this thesis does 
not aim to completely dismiss the VoC approach, but the aim was to establish a 
re-think on the issue. German firms are not found to specialise in the production 
of radical innovation. A solid working middle class in Germany is employed in 
the traditional sectors. Therefore, it is important for economic growth and well-





German case, to keep and develop old industries while preparing and building 
future technologies. A stepwise approach to creating radical innovation is found in 
Germany. The difference between the innovation strategy of firms in achieving a 
product innovation and the production of innovation on a macro level is shown 
and the diverse concepts of disruptive, incremental, radical and stepwise 
innovation are illustrated.  
The last research question in this thesis is RQ IV:  
In what ways has the skill formation system in Germany oppressed or 
fostered radical trajectories of innovation in the country during the past 
three decades? 
Skill formation theory assumes a rational worker who follows imaginary rules of 
action due to a more or less liberal institutional foundation. These expectations 
were extensively discussed in this thesis. It is found that no rational worker exists. 
The influence of government policy on university education in Germany and in 
enforcing MINT degrees together with national innovation strategy illustrate the 
interacting and central role of skill equilibria and the emergence of new 
technological sectors. Skill formation plays a central role in the enhanced 
theoretical framework of this doctoral dissertation.  
 The findings of this dissertation do further suggest that a dichotomist 
framework for specialisation in innovation of nations does not exist. The 
reflectance of a mirroring innovation behavior brings us back to Adam Smith. A 
simple division of work (sector specialisation) cannot be found. VoC appears to 





variation of nations leading to variation in comparative economic advantage 
which did not and does not exist in this simplistic form. 
 
9.2.  Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
The chosen methodology for this thesis contributes to the ongoing discussion of 
comparative capitalism in several ways. This section reflects on the implications 
which can be derived from the chosen research strategy. It first reflects on the 
theoretical contributions from analysing different institutional spheres and their 
(non-) change due to government policy throughout the years. In a second step, it 
reflects on the use of the "VoC calculation" for the cases of German biotech and 
software. Theory and empirical findings led the analysis in chapter eight to a 
further focus on skill formation within the institutional foundations of Germany 
leading to radical innovation.  
 By taking an in-depth view on the institutional framework of the German 
CME, it is possible to discuss the propositions underlying the VoC approach. This 
thesis illustrates how the logic behind the reasoning of these propositions can be 
seen from a different angle. By analysing the impact of government policy on the 
German LMIs, it is obvious that social policy (described by VoC as employment 
and unemployment protection) have not been majorly implemented by WPRs but 
through democratic processes. The belief that social policy is desirable appears to 
be within the German culture/belief system of the individual.  
 The importance of government policy for institutional change is easily 
observable in this analysis within the German capitalist system. Different regimes 





social protection. Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the government 
focused more on corporate governance and financial institutions as well. The role 
of government for institutional change in Germany has been found to be of great 
relevance. Without a case-specific long-term view, these implications could not be 
drawn, as change would not be visible. The analysis of two so called radically 
innovative sectors left this thesis with a range of theoretical implications in 
relation to the VoC approach. Firstly, it was found that the theoretical construct 
built in the VoC literature could have drawn different conclusions from the start. 
A misleading image was established, which cannot easily be erased from one's 
mind. Instead, an attempt to enhance theory is made by differentiating between 
specialisation and actual performance. Germany is performing relatively well in 
so called radically innovative sectors – also in comparison with LMEs. Compared 
to other nations, the ability of firms to also produce patents in other sectors, 
however, is relatively high. It can be argued that the high-employment sectors of 
traditional industry are well developed in spite of Germany’s focus on new and 
emerging technologies. The findings of this dissertation suggest essential flaws in 
the empirical and analytical framework of Hall and Soskice’s introduction to the 
VoC approach. In the first instance, the given explanandum phenomenon of VoC 
bears a range of flaws: the data provided by the two authors describe a mirroring 
specialisation of product market activities in German and US firms in terms of 
patent applications to the EPO. Using extensive explanations in terms of thick 
description of multiple institutional frameworks of nations, this finding is further 
generalised. Briefly described liberalism is referred to as a source of radical 





the USA is an outlier in all terms. This thesis shows how a direct comparison of 
high-tech patent applications to the EPO illustrates the outlier position of the 
USA, even more so if viewed within the group of LMEs. A direct comparison 
with this national case is, therefore, potentially misleading in terms of further 
interpretation. This thesis further finds that the data basis of Hall and Soskice 
(2001, 42–43) is not as convincing as it actually pretends to be on first view. IN 
spite of a low specialisation of German patenting activities in emerging sectors, 
the actual patenting performance does not follow the expectation of a weak 
performance. This thesis illustrates how VoC could contribute from using the 
other side of this same data in building an alternative explanandum phenomenon. 
As expected according to the theory, this thesis briefly finds that the USA is 
highly specialised in applying for patents in emerging sectors. In contrast, 
Germany shows strong patenting behaviour in different sectors. National firms 
appear to be active in diverse areas, leaving them in a comparatively strong and 
highly competitive international position in emerging markets, but even more 
specialised in developing well established sectors. Simplifying this observation 
into the described explanandum of coordination leading to incremental innovation 
and/or a weak performance in radical innovation is incorrect. VoC theory 
contributes to a more complex view proposed in this thesis.  
 By conducting a short analysis of the way in which corporations in a 
traditional German industry (automobile) aim to foster radical innovation, this 
thesis illustrates the unique way in which German firms proceed stepwise in order 





thesis differentiates between radical, incremental, disruptive and stepwise 
innovation, as a theoretical contribution from this analysis.  
 Chapter eight illustrated how the changes in German skill formation 
influence changes in the German job market and potential high-tech employment. 
By re-thinking skill creation as an individual choice within a globalising system, 
the simplistic framework of VoC arguing for globalisation as a "pressure" needs 
to be re-thought. Moreover, an entirely different system of analysis in terms of a 
globalised skill creation system with MNCs as key players as rule makers 
emerges. The need for distinct associations of MNCs for value creation and for 
fostering government influence over social protection for employees emerges.  
 This thesis extensively discusses the institutional spheres of the German 
CME. Not only the observed institutional (non-) change but moreover the logic 
behind each interconnection with the creation of radical trajectories of innovation 
are discussed. As a theoretical contribution, the universal logic behind the 
explanations for radical innovation is questioned and re-thought. 
The paradoxical finding of comparatively strong activities of German 
firms in emerging sectors, with an even further specialisation of activities in 
established sectors, offers not only theoretical but also practical contributions. The 
national innovation management of Germany and other countries contributes in 
several instances to the findings of this dissertation.  
The case of Germany illustrates how innovation management on the 
national level does not attempt to make sectoral specialisation propser but overall 
economic wellbeing and overall economic growth. The goal of innovation 





well-being. Several aspects influence this goal. If a national framework 
continuously focuses on creating the skills needed for prospering in emerging 
sectors, it might well be argued that a large part of society is neglected. The 
German institutions illustrate how, even though there are shifts in skill 
development and economic activities, the traditional well-established sectors are 
continuously supported and further developed for the future, in order to keep 
societal prosperity and employment alive. The attempts of traditional German 
firms to follow a long-term, stakeholder-oriented path are well illustrated in the 
case of the German automobile sector. Traditional, well-established firms and 
partners are not left in order to create something new. In this case, even the old 
partners are drawn into the journey to create new technologies. This finding offers 
practical contributions for other national frameworks. The German example 
illustrates how new and emerging technologies can successfully be created in a 
capitalist country which has been called coordinated, social or a welfare country. 
There is more than one capitalist variety that can create economic growth, more 
than one innovation strategy in firms that can lead to success, more than one 
possible change in innovativeness due to changes in the labour market and skill 
equilibrium of a nation. 
 Additionally, the process of the success of radical innovation in Germany 
really is different from that in the UK/US. One of the most eye-catching issues is 
the average firm size. I argue that the different financial and corporate governance 
systems of the countries mediate between the skill-innovation framework and 
shape the different outlooks of success in radical innovation. I argue for more than 





 In spite of increased numbers of university graduates and highly 
innovative SMEs which produce a significant amount of radical innovation in 
Germany, these firms lack financial support for their further growth. To date, 
government policy focuses on start-ups, SMEs and easing business for the well-
established large employers represented by large lobbying associations and 
research institutes. The desperately needed financial support e.g. for average sized 
biotech firms, to compete with large UK firms, for example, is hardly available – 
neither through government support, nor through the bank-oriented financial 
system. Private investments are desperately needed by these firms. Therefore 
employer associations demand government to subvert these private investments to 
give private persons incentives to invest in medium-sized technology-oriented 
firms with high risk and long-term investments needed. Where international 
attention for German SMEs in the high-tech field is growing (CureVac and Bill 
and Melinda Gates foundation 2015; Ettel and Haseborg 2015), lots of firms are 
bought up by larger (especially US) firms, in which enough capital is available 
due to the very different financial system. My argument is not for liberalising 
Germany’s financial system but for increased government support for medium-
sized technology-oriented firms. Identifying national champions through 
competition and further supporting these would be one way.  
 A second practical implication is the following scenario. Due to a 
continuous focus on general, science-oriented skills and the overall demographic 
change, German angst focuses on the growing importance of university education 
together with severe demographic changes which are currently leading the 





2015; Fachkräftemangel in Deutschland: 'Blue Card' soll Ingenieure aus Fernost 
anlocken - Fachkräftemangel in Deutschland - FOCUS Online - Nachrichten 
2012; Tagesschau 2012). This is already visible in the national agency for work`s 
labour market statistics and is predicted to become severe in the next ten years. 
Large employer associations and the chambers of crafts (Handwerkskammern) in 
Germany have already entered public discussion on this point. The employer 
associations describe how firms already experience and fear a further lack of 
industry-specific skilled labour. As a result, the government and chambers of 
crafts are actively advertising German dual apprenticeship training, and trade 
unions are currently very active in raising wages for these employee groups. Thus 
an apprenticeship is to be made more attractive again. Following the theory, I 
would argue that industry-specific skills, which are developed by the German 
apprenticeship system, could be acquired by adjusting immigration law in terms 
of refugees being supported to acquire German language skills even faster, their 
applications being processed faster and finally being allowed to join the 
apprenticeship system with school degrees from other nations. A liberalisation of 
sector-specific skill creation would help. Compared to the government’s current 
focus on increasing a family and child friendly environment, such policy would 
more quickly increase the potential skilled labour in the field. Besides non-EU 
immigration (see Geis 2017a), eastern European workers are of increasing 
importance in the German labour market (Geis 2017b). The institute of German 
industry supports these claims by speaking out for more industry-based 





 In parallel, the government has already opened up immigration laws to 
high-skilled immigrants and university students and is discussing further openings 
since general skills are argued to be exchangeable and do not need to be produced 
within the German market economy. Here we come to high skills and high skill 
immigration as is visible in the US. o, in the long run, the German government 
should aim do develop high university standards (the government’s u iversity 
elite initiative is going in this direction – competition between universities), and 
aim to become more attractive for international highly skilled labour, not only for 
study but for living and working in Germany. 
 
9.3.  Limitations and Research Implications 
Several limitations of this dissertation and arising future fields of research exist. 
The used data which are provided by the R&D Scoreboard are limited to Europe’s 
1,000 largest R&D spenders. Mostly large firms are captured, and thus the results 
are limited to large firms. This became apparent as a problem when viewing the 
Japanese firms in the software sector since they were brought in a direct context 
with US firms. Selecting the 1,000 largest Japanese and EU firms would have 
brought more Japanese firms into the picture. A similar problem occurrs with the 
number of captured French and German firms. The sample size is small. Selected 
firms with high R&D investments were later compared by their annual net sales. 
Thus, where the data have legitimacy is in terms of large R&D spenders, in the 
sense that these firms would be the strongest ones in Europe; this assertion i  not 
legitimate in the context of such a small sample size for firms when judging their 





the context of this thesis, the sales and R&D data were only used in order to give a 
different data source to EPO data for comparison. For the purpose of a 
comparative outlook on the patent data measures, the limitations of R&D 
Scoreboards data were accepted. For further research, different sources of data 
would have to be considered. 
The blank differentiation of countries being “radical” innovators has to be 
re-thought. Every sector includes radical and incremental areas. As illustrated in 
this thesis, a nation contributes from fostering new and emerging sectors, but 
older sectors have their own rights and requirements for existence (e.g. 
employment). A differentiation between “new” sectors meaning sectors at the 
beginning of their life cycles and “older” sectors meaning those ones which have 
already reached a certain stage in their general life cycle and which are now 
characterised by more incremental improvements appear to make more sense. 
Still, older sectors might also strive for radical innovation. Future research needs 
to acknowledge the differences between a nation’s way of creating innovation and 
the result. Christensen's concept of disruptive innovation is often misinterpreted as 
the Schumpeterian view on the nature of a product or service. What Christensen 
means in his approach is to describe a firm`s strategies for innovation in order to 
enter a pre-existing market field. He does not talk about the degree or novelty so 
much as about the firm's ability to ease the entrance by lowering the burden to 
make a change from a pre-existing market field. In the context of comparative 
capitalism literature, a variety of ideas and contexts from the field of innovation 
research get mixed up and confused. Moreover, the institutional foundations of a 





innovation, one often excluding the other. This dissertation finds and implies, in 
existing approaches to comparative capitalism, the necessity of differentiating 
between innovation output (product or service), and innovation process (within 
the firm’s organisation) and the possibility of creating different levels of each of 
these within one national market. The institutional changes of a partially flexible 
labour market in Germany during the Hartz reforms have been shown as one 
example for the later creation of low pay but, on the other hand and 
simultaneously, an increase in general skills.  
In the sectoral studies, it is found that government support for each of the 
two sectors has differed significantly over the past 30 years. The two sectors’ 
performances, within the German economy but also in terms of international 
comparison, differ from each other. It has been found that the paradoxical political 
situation (supporting biotech and not fulfilling EU regulations; regarding biotech 
as equal to the atomic industry) in the 1990s had a negative influence on already 
existing larger firms which had the wish to expand, but could not (see example of 
Hoechst). Even though these different policy styles are very obvious and have, on 
their own, been described exhaustingly in Germany, to the knowledge of the 
author, the two sectors have not been viewed before in direct comparison with 
each other, and there are thus no cocnlusions about these differences yet in 
existence. Research on national innovation management should further aim to find 
out how industry-specific governmental support can best support emerging sectors 
within the traditional economic framework, opening new routes for entrepreneurs 





in Germany. A comparison of the effect of these different policies on emerging 
sectors would be of great interest. 
The view of humans as rational entities is found to underlie existing theory 
and appears to be a paradox. Human beings are, by nature, non-rational. It can be 
argued that humans, more or less, follow self-interest or might even like to see 
themselves in a better position than others, but these positions cannot be 
considered rational. Further research needs to address human emotions and 
cognitions. 
 There is, therefore, the need for a theory which combines the disciplines of 
macroeconomics and psychology –a field of economic psychology. The search for 
value systems underlying attempts to structure an economy by establishing 
institutions in certain ways would belong to this field. It is important to identify 
the value systems and beliefs underlying our actions in creating economic 
systems. Understanding human action and behaviour in different economic 
systems is of great interest and would enable us to reflect on the existing systems 
in different ways. A second topic of research within this field would be socio-
technical systems within a society. The emotional recognition of technological 
developments and their (non-) acceptance in society would be one area of interest 
here. Emotions play a huge role in industry and policy. Technological 
development not only fosters fears but also enhances the group feeling of 
societies. In terms of bringing people together for a common goal, the role of 
fighting climate change could, for example, take the place of a war against 





economic effects than “only” economic growth. Research in this area is 
recommended. As described by Wood and Bewster (2016): 
 "There are many different dimensions to national corporate governance 
 regimes, encompassing the legal, the political, the economic, and, indeed, 
 embedded patterns of social behaviour; there is much debate within the 
 literature as to which is the most important aspect of each" (Wood and 
 Bewster 2016, 249). 
 
 The (as Wood and Beswster call them) “patterns of social behavior” are an 
important issue which need further research, even though they might just be one 
of many dependent variables within an analysis.  
 
9.4.  Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has provided insights into how the coordinated institutional framework 
of Germany is supporting the emergence of new technological fields in Germany. 
The critical case studies of the software and biotech sectors which are presented 
here, two radically innovative sectors in the typical CME make several 
contributions to theory and practice. An enhanced theoretical framework for the 
creation of emerging technologies in the CME Germany is developed following 
the findings of this thesis. It has been found that a change within the institutional 
sphere of the labour market (Hartz reforms) resulted not only in the creation of a 
low-pay employment sector, but moreover might be the foundation brick for the 
further generalisation of skill equilibria in Germany. Government policy, e.g. in 
terms of fostering MINT degrees, was found to be of great importance for the 
further specialisation of the nation in these fields. The role of social and economic 
policy in terms of institutional change and direct sectoral development has been 





how firms can develop new technological fields, not only in LMEs but in the 
coordinated institutional framework of Germany. The term radical innovation for 
research in the area of innovation management is re-defined and differentiated 
from other concepts. 
This dissertation is of relevance for scholars and policy-makers in the field 
of innovation management. A focus is on institutional change and its influence on 
new and emerging technologies within a national framework. The role of skill 
creation for technological development is identified. The development of an 
image of a (non-) rational human in the context of fostering innovative 
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